Constructive Game Logic by Bohrer, Brandon & Platzer, André
Constructive Game Logic ?
Brandon Bohrer1 and André Platzer1,2
1 Computer Science Department, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA
{bbohrer,aplatzer}@cs.cmu.edu
2 Fakultät für Informatik, Technische Universität München, München, Germany
Abstract. Game Logic is an excellent setting to study proofs-about-
programs via the interpretation of those proofs as programs, because
constructive proofs for games correspond to effective winning strategies
to follow in response to the opponent’s actions. We thus develop Con-
structive Game Logic, which extends Parikh’s Game Logic (GL) with
constructivity and with first-order programs à la Pratt’s first-order dy-
namic logic (DL). Our major contributions include: 1. a novel realizability
semantics capturing the adversarial dynamics of games, 2. a natural de-
duction calculus and operational semantics describing the computational
meaning of strategies via proof-terms, and 3. theoretical results includ-
ing soundness of the proof calculus w.r.t. realizability semantics, progress
and preservation of the operational semantics of proofs, and Existential
Properties on support of the extraction of computational artifacts from
game proofs. Together, these results provide the most general account of
a Curry-Howard interpretation for any program logic to date, and the
first at all for Game Logic.
Keywords: Game Logic, Constructive Logic, Natural Deduction, Proof Terms
1 Introduction
Two of the most essential tools in theory of programming languages are program
logics, such as Hoare calculi [29] and dynamic logics [43], and the Curry-Howard
correspondence [17,31], wherein propositions correspond to types, proofs to func-
tional programs, and proof term normalization to program evaluation. Their
intersection, the Curry-Howard interpretation of program logics, has received
surprisingly little study. We undertake such a study in the setting of Game
Logic (GL) [38], because this leads to novel insights, because the Curry-Howard
correspondence can be explained particularly intuitively for games, and because
our first-order GL is a superset of common logics such as first-order Dynamic
Logic (DL).
Constructivity and program verification have met before: Higher-order con-
structive logics [16] obey the Curry-Howard correspondence and are used to
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develop verified functional programs. Program logics are also often embedded
in constructive proof assistants such as Coq [47], inheriting constructivity from
their metalogic. Both are excellent ways to develop verified software, but we
study something else.
We study the computational content of a program logic itself. Every funda-
mental concept of computation is expected to manifest in all three of logic, type
systems, and category theory [27]. Because dynamics logics (DL’s) such as GL
have shown that program execution is a first-class construct in modal logic, the
theorist has an imperative to explore the underlying notion of computation by
developing a constructive GL with a Curry-Howard interpretation.
The computational content of a proof is especially clear in GL, which gen-
eralizes DL to programmatic models of zero-sum, perfect-information games be-
tween two players, traditionally named Angel and Demon. Both normal-play and
misère-play games can be modeled in GL. In classical GL, the diamond modality
〈α〉φ and box modality [α]φ say that Angel and Demon respectively have a strat-
egy to ensure φ is true at the end of α, which is a model of a game. The difference
between classical GL and CGL is that classical GL allows proofs that exclude the
middle, which correspond to strategies which branch on undecidable conditions.
CGL proofs can branch only on decidable properties, thus they correspond to
strategies which are effective and can be executed by computer. Effective strate-
gies are crucial because they enable the synthesis of code that implements a
strategy. Strategy synthesis is itself crucial because even simple games can have
complicated strategies, and synthesis provides assurance that the implementa-
tion correctly solves the game. A GL strategy resolves the choices inherent in a
game: a diamond strategy specifies every move made by the Angel player, while
a box strategy specifies the moves the Demon player will make.
In developing Constructive Game Logic (CGL), adding constructivity is a
deep change. We provide a natural deduction calculus for CGL equipped with
proof terms and an operational semantics on the proofs, demonstrating the mean-
ing of strategies as functional programs and of winning strategies as functional
programs that are guaranteed to achieve their objective no matter what counter-
strategy the opponent follows. While the proof calculus of a constructive logic
is often taken as ground truth, we go a step further and develop a realizability
semantics for CGL as programs performing winning strategies for game proofs,
then prove the calculus sound against it. We adopt realizability semantics in
contrast to the winning-region semantics of classical GL because it enables us
to prove that CGL satisfies novel properties (Section 8). The proof of our Strat-
egy Property (Theorem2) constitutes an (on-paper) algorithm that computes a
player’s (effective) strategy from a proof that they can win a game. This is the
key test of constructivity for CGL, which would not be possible in classical GL. We
show that CGL proofs have two computational interpretations: the operational
semantics interpret an arbitrary proof (strategy) as a functional program which
reduces to a normal-form proof (strategy), while realizability semantics interpret
Angel strategies as programs which defeat arbitrary Demonic opponents.
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While CGL has ample theoretical motivation, the practical motivations from
synthesis are also strong. A notable line of work on dGL extends first-order GL
to hybrid games to verify safety-critical adversarial cyber-physical systems [42].
We have designed CGL to extend smoothly to hybrid games, where synthesis
provides the correctness demanded by safety-critical systems and the synthesis
of correct monitors of the external world [36].
2 Related Work
This work is at the intersection of game logic and constructive modal logics.
Individually, they have a rich literature, but little work has been done at their
intersection. Of these, we are the first for GL and the first with a proofs-as-
programs interpretation for a full first-order program logic.
Games in Logic. Parikh’s propositional GL [38] was followed by coalitional
GL [39]. A first-order version of GL is the basis of differential game logic dGL [42]
for hybrid games. GL’s are unique in their clear delegation of strategy to the proof
language rather than the model language, crucially allowing succinct game spec-
ifications with sophisticated winning strategies. Succinct specifications are im-
portant: specifications are trusted because proving the wrong theorem would not
ensure correctness. Relatives without this separation include Strategy Logic [15],
Alternating-Time Temporal Logic (ATL) [4], CATL [30], Ghosh’s SDGL [24],
Ramanujam’s structured strategies [44], Dynamic-epistemic logics [7,11,48], ev-
idence logics [10], and Angelic Hoare logic [35].
Constructive Modal Logics. A major contribution of CGL is our constructive
semantics for games, not to be confused with game semantics [1], which are used
to give programs semantics in terms of games. We draw on work in semantics
for constructive modal logics, of which two main approaches are intuitionistic
Kripke semantics and realizability semantics.
An overview of Intuitionistic Kripke semantics is given by Wijesekera [51].
Intuitionistic Kripke semantics are parameterized over worlds, but in contrast
to classical Kripke semantics, possible worlds represent what is currently known
of the state. Worlds are preordered by w1 ≥ w2 when w1 contains at least
the knowledge in w2. Kripke semantics were used in Constructive Concurrent
DL [52], where both the world and knowledge of it change during execution. A
key advantage of realizability semantics [37,33] is their explicit interpretation of
constructivity as computability by giving a realizer, a program which witnesses
a fact. Our semantics combine elements of both: Strategies are represented by
realizers, while the game state is a Kripke world. Constructive set theory [2] aids
in understanding which set operations are permissible in constructive semantics.
Modal semantics have also exploited mathematical structures such as: i) Neigh-
borhood models [9], topological models for spatial logics [8], and temporal log-
ics of dynamical systems [20]. ii) Categorical [3], sheaf [28], and pre-sheaf [23]
models. iii) Coalgebraic semantics for classical Propositional Dynamic Logic
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(PDL) [19]. While games are known to exhibit algebraic structure [25], such
laws are not essential to this work. Our semantics are also notable for the seam-
less interaction between a constructive Angel and a classical Demon.
CGL is first-order, so we must address the constructivity of operations that
inspect game state. We consider rational numbers so that equality is decidable,
but our work should generalize to constructive reals [12,13].
Intuitionistic modalities also appear in dynamic-epistemic logic (DEL) [21],
but that work is interested primarily in proof-theoretic semantics while we em-
ploy realizability semantics to stay firmly rooted in computation. Intutionistic
Kripke semantics have also been applied to multimodal System K with itera-
tion [14], a weak fragment of PDL.
Constructivity and Dynamic Logic. With CGL, we bring to fruition several past
efforts to develop constructive dynamic logics. Prior work on PDL [18] sought
an Existential Property for Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL), but they ques-
tioned the practicality of their own implication introduction rule, whose side
condition is non-syntactic. One of our results is a first-order Existential Prop-
erty, which Degen cited as an open problem beyond the methods of their day [18].
To our knowledge, only one approach [32] considers Curry-Howard or functional
proof terms for a program logic. While their work is a notable precursor to
ours, their logic is a weak fragment of PDL without tests, monotonicity, or un-
bounded iteration, while we support not only PDL but the much more powerful
first-order GL. Lastly, we are preceded by Constructive Concurrent Dynamic
Logic, [52] which gives a Kripke semantics for Concurrent Dynamic Logic [41],
a proper fragment of GL. Their work focuses on an epistemic interpretation of
constructivity, algebraic laws, and tableaux. We differ in our use of realizability
semantics and natural deduction, which were essential to developing a Curry-
Howard interpretation for CGL. In summary, we are justified in claiming to have
the first Curry-Howard interpretation with proof terms and Existential Proper-
ties for an expressive program logic, the first constructive game logic, and the
only with first-order proof terms.
While constructive natural deduction calculi map most directly to functional
programs, proof terms can be generated for any proof calculus, including a well-
known interpretation of classical logic as continuation-passing style [26]. Proof
terms have been developed [22] for a Hilbert calculus for dL, a dynamic logic
(DL) for hybrid systems. Their work focuses on a provably correct interchange
format for classical dL proofs, not constructive logics.
3 Syntax
We define the language of CGL, consisting of terms, games, and formulas. The
simplest terms are program variables x, y ∈ V where V is the set of variable
identifiers. Globally-scoped mutable program variables contain the state of the
game, also called the position in game-theoretic terminology. All variables and
terms are rational-valued (Q); we also write B for the set of Boolean values {0, 1}
for false and true respectively.
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Definition 1 (Terms). A term f, g is a rational-valued computable function
over the game state. We give a nonexhaustive grammar of terms, specifically
those used in our examples:
f, g ::= · · · | q | x | f + g | f · g | f/g | f mod g
where q ∈ Q is a rational literal, x a program variable, f+g a sum, f ·g a product.
Division-with-remainder is intended for use with integers, but we generalize the
standard notion to support rational arguments. Quotient f/g is integer even
when f and g are non-integer, and thus leaves a rational remainder f mod g.
Divisors g are assumed to be nonzero.
A game in CGL is played between a constructive player named Angel and a
classical player named Demon. Our usage of the names Angel and Demon differs
subtly from traditional GL usage for technical reasons. Our Angel and Demon
are asymmetric: Angel is “our” player, who must play constructively, while the
“opponent” Demon is allowed to play classically because our opponent need not
be a computer. At any time some player is active, meaning their strategy resolves
all decisions, and the opposite player is called dormant. Classical GL identifies
Angel with active and Demon with dormant; the notions are distinct in CGL.
Definition 2 (Games). The set of games α, β is defined recursively as such:
α, β ::= ?φ | x := f | x := ∗ | α ∪ β | α;β | α∗ | αd
In the test game ?φ, the active player wins if they can exhibit a constructive
proof that formula φ currently holds. If they do not exhibit a proof, the dormant
player wins by default and we informally say the active player “broke the rules”.
In deterministic assignment games x := f, neither player makes a choice, but
the program variable x takes on the value of a term f . In nondeterministic
assignment games x := ∗, the active player picks a value for x : Q. In the choice
game α ∪ β, the active player chooses whether to play game α or game β. In
the sequential composition game α;β, game α is played first, then β from the
resulting state. In the repetition game α∗, the active player chooses after each
repetition of α whether to continue playing, but loses if they repeat α infinitely.
Notably, the exact number of repetitions can depend on the dormant player’s
moves, so the active player need not know, let alone announce, the exact number
of iterations in advance. In the dual game αd, the active player becomes dormant
and vice-versa, then α is played. We parenthesize games with braces {α} when
necessary. Sequential and nondeterministic composition both associate to the
right, i.e., α∪β∪γ ≡ {α∪{β∪γ}}. This does not affect their semantics as both
operators are associative, but aids in reading proof terms.
Definition 3 (CGL Formulas). The set of CGL formulas φ (also ψ, ρ) is given
recursively by the grammar:
φ ::= 〈α〉φ | [α]φ | f ∼ g
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The defining constructs in CGL (and GL) are the modalities 〈α〉φ and [α]φ.
These mean that the active or dormant Angel (i.e., constructive) player has a
constructive strategy to play α and achieve postcondition φ. This paper does
not develop the modalities for active and dormant Demon (i.e., classical) players
because by definition those cannot be synthesized to executable code. We assume
the presence of interpreted comparison predicates ∼ ∈ {≤, <,=, 6=, >,≥}.
The standard connectives of first-order constructive logic can be derived from
games and comparisons. Verum (tt) is defined 1 > 0 and falsum (ff) is 0 > 1.
Conjunction φ ∧ ψ is defined 〈?φ〉ψ, disjunction φ ∨ ψ is defined 〈?φ∪?ψ〉tt,
implication φ → ψ is defined [?φ]ψ, universal quantification ∀xφ is defined
[x := ∗]φ, and existential quantification ∃xφ is defined 〈x := ∗〉φ. As usual in
logic, equivalence φ ↔ ψ can also be defined (φ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ). As usual in
constructive logics, negation ¬φ is defined φ → ff, and inequality is defined
by f 6= g ≡ ¬(f = g). We will use the derived constructs freely but present
semantics and proof rules only for the core constructs to minimize duplication.
Indeed, it will aid in understanding of the proof term language to keep the
definitions above in mind, because the proof terms for many first-order programs
follow those from first-order constructive logic.
For convenience, we also write derived operators where the dormant player
is given control of a single choice before returning control to the active player.
The dormant choice α∩ β, defined {αd ∪ βd}d, says the dormant player chooses
which branch to take, but the active player is in control of the subgames. We
write φ yx (likewise for α and f) for the renaming of x for y and vice versa in
formula φ, and write φfx for the substitution of term f for program variable x in
φ, if the substitution is admissible (Definition 9 in Section 6).
3.1 Example Games
We demonstrate the meaning and usage of the CGL constructs via examples,
culminating in the two classic games of Nim and cake-cutting.
Nondeterministic Programs. Every (possibly nondeterministic) program is also
a one-player game. For example, the program n := 0; {n := n+ 1}∗ can nonde-
terministically sets n to any natural number because Angel has a choice whether
to continue after every repetition of the loop, but is not allowed to continue
forever. Conversely, games are like programs where the environment (Demon) is
adversarial, and the program (Angel) strategically resolves nondeterminism to
overcome the environment.
Demonic Counter. Angel’s choices often must be reactive to Demon’s choices.
Consider the game c := 10; {c := c− 1 ∩ c := c− 2}∗; ?0 ≤ c ≤ 2 where Demon
repeatedly decreases c by 1 or 2, and Angel chooses when to stop. Angel only wins
because she can pass the test 0 ≤ c ≤ 2, which she can do by simply repeating
the loop until 0 ≤ c ≤ 2 holds. If Angel had to decide the loop duration in
advance, Demon could force a rules violation by “guessing” the duration and
changing his choices of c := c− 1 vs. c := c− 2.
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Coin Toss. Games are perfect-information and do not possess randomness in the
probabilistic sense, only (possibilistic) nondeterminism. This standard limitation
is shown by attempting to express a coin-guessing game:
{coin := 0 ∩ coin := 1}; {guess := 0 ∪ guess := 1}; ?guess = coin
The Demon player sets the value of a tossed coin, but does so adversarially,
not randomly, since strategies in CGL are pure strategies. The Angel player has
perfect knowledge of coin and can set guess equivalently, thus easily passing
the test guess = coin, unlike a real coin toss. Partial information games are
interesting future work that could be implemented by limiting the variables
visible in a strategy.
Nim. Nim is the standard introductory example of a discrete, 2-player, zero-
sum, perfect-information game. We consider misère play (last player loses) for
a version of Nim that is also known as the subtraction game. The constant Nim
defines the game Nim.
Nim =
{{{c := c− 1 ∪ c := c− 2 ∪ c := c− 3}; ?c > 0};{{c := c− 1 ∪ c := c− 2 ∪ c := c− 3}; ?c > 0}d}∗
The game state consists of a single counter c containing a natural number, which
each player chooses (∪) to reduce by 1, 2, or 3 (c := c− k). The counter is non-
negative, and the game repeats as long as Angel wishes, until some player empties
the counter, at which point that player is declared the loser (?c > 0).
Proposition 1 (Dormant winning region). Suppose c ≡ 1 (mod 4), Then
the dormant player has a strategy to ensure c ≡ 1 (mod 4) as an invariant. That
is, the following CGL formula is valid (true in every state):
c > 0→ c mod 4 = 1→ [Nim∗] c mod 4 = 1
This implies the dormant player wins the game because the active player
violates the rules once c = 1 and no move is valid. We now state the winning
region for an active player.
Proposition 2 (Active winning region). Suppose c ∈ {0, 2, 3} (mod 4) ini-
tially, and the active player controls the loop duration. Then the active player
can achieve c ∈ {2, 3, 4}:
c > 0→ c mod 4 ∈ {0, 2, 3} → 〈Nim∗〉 c ∈ {2, 3, 4}
At that point, the active player will win in one move by setting c = 1 which
forces the dormant player to set c = 0 and fail the test ?c > 0.
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Cake-cutting. Another classic 2-player game, from the study of equitable divi-
sion, is the cake-cutting problem [40]: The active player cuts the cake in two,
then the (initially-)dormant player gets first choice of a piece. This is an optimal
protocol for splitting the cake in the sense that the active player is incentivized
to split the cake evenly, else the dormant player could take the larger piece.
Cake-cutting is also a simple use case for fractional numbers. The constant CC
defines the cake-cutting game. Here x is the relative size (from 0 to 1) of the
first piece, y is the size of the second piece, a is the size of the active player’s
piece, and d is the size of dormant player’s piece.
CC =x := ∗; ?(0 ≤ x ≤ 1); y := 1− x;
{a := x; d := y ∩ a := y; d := x}
The game is played only once. The active player picks the division of the cake,
which must be a fraction 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. The dormant player then picks which slice
goes to whom.
The active player has a tight strategy to achieve a 0.5 cake share, as stated
in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 (Active winning region). The following formula is valid:
〈CC〉 a ≥ 0.5
The dormant player also has a computable strategy to achieve exactly 0.5
share of the cake (Proposition 4). Division is fair because each player has a
strategy to get their fair 0.5 share.
Proposition 4 (Dormant winning region). The following formula is valid:
[CC] d ≥ 0.5
Computability and Numeric Types. Perfect fair division is only achieved for a, d ∈
Q because rational equality is decidable. Trichotomy (a < 0.5∨a = 0.5∨a > 0.5)
is a tautology, so the dormant player’s strategy can inspect the active player’s
choice of a. Notably, we intend to support constructive reals in future work, for
which exact equality is not decidable and trichotomy is not an axiom. Future
work on real-valued CGL will need to employ approximate comparison techniques
as is typical for constructive reals [12,13,50]. The examples in this section have
been proven(AppendixC) using the calculus defined in Section 5.
4 Semantics
We now develop the semantics of CGL. In contrast to classical GL, whose seman-
tics are well-understood [38], the major semantic challenge for CGL is capturing
the competition between a constructive Angel and classical Demon. We base
our approach on realizability semantics [37,33], because this approach makes the
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relationship between constructive proofs and programs particularly clear, and
generating programs from CGL proofs is one of our motivations.
Unlike previous applications of realizability, games feature two agents, and
one could imagine a semantics with two realizers, one for each of Angel and
Demon. However, we choose to use only one realizer, for Angel, which captures
the fact that only Angel is restricted to a computable strategy, not Demon.
Moreover, a single realizer makes it clear that Angel cannot inspect Demon’s
strategy, only the game state, and also simplifies notations and proofs. Because
Angel is computable but Demon is classical, our semantics has the flavor both
of realizability semantics and of a traditional Kripke semantics for programs.
The semantic functions employ game states ω ∈ S where we write S for
the set of all states. We additionally write >,⊥ ∈ S (not to be confused with
formulas tt and ff) for the pseudo-states > and ⊥ indicating that Angel or
Demon respectively has won the game early by forcing the other to fail a test.
Each ω ∈ S maps each x ∈ V to a value ω(x) ∈ Q. We write ωvx for the state
that agrees with ω except that x is assigned value v where v ∈ Q.
Definition 4 (Arithmetic term semantics). A term f is a computable func-
tion of the state, so the interpretation [[f ]]ω of term f in state ω is f(ω).
4.1 Realizers
To define the semantics of games, we first define realizers, the programs which
implement strategies. The language of realizers is a higher-order lambda calculus
where variables can range over game states, numbers, or realizers which realize a
give proposition φ. Gameplay proceeds in continuation-passing style: invoking a
realizer returns another realizer which performs any further moves. We describe
the typing constraints for realizers informally, and say a is a 〈α〉φ-realizer (a ∈
〈α〉φRz) if it provides strategic decisions exactly when 〈α〉φ demands them.
Definition 5 (Realizers). The syntax of realizers a, b, c ∈ Rz (where Rz is
the set of all realizers) is defined coinductively:
a, b, c ::= x | () | (a, b) | piL(a) | piR(a) | (λω : S. a(ω)) | (Λx : Q. a)
| (Λx : φRz. a) | a v | a b | aω | if (f(ω)) a else b
where x is a program (or realizer) variable and f is a term over the state ω. The
Roman a, b, c should not be confused with the Greek α, β, γ which range over
games. Realizers have access to the game state ω, expressed by lambda realizers
(λω : S. a(ω)) which, when applied in a state ν, compute the realizer a with
ν substituted for ω. State lambdas λ are distinguished from propositional and
first-order lambdas Λ. The unit realizer () makes no choices and is understood
as a unit tuple. Units () realize f ∼ g because rational comparisons, in contrast
to real comparisons, are decidable. Conditional strategic decisions are realized
by if (f(ω)) a else b for computable function f : S → B, and execute a if f
returns truth, else b. Realizer (λω : S. f(ω)) is a 〈α ∪ β〉φ-realizer if f(ω) ∈
({0} × 〈α〉φRz) ∪ ({1} × 〈β〉φRz) for all ω. The first component determines
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which branch is taken, while the second component is a continuation which
must be able to play the corresponding branch. Realizer (λω : S. f(ω)) can also
be a 〈x := ∗〉φ-realizer, which requires f(ω) ∈ Q × (φRz) for all ω. The first
component determines the value of x while the second component demonstrates
the postcondition φ. The pair realizer (a, b) realizes both Angelic tests 〈?φ〉φ and
dormant choices [α ∪ β]φ. It is identified with a pair of realizers: (a, b) ∈ Rz×Rz.
A dormant realizer waits and remembers the active Demon’s moves, because
they typically inform Angel’s strategy once Angel resumes action. The first-order
realizer (Λx : Q. b) is a [x := ∗]φ-realizer when bvx is a φ-realizer for every v ∈ Q;
Demon tells Angel the desired value of x, which informs Angel’s continuation b.
The higher-order realizer (Λx : φRz. b) realizes [?φ]ψ when bcx realizes ψ for every
φ-realizer c. Demon announces the realizer for φ which Angel’s continuation b
may inspect. Tuples are inspected with projections piL(a) and piR(a). A lambda
is inspected by applying arguments aω for state-lambdas, a v for first-order,
and a b for higher-order. Realizers for sequential compositions 〈α;β〉φ (likewise
[α;β]φ) are 〈α〉〈β〉φ-realizers: first α is played, and in every case the continuation
must play β before showing φ. Realizers for repetitions α∗ are streams containing
α-realizers, possibly infinite by virtue of coinductive syntax. Active loop realizer
ind(x. a) is the least fixed point of the equation b = [b/x]a, i.e., x is a recursive
call which must be invoked only in accordance with some well-order. We realize
dormant loops with gen(a, x.b, x.c), coinductively generated from initial value
a, update b, and post-step c with variable x for current generator value.
Active loops must terminate, so 〈α∗〉φ-realizers are constructed inductively
using any well-order on states. Dormant loops must be played as long as the
opponent wishes, so [α∗]φ-realizers are constructed coinductively, with the in-
variant that φ has a realizer at every iteration.
4.2 Formula and Game Semantics
A state ω paired with a realizer a that continues the game is called a possibility.
A region (written X,Y, Z) is a set of possibilities. We write [[φ]] ⊆ φRz×S for
the region which realizes formula φ. A formula φ is valid iff some a uniformly
realizes every state, i.e., {a} ×S ⊆ [[φ]]. A sequent Γ ` φ is valid iff the formula∧
Γ → φ is valid, where ∧Γ is the conjunction of all assumptions in Γ .
The game semantics are region-oriented, i.e., they process possibilities in
bulk, though Angel commits to a strategy from the start. The region X〈〈α〉〉 :
℘(Rz × S) is the union of all end regions of game α which arise when ac-
tive Angel commits to an element of X, then Demon plays adversarially. In
X[[α]] : ℘(Rz×S) Angel is the dormant player, but it is still Angel who commits
to an element ofX and Demon who plays adversarially. Recall that pseudo-states
> and ⊥ represent early wins by each Angel and Demon, respectively. The defini-
tions below implicitly assume ⊥,> /∈ X, they extend to the case ⊥ ∈ X (likewise
> ∈ X) using the equations (X ∪ {⊥})[[α]] = X[[α]]∪{⊥} and (X ∪ {⊥})〈〈α〉〉 =
X〈〈α〉〉 ∪ {⊥}. That is, if Demon has already won by forcing an Angel violation
initially, any remaining game can be skipped with an immediate Demon victory,
and vice-versa. The game semantics exploit the Angelic projections Z〈0〉, Z〈1〉
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and Demonic projections Z[0], Z[1], which represent binary decisions made by
a constructive Angel and a classical Demon, respectively. The Angelic projec-
tions, which are defined Z〈0〉 = {(piR(a), ω) | piL(a)(ω) = 0, (a, ω) ∈ Z} and
Z〈1〉 = {(piR(a), ω) | piL(a)(ω) = 1, (a, ω) ∈ Z}, filter by which branch Angel
chooses with piL(a)(ω) ∈ B, then project the remaining strategy piR(a). The
Demonic projections, which are defined Z[0] ≡ {(piL(a), ω) | (a, ω) ∈ Z} and
Z[1] ≡ {(piR(a), ω) | (a, ω) ∈ Z}, contain the same states as Z, but project the
realizer to tell Angel which branch Demon took.
Definition 6 (Formula semantics). [[φ]] ⊆ Rz×S is defined as:
((), ω) ∈ [[f ∼ g]] iff [[f ]]ω ∼ [[g]]ω
(a, ω) ∈ [[〈α〉φ]] iff {(a, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ ([[φ]] ∪ {>})
(a, ω) ∈ [[[α]φ]] iff {(a, ω)}[[α]] ⊆ ([[φ]] ∪ {>})
Comparisons f ∼ g defer to the term semantics, so the interesting cases are
the game modalities. Both [α]φ and 〈α〉φ ask whether Angel wins α by following
the given strategy, and differ only in whether Demon vs. Angel is the active
player, thus in both cases every Demonic choice must satisfy Angel’s goal, and
early Demon wins are counted as Angel losses.
Definition 7 (Angel game forward semantics). We inductively define the
region X〈〈α〉〉 : ℘(Rz×S) in which α can end when active Angel plays X:
X〈〈?φ〉〉 = {(piR(a), ω) | (piL(a), ω) ∈ [[φ]] for some (a, ω) ∈ X }
∪ {⊥ | (piL(a), ω) /∈ [[φ]] for all (a, ω) ∈ X }
X〈〈x := f〉〉 = {(a, ω[[f ]]ωx ) | (a, ω) ∈ X}
X〈〈x := ∗〉〉 = {(piR(a), ωpiL(a)(ω)x ) | (a, ω) ∈ X}
X〈〈α;β〉〉 = (X〈〈α〉〉)〈〈β〉〉
X〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 = X〈0〉〈〈α〉〉 ∪X〈1〉〈〈β〉〉
X〈〈α∗〉〉 =
⋂
{Z〈0〉 ⊆ Rz×S | X ∪ (Z〈1〉〈〈α〉〉) ⊆ Z}
X〈〈αd〉〉 = X[[α]]
Definition 8 (Demon game forward semantics). We inductively define the
region X[[α]] : ℘(Rz×S) in which α can end when dormant Angel plays X:
X[[?φ]] = {(a b, ω) | (a, ω) ∈ X, (b, ω) ∈ [[φ]], some b ∈ Rz}
∪ {> | (a, ω) ∈ X, but no (b, ω) ∈ [[φ]]}
X[[x := f ]] = {(a, ω[[f ]]ωx ) | (a, ω) ∈ X}
X[[x := ∗]] = {(a r, ωrx) | r ∈ Q}
X[[α;β]] = (X[[α]])[[β]]
X[[α ∪ β]] = X[0][[α]] ∪X[1][[β]]
X[[α∗]] =
⋂
{Z[0] ⊆ Rz×S | X ∪ (Z[1][[α]]) ⊆ Z}
X[[αd]] = X〈〈α〉〉
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Angelic tests ?φ end in the current state ω with remaining realizer piR(a) if
Angel can realize φ with piL(a), else end in ⊥. Angelic deterministic assignments
consume no realizer and simply update the state, then end. Angelic nondeter-
ministic assignments x := ∗ ask the realizer piL(a) to compute a new value for x
from the current state. Angelic compositions α;β first play α, then β from the
resulting state using the resulting continuation. Angelic choice games α ∪ β use
the Angelic projections to decide which branch is taken according to piL(a). The
realizer piR(a) may be reused between α and β, since piR(a) could just invoke
piL(a) if it must decide which branch has been taken. This definition of Angelic
choice (corresponding to constructive disjunction) captures the reality that re-
alizers in CGL, in contrast with most constructive logics, are entitled to observe
a game state, but they must do so in computable fashion.
Repetition Semantics. In any GL, the challenge in defining the semantics of
repetition games α∗ is that the number of iterations, while finite, can depend
on both players’ actions and is thus not known in advance, while the DL-like
semantics of α∗ as the finite reflexive, transitive closure of α gives an advance-
notice semantics. Classical GL provides the no-advance-notice semantics as a
fixed point [38], and we adopt the fixed point semantics as well. The Angelic
choice whether to stop (Z〈0〉) or iterate the loop (Z〈1〉) is analogous to the case
for α ∪ β.
Duality Semantics. To play the dual game αd, the active and dormant players
switch roles, then play α. In classical GL, this characterization of duality is inter-
changeable with the definition of αd as the game that Angel wins exactly when
it is impossible for Angel to lose. The characterizations are not interchangeable
in CGL because the Determinacy Axiom (all games have winners) of GL is not
valid in CGL:
Remark 1 (Indeterminacy). Classically equivalent determinacy axiom schemata
¬〈α〉¬φ → [α]φ and 〈α〉¬φ ∨ [α]φ of classical GL are not valid in CGL, because
they imply double negation elimination.
Remark 2 (Classical duality). In classical GL, Angelic dual games are character-
ized by the axiom schema 〈αd〉φ ↔ ¬〈α〉¬φ, which is not valid in in CGL. It is
classically interdefinable with 〈αd〉 ↔ [α]φ.
The determinacy axiom is not valid in CGL, so we take 〈αd〉 ↔ [α]φ as primary.
4.3 Demonic Semantics
Demon wins a Demonic test by presenting a realizer b as evidence that the
precondition holds. If he cannot present a realizer (i.e., because none exists), then
the game ends in > so Angel wins by default. Else Angel’s higher-order realizer a
consumes the evidence of the pre-condition, i.e., Angelic strategies are entitled to
depend (computably) on how Demon demonstrated the precondition. Angel can
check that Demon passed the test by executing b. The Demonic repetition game
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α∗ is defined as a fixed-point [42] with Demonic projections. Computationally,
a winning invariant for the repetition is the witness of its winnability.
The remaining cases are innocuous by comparison. Demonic deterministic
assignments x := f deterministically store the value of f in x, just as Angelic
assignments do. In demonic nondeterministic assignment x := ∗, Demon chooses
to set x to any value. When Demon plays the choice game α∪β, Demon chooses
classically between α and β. The dual game αd is played by Demon becoming
dormant and Angel become active in α.
Semantics Examples. The realizability semantics of games are subtle on a first
read, so we provide examples of realizers. In these examples, the state argument
ω is implicit, and we refer to ω(x) simply as x for brevity.
Recall that [?φ]ψ and φ→ ψ are equivalent. For any φ, the identity function
(Λx : φRz. x) is a φ→ φ-realizer: for every φ-realizer x which Demon presents,
Angel can present the same x as evidence of φ. This confirms expected behavior
per propositional constructive logic: the identity function is the proof of self-
implication.
In example formula 〈x := ∗d; {x := x ∪ x :=−x}〉x ≥ 0, Demon gets to set x,
then Angel decides whether to negate x in order to make it nonnegative. It is
realized by Λx : Q. ((if (x < 0) 1 else 0), ()): Demon announces the value of
x, then Angel’s strategy is to check the sign of x, taking the right branch when
x is negative. Each branch contains a deterministic assignment which consumes
no realizer, then the postcondition x ≥ 0 has trivial realizer ().
Consider the formula 〈{x := x+ 1}∗〉x > y, where Angel’s winning strategy
is to repeat the loop until x > y, which will occur as x increases. The realizer
is ind(w. (if (x > y) (0, ()) else (1, w), ())), which says that Angel stops the
loop if x > y and proves the postcondition with a trivial strategy. Else Angel
continues the loop, whose body consumes no realizer, and supplies the inductive
call w to continue the strategy inductively.
Consider the formula [?x > 0; {x := x+ 1}∗]∃y (y ≤ x ∧ y > 0) for a subtle
example. Our strategy for Angel is to record the initial value of x in y, then
maintain a proof that y ≤ x as x increases. This strategy is represented by Λw :
(x > 0)Rz. gen((x, ((), w)), z.(piL(z), ((), piR(piR(z)))), z.z). That is, initially
Demon announces a proof w of x > 0. Angel specifies the initial element of the
realizer stream by witnessing ∃y (y ≤ x∧y > 0) with c0 = (x, ((), w)), where the
first component instantiates y = x, the trivial second component indicates that
y ≤ y trivially, and the third component reuses w as a proof of y > 0. Demon can
choose to repeat the loop arbitrarily. When Demon demands the k’th repetition,
z is bound to ck−1 to compute ck = (piL(z), ((), piR(piR(z)))), which plays the
next iteration. That is, at each iteration Angel witnesses ∃y (y ≤ x ∧ y > 0) by
assigning the same value (stored in piL(z)) to y, reproving y ≤ x with (), then
reusing the proof (stored in piR(piR(z))) that y > 0.
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5 Proof Calculus
Having settled on the meaning of a game in Section 4, we proceed to develop a
calculus for proving CGL formulas syntactically. The goal is twofold: the practical
motivation, as always, is that when verifying a concrete example, the realizabil-
ity semantics provide a notion of ground truth, but are impractical for proving
large formulas. The theoretical motivation is that we wish to expose the compu-
tational interpretation of the modalities 〈α〉φ and [α]φ as the types of the players’
respective winning strategies for game α that has φ as its goal condition. Since
CGL is constructive, such a strategy constructs a proof of the postcondition φ.
To study the computational nature of proofs, we write proof terms explicitly:
the main proof judgement Γ `M : φ says proof termM is a proof of φ in context
Γ , or equivalently a proof of sequent (Γ ` φ). We write M,N,O (sometimes
A,B,C) for arbitrary proof terms, and p, q, `, r, s, g for proof variables, that is
variables that range over proof terms of a given proposition. In contrast to the
assignable program variables, the proof variables are given their meaning by
substitution and are scoped locally, not globally. We adapt propositional proof
terms such as pairing, disjoint union, and lambda-abstraction to our context of
game logic. To support first-order games, we include first-order proof terms and
new terms for features: dual, assignment, and repetition games.
We now develop the calculus by starting with standard constructs and work-
ing toward the novel constructs of CGL. The assumptions p in Γ are named,
so that they may appear as variable proof-terms p. We write Γ yx and M
y
x for
the renaming of program variable x to y and vice versa in context Γ or proof
termM, respectively. Proof rules for state-modifying constructs explicit perform
renamings, which both ensures they are applicable as often as possible and also
ensures that references to proof variables support an intuitive notion of lexical
scope. Likewise Γ fx and Mfx are the substitutions of term f for program variable
x. We use distinct notation to substitution proof terms for proof variables while
avoiding capture: [N/p]M substitutes proof term N for proof variable p in proof
term M . Some proof terms such as pairs prove both a diamond formula and a
box formula. We write 〈M,N〉 and [M,N ] respectively to distinguish the terms
or 〈[M,N ]〉 to treat them uniformly. Likewise we abbreviate 〈[α]〉φ when the same
rule works for both diamond and box modalities, using [〈α〉]φ to denote its dual
modality. The proof terms 〈x := f yx in p. M〉 and [x := f yx in p. M ] introduce
an auxiliary ghost variable y for the old value of x, which improves completeness
without requiring manual ghost steps.
The propositional proof rules of CGL are in Figure 1. Formula [?φ]ψ is con-
structive implication, so rule [?]E with proof term M N eliminates M by sup-
plying an N that proves the test condition. Lambda terms (λp : φ. M) are
introduced by rule [?]I by extending the context Γ . While this rule is standard,
it is worth emphasizing that here p is a proof variable for which a proof term (like
N in [?]E) may be substituted, and that the game state is untouched by [?]I.
Constructive disjunction (between the branches 〈α〉φ and 〈β〉φ) is the choice
〈α ∪ β〉φ. The introduction rules for injections are 〈∪〉I1 and 〈∪〉I2, and case-
analysis is performed with rule 〈∪〉E, with two branches that prove a common
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〈∪〉E Γ ` A : 〈α ∪ β〉φ Γ, ` : 〈α〉φ ` B : ψ Γ, r : 〈β〉φ ` C : ψ
Γ ` 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : ψ
〈∪〉I1 Γ `M : 〈α〉φ
Γ ` 〈` ·M〉 : 〈α ∪ β〉φ
〈∪〉I2 Γ `M : 〈β〉φ
Γ ` 〈r ·M〉 : 〈α ∪ β〉φ
[∪]I Γ `M : [α]φ Γ ` N : [β]φ
Γ ` [M,N ] : [α ∪ β]φ
〈?〉I Γ `M : φ Γ ` N : ψ
Γ ` 〈M,N〉 : 〈?φ〉ψ
[?]I
Γ, p : φ `M : ψ
Γ ` (λp : φ. M) : [?φ]ψ
[?]E
Γ `M : [?φ]ψ Γ ` N : φ
Γ ` (M N) : ψ
[∪]E1 Γ `M : [α ∪ β]φ
Γ ` [pi1M ] : [α]φ
[∪]E2 Γ `M : [α ∪ β]φ
Γ ` [pi2M ] : [β]φ
hyp
Γ, p : φ ` p : φ
〈?〉E1 Γ `M : 〈?φ〉ψ
Γ ` 〈pi1M〉 : φ
〈?〉E2 Γ `M : 〈?φ〉ψ
Γ ` 〈pi2M〉 : ψ
Fig. 1. CGL proof calculus: Propositional rules
consequence from each disjunct. The cases 〈?φ〉ψ and [α ∪ β]φ are conjunctive.
Conjunctions are introduced by 〈?〉I and [∪]I as pairs, and eliminated by 〈?〉E1,
〈?〉E2, [∪]E1, and [∪]E2 as projections. Lastly, rule hyp says formulas in the
context hold by assumption.
We now begin considering non-propositional rules, starting with the simplest
ones. The majority of the rules in Figure 2, while thoroughly useful in proofs,
〈∗〉C Γ ` A : 〈α
∗〉φ Γ, s : φ ` B : ψ Γ, g : 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ ` C : ψ
Γ ` 〈case∗ A of s⇒ B | g ⇒ C〉 : ψ
M
Γ `M : 〈α〉φ Γ yBV(α) , p : φ ` N : ψ
Γ `M◦pN : 〈α〉ψ
[∗]E Γ `M : [α
∗]φ
Γ ` [unroll M ] : φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ
〈∗〉S Γ `M : φ
Γ ` 〈stop M〉 : 〈α∗〉φ
〈∗〉G Γ `M : φ ∨ 〈α〉〈α
∗〉φ
Γ ` 〈go M〉 : 〈α∗〉φ
〈[d]〉I Γ `M : [〈α〉]φ
Γ ` 〈[yield M ]〉 : 〈[αd]〉φ
[∗]R Γ `M : φ ∧ [α][α
∗]φ
Γ ` [roll M ] : [α∗]φ
〈[;]〉I Γ `M : 〈[α]〉〈[β]〉φ
Γ ` 〈[ι M ]〉 : 〈[α;β]〉φ
Fig. 2. CGL proof calculus: Some non-propositional rules
are computationally trivial. The repetition rules ([∗]E,[∗]R) fold and unfold the
notion of repetition as iteration. The rolling and unrolling terms are named in
analogy to the iso-recursive treatment of recursive types [49], where an explicit
operation is used to expand and collapse the recursive definition of a type.
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Rules 〈∗〉C,〈∗〉S,〈∗〉G are the destructor and injectors for 〈α∗〉φ, which are
similar to those for 〈α ∪ β〉φ. The duality rules (〈[d]〉I) say the dual game is proved
by proving the game where roles are reversed. The sequencing rules (〈[;]〉I) say a
sequential game is played by playing the first game with the goal of reaching a
state where the second game is winnable.
Among these rules, monotonicity M is especially computationally rich. The
notation Γ yBV(α) says that in the second premiss, the assumptions in Γ have
all bound variables of α (written BV(α)) renamed to fresh variables y for com-
pleteness. In practice, Γ usually contains some assumptions on variables that
are not bound, which we wish to access without writing them explicitly in φ.
Rule M is used to execute programs right-to-left, giving shorter, more efficient
proofs. It can also be used to derive the Hoare-logical sequential composition
rule, which is frequently used to reduce the number of case splits. Note that like
every GL, CGL is subnormal, so the modal modus ponens axiom K and Gödel
generalization (or necessitation) rule G are not sound, and M takes over much of
the role they usually serve. On the surface, M simply says games are monotonic:
a game’s goal proposition may freely be replaced with a weaker one. From a
computational perspective, Section 7 will show that rule M can be (lazily) elimi-
nated. Moreover, M is an admissible rule, one whose instances can all be derived
from existing rules. When proofs are written right-to-left with M, the normal-
ization relation translates them to left-to-right normal proofs. Note also that in
checking M◦pN, the context Γ has the bound variables α renamed freshly to
some y within N, as required to maintain soundness across execution of α.
Next, we consider first-order rules, i.e., those which deal with first-order pro-
grams that modify program variables. The first-order rules are given in Figure 3.
In 〈:∗〉E, FV(ψ) are the free variables of ψ, the variables which can influence
its meaning. Nondeterministic assignment provides quantification over rational-
〈[:=]〉I Γ
y
x
, p : (x = f y
x
) `M : φ
Γ ` 〈[x := f y
x
in p. M ]〉 : 〈[x := f ]〉φ (y fresh)
〈:∗〉I Γ
y
x
, p : (x = f y
x
) `M : φ
Γ ` 〈f y
x
:∗ p. M〉 : 〈x := ∗〉φ (y, p fresh, f comp.)
〈:∗〉E Γ `M : 〈x := ∗〉φ Γ
y
x
, p : φ ` N : ψ
Γ ` unpack(M,py. N) : ψ (y fresh, x /∈ FV(ψ))
[:∗]I Γ
y
x
`M : φ
Γ ` (λx : Q. M) : [x := ∗]φ (y fresh)
[:∗]E Γ `M : [x := ∗]φ
Γ ` (M f) : φfx
(φfx admiss.)
Fig. 3. CGL proof calculus: first-order games
valued program variables. Rule [:∗]I is universal, with proof term (λx : Q. M).
While this notation is suggestive, the difference vs. the function proof term
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(λp : φ. M) is essential: the proof term M is checked (resp. evaluated) in a state
where the program variable x has changed from its initial value. For soundness,
[:∗]I renames x to fresh program variable y throughout context Γ, written Γ yx .
This means that M can freely refer to all facts of the full context, but they
now refer to the state as it was before x received a new value. Elimination [:∗]E
then allows instantiating x to a term f . Existential quantification is introduced
by 〈:∗〉I whose proof term 〈f yx :∗ p. M〉 is like a dependent pair plus bound
renaming of x to y. The witness f is an arbitrary computable term, as always.
We write 〈f x :∗ M〉 for short when y is not referenced in M . It is eliminated in〈:∗〉E by unpacking the pair, with side condition x /∈ FV(ψ) for soundness. The
assignment rules 〈[:=]〉I do not quantify, per se, but always update x to the value
of the term f, and in doing so introduce an assumption that x and f (suitably
renamed) are now equal. In 〈:∗〉I and 〈[:=]〉I, program variable y is fresh.
〈∗〉I
Γ ` A : ϕ
p : ϕ, q :M0 =M  0 ` B : 〈α〉(ϕ ∧M0 M) p : ϕ, q :M = 0 ` C : φ
Γ ` for(p : ϕ(M) = A; q.B;C){α} : 〈α∗〉φ (M0 fresh)
[∗]I
Γ `M : J
p : J ` N : [α]J p : J ` O : φ
Γ ` (M rep p : J. N in O) : [α∗]φ
split Γ ` (split [f, g] ) : f ≤ g ∨ f > g
FP
Γ ` A : 〈α∗〉φ
s : φ ` B : ψ g : 〈α〉ψ ` C : ψ
Γ ` FP(A, s. B, g. C) : ψ
Fig. 4. CGL proof calculus: loops
The looping rules in Figure 4, especially 〈∗〉I, are arguably the most sophis-
ticated in CGL. Rule 〈∗〉I provides a strategy to repeat a game α until the
postcondition φ holds. This is done by exhibiting a convergence predicate ϕ and
termination metricM with terminal value 0 and well-ordering . Proof term A
shows ϕ holds initially. Proof term B guaranteesM decreases with every itera-
tion whereM0 is a fresh metric variable which is equal toM at the antecedent
of B and is never modified. Proof term C allows any postcondition φ which fol-
lows from convergence ϕ ∧M = 0. Proof term for(p : ϕ(M) = A; q.B;C){α}
suggests the computational interpretation as a for-loop: proof A shows the con-
vergence predicate holds in the initial state, B shows that each step reduces the
termination metric while maintaining the predicate, and C shows that the post-
condition follows from the convergence predicate upon termination. The game α
repeats until convergence is reached (M = 0). By the assumption that metrics
are well-founded, convergence is guaranteed in finitely (but arbitrarily) many
iterations.
A naïve, albeit correct, reading of rule 〈∗〉I saysM is literally some term f .
If lexicographic or otherwise non-scalar metrics should be needed, it suffices to
interpret ϕ andM0 M as formulas over several scalar variables.
Rule FP says 〈α∗〉φ is a least pre-fixed-point. That is, if we wish to show a
formula ψ holds now, we show that ψ is any pre-fixed-point, then it must hold as
18 B. Bohrer and A. Platzer
it is no lesser than φ. Rule loop is the well-understood induction rule for loops,
which applies as well to repeated games. Premiss O ensures loop supports any
provable postcondition, which is crucial for eliminating M in Lemma7. The elim-
ination form for [α∗]φ is simply [∗]E. Like any program logic, reasoning in CGL
consists of first applying program-logic rules to decompose a program until the
program has been entirely eliminated, then applying first-order logic principles
at the leaves of the proof. The constructive theory of rationals is undecidable
because it can express the undecidable [45] classical theory of rationals. Thus
facts about rationals require proof in practice. For the sake of space and since our
focus is on program reasoning, we defer an axiomatization of rational arithmetic
to future work. We provide a (non-effective!) rule FO which says valid first-order
formulas are provable.
FO
Γ `M : ρ
Γ ` FO[φ](M) : φ (exists a s.t. {a} ×S ⊆ [[ρ→ φ]], ρ, φ F.O.)
An effective special case of FO is split (Figure 4), which says all term comparisons
are decidable. Rule split can be generalized to decide termination metrics (M =
0∨M  0). Rule iG says the value of term f can be remembered in fresh ghost
variable x:
iG
Γ, p : x = f `M : φ
Γ ` Ghost[x = f ](p. M) : φ (x fresh except free in M,p fresh)
Rule iG can be defined using arithmetic and with quantifiers:
Ghost[x = f ](p. M) ≡ (λx : Q. (λp : (x = f). M)) f (FO[f = f ]())
What’s Novel in the CGL Calculus? CGL extends first-order reasoning with game
reasoning (sequencing [32], assignments, iteration, and duality). The combina-
tion of first-order reasoning with game reasoning is synergistic: for example,
repetition games are known to be more expressive than repetition systems [42].
We give a new natural-deduction formulation of monotonicity. Monotonicity is
admissible and normalization translates monotonicity proofs into monotonicity-
free proofs. In doing so, normalization shows that right-to-left proofs can be
(lazily) rewritten as left-to-right. Additionally, first-order games are rife with
changing state, and soundness requires careful management of the context Γ . In
the appendix (AppendixC), we use our calculus to prove the example formulas.
6 Theory: Soundness
Full versions of proofs outlined in this paper are given in the appendix (Ap-
pendixD). We have introduced a proof calculus for CGL which can prove win-
ning strategies for Nim and CC. For any new proof calculus, it is essential to
convince ourselves of our soundness, which can be done within several prominent
schools of thought. In proof-theoretic semantics, for example, the proof rules are
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taken as the ground truth, but are validated by showing the rules obey expected
properties such as harmony or, for a sequent calculus, cut-elimination. While we
will investigate proof terms separately (Section 8), we are already equipped to
show soundness by direct appeal to the realizability semantics (Section 4), which
we take as an independent notion of ground truth. We show soundness of CGL
proof rules against the realizability semantics, i.e., that every provable natural-
deduction sequent is valid. An advantage of this approach is that it explicitly
connects the notions of provability and computability! We build up to the proof
of soundness by proving lemmas on structurality, renaming and substitution.
Lemma 1 (Structurality). The structural rules W, X, and C are admissible,
i.e., the conclusions are provable whenever the premisses are provable.
W
Γ `M : φ
Γ, p : ψ `M : φ X
Γ, p : φ, q : ψ `M : ρ
Γ, q : ψ, p : φ `M : ρ C
Γ, p : φ, q : φ `M : ρ
Γ, p : φ ` [p/q]M : ρ
Proof summary. Each rule is proved admissible by induction onM . Observe that
the only premisses regarding Γ are of the form Γ (p) = φ, which are preserved
under weakening. Premisses are trivially preserved under exchange because con-
texts are treated as sets, and preserved modulo renaming by contraction as it
suffices to have any assumption of a given formula, regardless its name. The
context Γ is allowed to vary in applications of the inductive hypothesis, e.g., in
rules that bind program variables. Some rules discard Γ in checking the subterms
inductively, in which case the IH need not be applied at all.
Lemma 2 (Uniform renaming). LetM yx be the renaming of program variable
x to y (and vice-versa) within M , even when neither x nor y is fresh. If Γ `M
: φ then Γ yx `M yx : φ yx .
Proof summary. Straightforward induction on the structure of M . Renaming
within proof terms (whose definition we omit as it is quite tedious) follows
the usual homomorphisms, from which the inductive cases follow. In the case
that M is a proof variable z, then
(
Γ yx
)
(z) = Γ (z) yx from which the case
follows. The interesting cases are those which modify program variables, e.g.,
〈z := f wz in p. M〉. The bound variable z is renamed to z yx , while the auxiliary
variable w is α-varied if necessary to maintain freshness. Renaming then happens
recursively in M .
Substitution will use proofs of coincidence and bound effect lemmas.
Lemma 3 (Coincidence). Only the free variables of an expression influence
its semantics.
Lemma 4 (Bound effect). Only the bound variables of a game are modified
by execution.
Summary. By induction on the expression, in analogy to [?].
Definition 9 (Term substitution admissibility). For simplicity, we say φfx
(likewise for context Γ, term f, game α, and proof term M) is admissible if φ
binds neither x nor free variables of f .
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The latter condition can be relaxed in practice [?] to requiring φ does not
mention x under bindings of free variables.
Lemma 5 (Arithmetic-term substitution). If Γ ` M : φ and the substitu-
tions Γ fx , Mfx , and φfx are admissible, then Γ fx `Mfx : φfx.
Summary. By induction on M . Admissibility holds recursively, and so can be
assumed at each step of the induction. For non-atomicM that bind no variables,
the proof follows from the inductive hypotheses. For M that bind variables, we
appeal to Lemma3 and Lemma4.
Just as arithmetic terms are substituted for program variables, proof terms
are substituted for proof variables.
Lemma 6 (Proof term substitution). Let [N/p]M substitute N for p in M ,
avoiding capture. If Γ, p : ψ `M : φ and Γ ` N : ψ then Γ ` [N/p]M : φ.
Proof. By induction on M, appealing to renaming, coincidence, and bound ef-
fect. When substituting N for p into a term that binds program variables such
as 〈z := f yz in q. M〉, we avoid capture by renaming within occurrences of N
in the recursive call, i.e., [N/p]〈z := f yz in q. M〉 = 〈z := f yz in q. [N zy/p]M〉,
preserving soundness by Lemma2.
Soundness of the proof calculus exploits renaming and substitution.
Theorem 1 (Soundness of proof calculus). If Γ ` M : φ then (Γ ` φ) is
valid. As a special case for empty context ·, if · `M : φ, then φ is valid.
Proof summary. By induction onM . Modus ponens caseAB reduces to Lemma6.
Cases that bind program variables, such as assignment, hold by Lemma5 and
Lemma2. Rule W is employed when substituting under a binder.
We have now shown that the CGL proof calculus is sound, the sine qua non
condition of any proof system. Because soundness was w.r.t. a realizability se-
mantics, we have shown CGL is constructive in the sense that provable formulas
correspond to realizable strategies, i.e., imperative programs executed in an ad-
versarial environment. We will revisit constructivity again in Section 8 from the
perspective of proof terms as functional programs.
7 Operational Semantics
The Curry-Howard interpretation of games is not complete without exploring the
interpretation of proof simplification as normalization of functional programs.
To this end, we now introduce a structural operational semantics for CGL proof
terms. This semantics provides a view complementary to the realizability seman-
tics: not only do provable formulas correspond to realizers, but proof terms can
be directly executed as functional programs, resulting in a normal proof term.
The chief subtlety of our operational semantics is that in contrast to realizer exe-
cution, proof simplification is a static operation, and thus does not inspect game
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state. Thus the normal form of a proof which branches on the game state is, of
necessity, also a proof which branches on the game state. This static-dynamic
phase separation need not be mysterious: it is analogous to the monadic phase
separation between a functional program which returns an imperative command
vs. the execution of the returned command. While the primary motivation for
our operational semantics is to complete the Curry-Howard interpretation, proof
normalization is also helpful when implementing software tools which process
proof artifacts, since code that consumes a normal proof is in general easier to
implement than code that consumes an arbitrary proof.
The operational semantics consist of two main judgments:M normal says that
M is a normal form, whileM 7→M ′ says thatM reduces to termM ′ in one step
of evaluation. A normal proof is allowed a case operation at the top-level, either
〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 or 〈case∗ A of s⇒ B | g ⇒ C〉. Normal proofs M
without state-casing are called simple, written M simp. The requirement that
cases are top-level ensures that proofs which differ only in where the case was
applied share a common normal form, and ensures that β-reduction is never
blocked by a case interceding between introduction-elimination pairs. Top-level
case analyses are analogous to case-tree normal forms in lambda calculi with
coproducts [?]. Reduction of proof terms is eager.
Definition 10 (Normal forms). We say M is simple, written M simp, if
eliminators occur only under binders. We say M is normal, written M normal, if
M simp orM has shape 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 or 〈case∗ A of s⇒ B | g ⇒
C〉 where A is a term such as (split [f, g] M) that inspects the state. Subterms
B and C need not be normal since they occur under the binding of ` or r (resp.
s or g).
That is, a normal term has no top-level beta-redexes, and state-dependent
cases are top-level. We consider rules [∗]R, [:∗]I, [?]I, and 〈[:=]〉I binding. Rules
such as 〈∗〉I have multiple premisses but bind only one. While [∗]R does not
introduce a proof variable, it is rather considered binding to prevent divergence,
which is in keeping with a coinductive understanding of formula [α∗]φ. If we did
not care whether terms diverge, we could have made [∗]R non-binding.
For the sake of space, this section focuses on the β-rules (Figure 5). The full
calculus, given inthe appendix (AppendixA), includes structural and commuting-
conversion rules, as well as what we call monotonicity conversion rules: a proof
term M◦pN is simplified by structural recursion on M . The capture-avoiding
substitution of M for p in N is written [M/p]N (Lemma6). The propositional
cases λφβ, λβ, caseβL, caseβR, pi1β, and pi2β are standard reductions for ap-
plications, cases, and projections. Projection terms pi1M and pi2M should not
be confused with projection realizers piL(a) and piR(a). Rule unpackβ makes the
witness of an existential available in its client as a ghost variable.
Rule FPβ, repβ, and forβ reduce introductions and eliminations of loops.
Rule FPβ, which reduces a proof FP(A, s. B, g. C) says that if α∗ has already
terminated according to A, then B proves the postcondition. Else the inductive
step C applies, but every reference to the IH g is transformed to a recursive
application of FP. If A uses only 〈∗〉S and 〈∗〉G, then FP(A, s. B, g. C) reduces
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λφβ (λp : φ. M) N 7→ [N/p]M
λβ (λx : Q. M) f 7→Mfx
pi1β 〈[pi1〈[M,N ]〉]〉 7→M
pi2β 〈[pi2〈[M,N ]〉]〉 7→ N
caseβL 〈[case 〈[` ·A]〉 of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C]〉 7→ [A/`]B
caseβR 〈[case 〈[r ·A]〉 of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C]〉 7→ [A/r]C
unrollβ [unroll [roll M ]] 7→M
unpackβ unpack(〈f y
x
:∗ q. M〉, py. N) 7→ (Ghost[x = f y
x
](q. [M/p]N))x
y
FPβ FP(D, s. B, g. C) 7→ (〈case∗ D of s⇒ B | g ⇒ [(g◦zFP(z, s. B, g. C))/g]C〉)
repβ (M rep p : J. N in O) 7→ [roll 〈M, ([M/p]N)◦q(q rep p : J. N in O)〉]
forβ for(p : ϕ(M) = A; q.B;C){α} 7→
〈case split [M, 0] of
`⇒ 〈stop [(A, `)/(p, q)]C〉
| r ⇒ Ghost[M0 =M](rr. 〈go (([A, 〈rr, r〉/p, q]B)◦t(for(p : ϕ(M) = pi1t; q.B;C){α}))〉)〉
Fig. 5. Operational semantics: β-rules
to a simple term, else if A uses 〈∗〉I, then FP(A, s. B, g. C) reduces to a case.
Rule repβ says loop induction (M rep p : J. N in O) reduces to a delayed pair
of the “stop” and “go” cases, where the “go” case first shows [α]J, for loop in-
variant J, then expands J → [α∗]φ in the postcondition. Note the laziness of
[roll] is essential for normalization: when (M rep p : J. N in O) is understood
as a coinductive proof, it is clear that normalization would diverge if repβ were
applied indefinitely. Rule forβ for for(p : ϕ(M) = A; q.B;C){α} checks whether
the termination metricM has reached terminal value 0. If so, the loop 〈stop〉’s
and A proves it has converged. Else, we remember M’s value in a ghost term
M0, and 〈go〉 forward, supplying A and 〈r, rr〉 to satisfy the preconditions of
inductive step B, then execute the loop for(p : ϕ(M) = pi1t; q.B;C){α} in the
postcondition. Rule forβ reflects the fact that the exact number of iterations is
state dependent.
We discuss the structural, commuting conversion, and monotonicity conver-
sion rules for left injections as an example, with the full calculus in AppendixA.
Structural rule `·S evaluates term M under an injector. Commuting conversion
rule 〈[`·]〉C normalizes an injection of a case to a case with injectors on each
branch. Monotonicity conversion rule 〈[`·]〉◦ simplifies a monotonicity proof of an
injection to an injection of a monotonicity proof.
8 Theory: Constructivity
We now complete the study of CGL’s constructivity. We validate the operational
semantics on proof terms by proving that progress and preservation hold, and
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`·S M 7→M
′
〈[` ·M ]〉 7→ 〈[` ·M ′]〉
〈[`·]〉C 〈[` · 〈case A of p⇒ B | q ⇒ C〉]〉 7→ 〈case A of p⇒ 〈[` ·B]〉 | q ⇒ 〈[` · C]〉〉
〈[`·]〉◦ 〈[` ·M ]〉◦pN 7→ 〈[` · (M◦pN)]〉
Fig. 6. Operational semantics: structural, commuting conversion, monotonicity rules
thus the CGL proof calculus is sound as a type system for the functional pro-
gramming language of CGL proof terms.
Lemma 7 (Progress). If · ` M : φ, then either M is normal or M 7→ M ′ for
some M ′.
Summary. By induction on the proof term M . If M is an introduction rule, by
the inductive hypotheses the subterms are well-typed. If they are all simple, then
M simp. If some subterm (not under a binder) steps, thenM steps by a structural
rule. Else some subterm is an irreducible case expression not under a binder, it
lifts by the commuting conversion rule. If M is an elimination rule, structural
and commuting conversion rules are applied as above. Else by Definition 10 the
subterm is an introduction rule, and M reduces with a β-rule. Lastly, if M has
form A◦xB and A simp, then by Definition 10 A is an introduction form, thus
reduced by some monotonicity conversion rule.
Lemma 8 (Preservation). Let 7→ ∗ be the reflexive, transitive closure of the
7→ relation. If · `M : φ and M 7→ ∗M ′, then · `M ′ : φ
Summary. Induct on the derivation M 7→∗M ′, then induct on M 7→ M ′. The β
cases follow by Lemma6 (for base constructs), and Lemma6 and Lemma2 (for
assignments). C-rules and ◦-rules lift across binders, soundly by W. S-rules are
direct by IH.
We gave two understandings of proofs in CGL, as imperative strategies and
as functional programs. We now give a final perspective: CGL proofs support
synthesis in principle, one of our main motivations. Formally, the Existential
Property (EP) and Disjunction Property (DP) justify synthesis [18] for exis-
tentials and disjunctions: whenever an existential or disjunction has a proof,
then we can compute some instance or disjunct that has a proof. We state and
prove an EP and DP for CGL, then introduce a Strategy Property, their coun-
terpart for synthesizing strategies from game modalities. It is important to our
EP that terms are arbitrary computable functions, because more simplistic term
languages are often too weak to witness the existentials they induce.
Example 1 (Rich terms help). Formulas over polynomial terms can have non-
polynomial witnesses.
Let φ ≡ (x = y ∧x ≥ 0)∨ (x = −y ∧x < 0). Then f = |x| witnesses ∃y :Q φ.
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Lemma 9 (Existential Property). If Γ ` M : (∃x :Q φ) then there exists a
term f and realizer b such that for all (a, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]], we have (b a, ωf(ω)x ) ∈ [[φ]].
Proof. By Theorem1, the sequent (Γ ` ∃x :Q φ) is valid. Since (a, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]],
then by the definition of sequent validity, there exists a common realizer c such
that (c a, ω) ∈ [[∃x :Q φ]]. Now let f = piL(c a) and b = piR(c a) and the result is
immediate by the semantics of existentials.
Disjunction strategies can depend on the state, so naïve DP does not hold.
Example 2 (Naïve DP). When Γ ` M : (φ ∨ ψ) there need not be N such that
Γ ` N : φ or Γ ` N : ψ.
Consider φ ≡ x > 0 and ψ ≡ x < 1. Then · ` split [x, 0] () : (φ ∨ ψ), but
neither x < 1 nor x > 0 is valid, let alone provable.
Lemma 10 (Disjunction Property).When Γ `M : φ∨ψ there exists realizer
b and computable f, s.t. for every ω and a such that (a, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]], either
f(ω) = 0 and (piL(b), ω) ∈ [[φ]], else f(ω) = 1 and (piR(b), ω) ∈ [[ψ]].
Proof. By Theorem1, the sequent Γ ` φ ∨ ψ is valid. Since (a, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]],
then by the definition of sequent validity, there exists a common realizer c such
that (c a, ω) ∈ [[φ ∨ ψ]]. Now let f = piL(c a) and b = piR(c a) and the result is
immediate by the semantics of disjunction.
Following the same approach, we generalize to a Strategy Property. In CGL,
strategies are represented by realizers, which implement every computation made
throughout the game. Thus, to show provable games have computable winning
strategies, it suffices to exhibit realizers.
Theorem 2 (Active Strategy Property). If Γ `M : 〈α〉φ, then there exists
a realizer b such that for all ω and realizers a such that (a, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]], then
{(b a, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}.
Theorem 3 (Dormant Strategy Property). If Γ ` M : [α]φ, then there
exists a realizer b such that for all ω and realizers a such that (a, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]],
then {(b a, ω)}[[α]] ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}.
Summary. From proof term M and Theorem1, we have a realizer for formula
〈α〉φ or [α]φ, respectively. We proceed by induction on α: the realizer b a contains
all realizers applied in the inductive cases composed with their continuations that
prove φ in each base case.
While these proofs, especially EP and DP, are short and direct, we note that
this is by design: the challenge in developing CGL is not so much the proofs of
this section, rather these proofs become simple because we adopted a realizability
semantics. The challenge was in developing the semantics and adapting the proof
calculus and theory to that semantics.
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9 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we developed a Constructive Game Logic CGL, from syntax and re-
alizability semantics to a proof calculus and operational semantics on the proof
terms. We developed two understandings of proofs as programs: semantically,
every proof of game winnability corresponds to a realizer which computes the
game’s winning strategy, while the language of proof terms is also a functional
programming language where proofs reduce to their normal forms according to
the operational semantics. We completed the Curry-Howard interpretation for
games by showing Existential, Disjunction, and Strategy properties: programs
can be synthesized that decide which instance, disjunct, or moves are taken in
existentials, disjunctions, and games. In summary, we have developed the most
comprehensive Curry-Howard interpretation of any program logic to date, for a
much more expressive logic than prior work [32]. Because CGL contains construc-
tive Concurrent DL and first-order DL as strict fragments, we have provided a
comprehensive Curry-Howard interpretation for them in one fell swoop. The key
insights behind CGL should apply to the many dynamic and Hoare logics used
in verification today.
Synthesis is the immediate application of CGL. Motivations for synthesis
include security games [40], concurrent programs with demonic schedulers (Con-
current Dynamic Logic), and control software for safety-critical cyber-physical
systems such as cars and planes. In general, any kind of software program which
must operate correctly in an adversarial environment can benefit from game logic
verification. The proofs of Theorem2 and Theorem3 constitute an (on-paper)
algorithm which perform synthesis of guaranteed-correct strategies from game
proofs. The first future work is to implement this algorithm in code, providing
much-needed assurance for software which is often mission-critical or safety-
critical. This paper focused on discrete CGL with one numeric type simply be-
cause any further features would distract from the core features. Real applica-
tions come from many domains which add features around this shared core.
The second future work is to extend CGL to hybrid games, which provide
compelling applications from the domain of adversarial cyber-physical systems.
This future work will combine the novel features of CGL with those of the classical
logic dGL. The primary task is to define a constructive semantics for differential
equations and to give constructive interpretations to the differential equation
rules of dGL. Previous work on formalizations of differential equations [34] sug-
gests differential equations can be treated constructively. In principle, existing
proofs in dGL might happen to be constructive, but this does not obviate the
present work. On the contrary, once a game logic proof is shown to fall in the
constructive fragment, our work gives a correct synthesis guarantee for it too!
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A Full Proof Calculus
〈∪〉E Γ ` A : 〈α ∪ β〉φ Γ, ` : 〈α〉φ ` B : ψ Γ, r : 〈β〉φ ` C : ψ
Γ ` 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : ψ
〈∪〉I1 Γ `M : 〈α〉φ
Γ ` 〈` ·M〉 : 〈α ∪ β〉φ
〈∪〉I2 Γ `M : 〈β〉φ
Γ ` 〈r ·M〉 : 〈α ∪ β〉φ
[∪]I Γ `M : [α]φ Γ ` N : [β]φ
Γ ` [M,N ] : [α ∪ β]φ
〈?〉I Γ `M : φ Γ ` N : ψ
Γ ` 〈M,N〉 : 〈?φ〉ψ
[?]I
Γ, p : φ `M : ψ
Γ ` (λp : φ. M) : [?φ]ψ
[?]E
Γ `M : [?φ]ψ Γ ` N : φ
Γ ` (M N) : ψ
[∪]E1 Γ `M : [α ∪ β]φ
Γ ` [pi1M ] : [α]φ
[∪]E2 Γ `M : [α ∪ β]φ
Γ ` [pi2M ] : [β]φ
hyp
Γ, p : φ ` p : φ
〈?〉E1 Γ `M : 〈?φ〉ψ
Γ ` 〈pi1M〉 : φ
〈?〉E2 Γ `M : 〈?φ〉ψ
Γ ` 〈pi2M〉 : ψ
Fig. 7. CGL proof calculus: Propositional rules
iG
Γ, p : x = f `M : φ
Γ ` Ghost[x = f ](p. M) : φ (x fresh except free in M,p fresh)
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〈∗〉C Γ ` A : 〈α
∗〉φ Γ, s : φ ` B : ψ Γ, g : 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ ` C : ψ
Γ ` 〈case∗ A of s⇒ B | g ⇒ C〉 : ψ
[∗]E Γ `M : [α
∗]φ
Γ ` [unroll M ] : φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ
〈[d]〉I Γ `M : [〈α〉]φ
Γ ` 〈[yield M ]〉 : 〈[αd]〉φ
M
Γ `M : 〈α〉φ Γ yBV(α) , p : φ ` N : ψ
Γ `M◦pN : 〈α〉ψ
〈∗〉S Γ `M : φ
Γ ` 〈stop M〉 : 〈α∗〉φ
〈∗〉G Γ `M : 〈α〉〈α
∗〉φ
Γ ` 〈go M〉 : 〈α∗〉φ
[∗]R Γ `M : φ ∧ [α][α
∗]φ
Γ ` [roll M ] : [α∗]φ
〈[;]〉I Γ `M : 〈[α]〉〈[β]〉φ
Γ ` 〈[ι M ]〉 : 〈[α;β]〉φ
Fig. 8. CGL proof calculus: Non-propositional rules
B Full operational semantics
We recite the full operational semantics on proof terms here for reference. We
begin by reciting the language of proof terms.
Definition 11 (Proof terms). The proof termsM,N (sometimes A,B,C) are
given by the grammar:
M,N ::= λx : Q. M | M f | λp : φ. M | M N | 〈` ·M〉 | 〈r ·M〉
| 〈case∗ A of s⇒ B | g ⇒ C〉 | 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉
| for(p : ϕ(M) = A; q.B;C){α} | FP(A, s. B, g. C)
| M rep p : J. N in O | [unroll M ] | 〈stop M〉 | 〈go M〉
| 〈f yx :∗ p. M〉 | 〈[pi1M ]〉 | 〈[pi2M ]〉 | 〈[M,N ]〉 | 〈[ι M ]〉 | 〈[yield M ]〉
| 〈[x := f yx in p. M ]〉 | unpack(M,py. N) | M◦pN | FO[φ](M) | p
where p, q, `, r, s, and g are proof variables, that is variables that range over proof
terms of a given proposition. In contrast to the assignable program variables, the
proof variables are given their meaning by substitution and are scoped locally, not
globally.
We proceed with the β rules. The first-order simplification rules (e.g., FO∀β)
are not discussed in the main paper for the sake of simplicitiy. These rules enable
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〈:∗〉I Γ
y
x
, p : (x = f y
x
) `M : φ
Γ ` 〈f y
x
:∗ p. M〉 : 〈x := ∗〉φ (y, p fresh, f comp.)
〈[:=]〉I Γ
y
x
, p : (x = f y
x
) `M : φ
Γ ` 〈[x := f y
x
in p. M ]〉 : 〈[x := f ]〉φ (y fresh)
〈:∗〉E Γ `M : 〈x := ∗〉φ Γ
y
x
, p : φ ` N : ψ
Γ ` unpack(M,py. N) : ψ (y fresh, x /∈ FV(ψ))
[:∗]I Γ
y
x
`M : φ
Γ ` (λx : Q. M) : [x := ∗]φ (y fresh)
[:∗]E Γ `M : [x := ∗]φ
Γ `M f : φfx
(φfx admiss.)
Fig. 9. CGL proof calculus: first-order programs
〈∗〉I
Γ ` A : ϕ
p : ϕ, q :M0 =M  0 ` B : 〈α〉(ϕ ∧M0 M) p : ϕ, q :M = 0 ` C : φ
Γ ` for(p : ϕ(M) = A; q.B;C){α} : 〈α∗〉φ (M0 fresh)
loop
Γ `M : J p : J ` N : [α]J p : J ` O : φ
Γ ` (M rep p : J. N in O) : [α∗]φ
split Γ ` (split [f, g] ) : f ≤ g ∨ f > g
FP
Γ ` A : 〈α∗〉φ s : φ ` B : ψ g : 〈α〉ψ ` C : ψ
Γ ` FP(A, s. B, g. C) : ψ
Fig. 10. CGL proof calculus: loops
FO
Γ `M : ρ
Γ ` FO[φ](M) : φ (exists a, {a} ×S ⊆ [[ρ→ φ]], ρ, φ F.O.)
Dec
Γ `M : ρ
Γ ` (Dec[φ ∨ ψ](M)) : φ ∨ ψ (exists a, {a} ×S ⊆ [[ρ→ φ ∨ ψ]], ρ, φ, ψ F.O.)
Fig. 11. CGL proof calculus: first-order arithmetic
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λφβ (λp : P. M) N 7→ [N/x]M
λβ (λx : Q. M) f 7→Mfx
pi1β 〈[pi1〈[M,N ]〉]〉 7→M
pi2β 〈[pi2〈[M,N ]〉]〉 7→ N
caseβL 〈[case 〈[` ·A]〉 of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C]〉 7→ [A/`]B
caseβR 〈[case 〈[r ·A]〉 of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C]〉 7→ [A/r]C
unrollβ [unroll [roll M ]] 7→M
FO∀β FO[∀xφ](M) 7→ (λx : Q. FO[φ](M))
FO∧β FO[φ ∧ ψ](M) 7→ 〈[FO[φ](M),FO[ψ](M)]〉
FO∃β FO[∃xφ](M) 7→ 〈f y
x
:∗ p. FO[φ]([FO[f y
x
= f y
x
]()/p](M
(
f
y
x
)
x ))〉
FO∨β FO[φ ∨ ψ](M) 7→ 〈case piL(a) of `⇒ ` · FO[φ](M, `) | r ⇒ r · FO[ψ](M, r)〉
unpackβ unpack(〈f y
x
:∗ q. M〉, py. N) 7→ (Ghost[x = f y
x
](q. [M/p]N))x
y
FPβ FP(A, s. B, g. C) 7→ 〈case∗ A of s⇒ B | g ⇒ [(g◦zFP(z, s. B, g. C))/g]C〉
repβ (M rep p : J. N in O) 7→ [roll 〈M, ([M/p]N)◦q(q rep p : J. N in O)〉]
forβ for(p : ϕ(M) = A; q.B;C){α} 7→
〈case split [M, 0] of
`⇒ 〈stop [(A, `)/(p, q)]C〉
| r ⇒ Ghost[M0 =M](rr. 〈go (([A, 〈rr, r〉/p, q]B)◦t(for(p : ϕ(M) = pi1t; q.B;C){α}))〉)〉
Fig. 12. Operational semantics: β-rules
a simpler notion of normal forms. First-order non-syntactic proofs can be used
to provide a proof of arbitrary first-order facts. However, these rules show that
non-syntactic proofs need not be thought of as a normal form because they can
be simplified into normal proofs by inspection on the underlying realizer.
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λ◦ (λx : Q. M)◦qN 7→ (λx : Q. ([M/q]N))
[∧]◦ [A,B]◦qN 7→ [A◦p(N aa′ ), B◦p(N bb′ )]
〈∧〉◦ 〈A,B〉◦pN 7→ 〈A, [B/p]N〉
〈[`·]〉◦ 〈[` ·M ]〉◦pN 7→ 〈[` · (M◦pN)]〉
[d]◦ [yield M ]◦pN 7→ [yield (M◦pN)]
〈d〉◦ 〈yield M〉◦pN 7→ 〈yield (M◦pN)〉
λφ◦ (λp : P. M)◦qN 7→ (λp : P. ([M/q]N))
:∗◦ 〈f y
x
:∗ q. M〉◦pN 7→ 〈f yx :∗ q. [M/p]N〉
[ι◦] [ι M ]◦pN 7→ [ι (M◦q(q◦pN))]
〈ι◦〉 〈ι M〉◦pN 7→ 〈ι (M◦q(q◦pN))〉
〈[r·]〉◦ 〈[r ·M ]〉◦pN 7→ 〈[r · (M◦pN)]〉
〈:=◦〉 〈x := f y
x
in q. M〉◦pN 7→ 〈x := f yx in q. [M/p]N〉
[:=◦] [x := f y
x
in q. M ]◦pN 7→ [x := f yx in q. [M/p]N ]
case◦ 〈[case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C]〉◦pD 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ B◦pD | r ⇒ C◦pD〉
[∗]◦ [roll M ]◦pN 7→ [roll 〈(pi1M)◦p(N xy ), (pi2M)◦t(t◦pN)〉]
stop◦ 〈stop M〉◦pN 7→ 〈stop ([M/p](N aa′ ))〉
go◦ 〈go M〉◦pN 7→ 〈go (M◦qq◦pN)〉
Fig. 13. Operational semantics: monotonicity rules. When rule stop◦ is applied to
program α∗ then a = BV(α) and a′ is the vector of corresponding ghost variables
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pi1C pi1〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ pi1B | r ⇒ pi1C〉
pi2C pi2〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ pi2B | r ⇒ pi2C〉
∧C1 [〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉, N ] 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ [B,N ] | r ⇒ [C,N ]〉
∧C2 [M, 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉] 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ [M,B] | r ⇒ [M,C]〉
∧C1 〈〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉, N〉 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ 〈B,N〉 | r ⇒ 〈C,N〉〉
∧C2 〈M, 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉〉 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ 〈M,B〉 | r ⇒ 〈M,C〉〉
Fig. 14. Operational semantics: commuting conversion rules (contd.)
stopC 〈stop 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉〉 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ 〈stop B〉 | r ⇒ 〈stop C〉〉
goC 〈go 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉〉 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ 〈go B〉 | r ⇒ 〈go C〉〉
〈[`·]〉C 〈[` · 〈case A of p⇒ B | q ⇒ C〉]〉 7→ 〈case A of p⇒ ` ·B | q ⇒ ` · C〉
r·C 〈[r · 〈case A of p⇒ B | q ⇒ C〉]〉 7→ 〈case A of p⇒ r ·B | q ⇒ r · C〉
caseC
〈case∗ 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 of s⇒ D | g ⇒ E〉
7→〈case A of `⇒ 〈case∗ B of s⇒ D | g ⇒ E〉 | r ⇒ 〈case∗ C of s⇒ D | g ⇒ E〉〉
caseC
〈case 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 of `⇒ D | r ⇒ E〉
7→〈case A of `⇒ 〈case B of `⇒ D | r ⇒ E〉 | r ⇒ 〈case C of `⇒ D | r ⇒ E〉〉
Fig. 15. Operational semantics: commuting conversion rules (contd.)
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unrollC [unroll 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉] 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ [unroll B] | r ⇒ [unroll C]〉
repC
〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 rep p : J. N in O
7→〈case A of `⇒ (B rep p : J. N in O) | r ⇒ (C rep p : J. N in O)〉
forC
for(p : ϕ(M) = 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉; q.N ;O){α}
7→〈case A of `⇒ for(p : ϕ(M) = B; q.N ;O){α} | r ⇒ for(p : ϕ(M) = C; q.N ;O){α}〉
FPC
FP(〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉, s. D, g. E)
7→〈case A of `⇒ FP(B, s. D, g. E) | r ⇒ FP(C, s. D, g. E)〉
Fig. 16. Operational semantics: commuting conversion rules (contd.)
ιC 〈ι 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉〉 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ 〈ι B〉 | r ⇒ 〈ι C〉〉
ιC [ι 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉] 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ [ι B] | r ⇒ [ι C]〉
yieldC 〈yield 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉〉 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ 〈yield B〉 | r ⇒ 〈yield C〉〉
yieldC [yield 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉] 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ [yield B] | r ⇒ [yield C]〉
app1C 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 N 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ B N | r ⇒ C N〉
app2C M 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ M B | r ⇒ M C〉
appC 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 f 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ B f | r ⇒ C f〉
◦C 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉◦pN 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ (B◦pN) | r ⇒ (C◦pN)〉
tconsC
〈f y
x
:∗ p. 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉〉
7→〈case A of `⇒ 〈f y
x
:∗ p. B〉 | r ⇒ 〈f y
x
:∗ p. C〉〉
: ∗C unpack(〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉, py. N)7→〈case A of `⇒ unpack(B, py. N) | r ⇒ unpack(C, py. N)〉
Fig. 17. Operational semantics: commuting conversion rules (contd.)
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pi1S
M 7→M ′
〈[pi1M ]〉 7→ 〈[pi1M ′]〉
pi2S
M 7→M ′
〈[pi2M ]〉 7→ 〈[pi2M ′]〉
repS
M 7→M ′
(M rep p : J. N in O) 7→ (M ′ rep p : J. N in O)
unroll
M 7→M ′
[unroll M ] 7→ [unroll M ′]
[:*]S
M 7→M ′
M f 7→M ′ f
appS1
M 7→M ′
M N 7→M ′ N
[ι]S
M 7→M ′
〈[ι M ]〉 7→ 〈[ι M ′]〉
〈ι〉S M 7→M
′
〈[ι M ]〉 7→ 〈[ι M ′]〉
◦S M 7→M
′
M◦pN 7→M ′◦pN
`·S M 7→M
′
〈[` ·M ]〉 7→ 〈[` ·M ′]〉
r·S M 7→M
′
〈[r ·M ]〉 7→ 〈[r ·M ′]〉
[∧]S1 M 7→M
′
[M,N ] 7→ [M ′, N ]
〈∧〉S1 M 7→M
′
〈M,N〉 7→ 〈M ′, N〉
[∧]S2 M normal N 7→ N
′
[M,N ] 7→ [M,N ′]
〈∧〉S2 M normal N 7→ N
′
〈M,N〉 7→ 〈M,N ′〉
appS2
M normal N 7→ N ′
M N 7→M N ′
[d]S
M 7→M ′
[yield M ] 7→ [yield M ′]
〈d〉S M 7→M
′
〈yield M〉 7→ 〈yield M ′〉
forS
A 7→ A′
for(p : ϕ(M) = A; q.B;C){α} 7→ for(p : ϕ(M) = A; q.B;C){α}
FPS
A 7→ A′
FP(A, s. B, g. C) 7→ FP(A′, s. B, g. C)
caseS
A 7→ A′
〈[case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C]〉 7→ 〈[case A′ of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C]〉
: ∗S M 7→M
′
unpack(M,py. N) 7→ unpack(M ′, py. N)
Fig. 18. Operational semantics: structural rules
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C Example Proofs
Having developed a proof calculus, we are now equipped to verify the example
games of Section 3.1. We give proof terms for each player’s winning region in
Nim in Figure 19, likewise for cake-cutting in Figure 20. While we expect to pro-
vide additional tool support for practical proving, the natural deduction proofs
in this case are already surprisingly simple. Moreover, the examples serve to
demonstrate the typical usage of each construct and to confirm that the rules
are applicable to typical practical examples. By convention, in the examples,
we assume the proof variable for the fact introduced by assigning to a variable
named x is itself also named x.
aNim and dNim both give examples of typical convergence proofs, with a
subtle difference. In aNim, the invariant is c mod 4 6= 0, i.e., (c mod 4 = 0)→ ff,
so the invariant does not tell Angel which value c mod 4 assumes, only that it
would be a contradiction to take value 0. Thus Angel must inspect the state using
the law of excluded middle (which is constructive for equality tests on natural
numbers). For each case Angel picks the branch that ensures c mod 4 = 0.
The uses of M reduces the number of cases from 9 total to 3 for Angel and
3 for demon: Under the assumption (named mid) that c > 0 ∧ c mod 4 =
0, then all possible Demon choices restore the invariant, which we prove by
FO (automation, in practice). The dNim shows a similar strategy where the
dormant Angel mirrors Demon’s choices, but for the sake of demonstrating both
techniques, the monotonicity formula is a constructive disjunction, ie.., Demon
explicitly tells Angel which branch they took, which Angel then mirrors.
In aCake, Angel splits the cake evenly, which is their optimal strategy. Even
assuming Demon is entitled to nonconstructive strategies, whatever slice they
pick must be one of the two, both of which have size 0.5. In dCake, Demon
splits the cake according to an arbitrary strategy, then Angel inspects the value
of x to decide which slice to take. If x ≥ 0.5 then Angel takes it, else Angel takes
y. Angel has an optimal strategy because rationals can be compared exactly.
If we operated over constructive reals, Angel would not have exact optimality
because reals could not be compared exactly. They would, however, be allowed
to get arbitrarily close to optimal.
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Mid ≡ c > 0 ∧ c mod 4 ∈ {0, 2, 3} M ≡ c/4 ϕ ≡ (c > 0 ∧ c mod 4 ∈ {0, 2, 3})
aNim ≡ λnz : c > 0. λmod0 : (c mod 4 ∈ {1, 2, 3}).
for(cnv : ϕ(M) = 〈nz,mod0〉;mod; step){Nim}
step ≡ 〈ι 〈ι 〈case Dec[(c mod 4 = 3)]() of
`1 ⇒ 〈r · 〈` · 〈c := f c in FO[Mid](cnv, `1, c)〉〉〉
| r1 ⇒ 〈case Dec[(c mod 4 = 2)]() of
`2 ⇒ 〈` · 〈c := f c in FO[Mid](cnv, r1, `2, c)〉〉
| r2 ⇒ 〈r · 〈r · 〈c := f c in FO[Mid](cnv, r1, r2, c)〉〉〉〉〉
◦mid:Mid
〈FO[c > 0](mid), 〈yield [ι
[[c := f
c
in (λtest : c > 0. FO[ϕ ∧M0 M](mid , c))]
, [[c := f
c
in (λtest : c > 0. FO[ϕ ∧M0 M](mid , c))]
, [c := f
c
in (λtest : c > 0. FO[ϕ ∧M0 M](mid , c))]]]]〉〉〉〉
Mid ≡ c ≥ 0 ∧ (c mod 4 = 2 ∨ c mod 4 = 3 ∨ c mod 4 = 0)
M≡ c/4 ϕ ≡ (c > 0 ∧ c mod 4 = 1)
dNim ≡ λnz : c > 0. λmod0 : (c mod 4 = 1).
〈nz,mod〉 rep cnv : ϕ. step in cnv
step ≡ [ι ([ι
[[c := f
c
in (λtest : c > 0. FO[Mid](cnv, c, test))]
, [[c := f
c
in (λtest : c > 0. FO[Mid](cnv, c, test))]
, [c := f
c
in (λtest : c > 0. FO[Mid](cnv, c, test))]]])
◦mid:Mid
〈yield 〈case mid of
`1 ⇒ 〈` · 〈c := f c in 〈FO[c > 0](mid , `1, c),FO[ϕ ∧M <M0](mid , `1, c)〉〉〉
| r1 ⇒ 〈case r1 of
`2 ⇒ 〈r · 〈` · 〈c := f c in 〈FO[c > 0](mid , r1, `2, c),FO[ϕ ∧M0 M](mid , r1, `2, c)〉〉〉〉
| r2 ⇒ 〈r · 〈r · 〈c := f c in 〈FO[c > 0](mid , r1, r2, c),FO[ϕ ∧M0 M](mid , r1, r2, c)〉〉〉〉〉〉〉
Fig. 19. Proof terms for Nim example
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Mid ≡ x = 0.5 ∧ y = 0.5
aCake ≡ 〈0.5
x
:∗ 〈FO[0 < x < 1](), 〈y := f
y
in 〈FO[Mid](x, y),FO[Mid](x, y)〉〉〉〉
◦mid:Mid
〈yield [[yield 〈ι 〈a := f
a
in 〈d := f
d
in FO[a ≥ 0.5](a, x)〉〉〉]
, [yield 〈ι 〈a := f
a
in 〈d := f
d
in FO[a ≥ 0.5](a, x)〉〉〉]]〉
dCake ≡ λx : Q. λRange : (0 ≤ x ≤ 1).
([y := f
y
in FO[x+ y = 1](Range, y)])
◦mid:(x+y=1)[yield
〈case (split [x, 0.5] ) of
`⇒ ` · 〈yield [a := f
a
in [d := f
d
in FO[d ≥ 0.5](`, d,m,Range)]]〉
| r ⇒ r · 〈yield [a := f
a
in [d := f
d
in FO[d ≥ 0.5](r, d)]]〉〉]
Fig. 20. Proof terms for cake-cutting example
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D Theory Proofs
We give proofs regarding semantics, soundness, and progress and preservation.
D.1 Static semantics
We repeat the definitions of free variable FV(e), bound variable BV(α), and
must-bound variable MBV(α) computations which will be used throughout the
proofs. Free variables are those which might influence the expression. Bound
variables are those which could be modified during a game, and must-bound
variables are those which are modified on every path of a game. The definitions
are standard [?].
FV(f ∼ g) = FV(f) ∼ FV(g)
FV(〈α〉φ) = FV(α) ∪ (FV(φ) \MBV(α))
FV([α]φ) = FV(α) ∪ (FV(φ) \MBV(α))
FV(?φ) = FV(φ)
FV(x := f) = FV(f)
FV(x := ∗) = ∅
FV(α;β) = FV(α) ∪ (FV(β) \MBV(α))
FV(α ∪ β) = FV(α) ∪ FV(β)
FV(α∗) = FV(α)
FV(αd) = FV(α)
BV(?φ) = ∅
BV(x := f) = {x}
BV(x := ∗) = {x}
BV(α;β) = BV(α) ∪ BV(β)
BV(α ∪ β) = BV(α) ∪ BV(β)
BV(α∗) = BV(α)
BV(αd) = BV(α)
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MBV(?φ) = ∅
MBV(x := f) = {x}
MBV(x := ∗) = {x}
MBV(α;β) = MBV(α) ∪MBV(β)
MBV(α ∪ β) = MBV(α) ∩MBV(β)
MBV(α∗) = ∅
MBV(αd) = MBV(α)
D.2 Repetition
In classical GL, the challenge in defining the semantics of repetition games α∗ is
that the number of iterations, while finite, can depend on both players’ actions
and is thus not known in advance, while the DL-like semantics of α∗ as the finite
reflexive, transitive closure of α gives an advance-notice semantics. Classical GL
provides the no-advance-notice semantics as a fixed point [38], and we adopt
the fixed point semantics as well. Surprisingly, the fixed point semantics and
inflationary semantics agree with each other for CGL because Angel must fix a
computable strategy in advance. This results in a semantics with only Demonic
nondeterminism, reminiscent of Kripke semantics for DL.
Definition 12 (Inflationary CGL semantics). We define the k-step Angelic
and Demonic inflations recursively for k ∈ N, i.e.,
X〈〈α〉〉0 = X X〈〈α〉〉k+1 = (X〈〈α〉〉k)〈1〉〈〈α〉〉
X[[α]]
0
= X X[[α]]
k+1
= (X[[α]]
k
)〈1〉[[α]]
Remark 3 (Pre-inflation and post-inflation). Pre-inflation and post-inflation agree
in the following sense:
(X〈1〉〈〈α〉〉)〈〈α〉〉k = (X〈〈α〉〉k)〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 (X[1][[α]])[[α]]k = (X〈〈α〉〉k)[1][[α]]
Proof. Each claim is by induction on k.
Angel, case 0: (X〈1〉〈〈α〉〉)〈〈α〉〉0 = X〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 = ((X〈〈α〉〉0)〈1〉)〈〈α〉〉.
Angel, case k + 1:
Assume IH: (X〈1〉〈〈α〉〉)〈〈α〉〉k = ((X〈〈α〉〉k)〈1〉)〈〈α〉〉
Show: (X〈1〉〈〈α〉〉)〈〈α〉〉k+1 = ((X〈1〉〈〈α〉〉)〈1〉〈〈α〉〉)〈〈α〉〉k =IH ((X〈〈α〉〉)〈1〉〈〈α〉〉k)〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 =
(X〈〈α〉〉k+1)〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 as desired, completing the induction for Angel.
Demon, case 0: (X[1][[α]])[[α]]
0
= X[1][[α]] = (X[[α]]
0
)[1][[α]].
Demon, case k + 1:
Assume IH: (X[1][[α]])[[α]]
k
= ((X[[α]]
k
)[1])[[α]]
Show: (X[1][[α]])[[α]]
k+1
= (((X[1][[α]])[1])[[α]])[[α]]
k
=IH ((X[[α]])[1][[α]]
k
)[1][[α]] =
(X[[α]]
k+1
)[1][[α]] as desired, completing the induction for Demon.
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Lemma 11 (Alternative semantics). The CGL fixed-point definition of rep-
etition agrees with the inflationary definition:
X〈〈α∗〉〉 =
⋃
k∈N
(X〈〈α〉〉k)〈0〉 X[[α∗]] =
⋃
k∈N
(X[[α]]
k
)[0]
Proof. We show the set equality first for Angel by showing both directions of
inclusion, then likewise for Demon.
For Angel, let L = X〈〈α∗〉〉 = ⋂{Z〈0〉 | X ∪ Z〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ Z}. Let R =⋃
k∈NX〈〈α〉〉k〈0〉. First show L ⊆ R. Because L was defined inductively, it suf-
fices to show any show two cases: Case 1: X ⊆ L. Then X〈0〉 = X〈〈α〉〉0〈0〉 ⊆ R.
Case 2: Z〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ Z. By IH, assume some Z〈0〉 ⊆ R. Let Zi = Z ∩
X〈〈α〉〉k, then Z = ⋃i∈N Zi and suffices to show (since ·〈0〉 is monotone) that
Zi〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ R. This holds because (by Lemma20 first, then Remark 3) Zi〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 ⊆
X〈〈α〉〉k〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 = X〈〈α〉〉1+k = Zi+i. Then since
⋃
k∈N Z
i+1 =
⋃
k∈N Z
i = Z it fol-
lows that each Zi〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ R, as desired.
It may be surprising at first that Remark 3 holds because unlike in DL, the
formula 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ need not hold when the commuted formula 〈α∗〉〈α〉φ does.
However, Remark 3 does not refer to two different games, but to two characteri-
zations of the executions taken through a game α∗ by the same realizers given in
X. Likewise, may be surprising because the game α is also disequal to the game⋃
k∈N α
k and because fixed point constructions of winning regions in classical GL
can take infinitely many repetitions to converge. However, only claims something
simpler: once the strategies have been fixed (by X), it suffices to consider finite
executions according to those strategies, which is equally true in classical GL and
CGL.
We differ from the classical definition in that we require the termination
condition to be computable (piL(a b)), which gives a constructive interpretation
as shown by the elimination rule (FP in Section 5). We postulate that the closure
ordinal of CGL is exactly the Church-Kleene ordinal ωCK, which is only known
to be a lower bound for classical GL’s [42]. The Angelic choice whether to stop
(Z〈0〉) or iterate the loop (Z〈1〉) is analogous to the case for α ∪ β.
D.3 Soundness
Let e yx denote the renaming of x and y in e, (where e is term f formula φ, game
α, or realizer a).
Lemma 12 (Renaming is Self-dual). Renaming the same variables twice
cancels, because renaming is by transposition.
– f yx
y
x = f
– a yx
y
x = a
– φ yx
y
x = φ
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– α yx
y
x = α
– ω yx
y
x = ω
The first claim holds for any reasonable representation of computable func-
tions, and can be proved by induction on the example term constructors. The
next three claims are by induction, where the induction on formulas and games
is simultaneous. The last claim is direct.
Lemma 13 (Renaming). Renaming commutes with the interpretation func-
tions.
– [[f yx ]]ω = [[f ]]ω
y
x
– [[φ yx ]] = {(a yx , ω yx ) | (a, ω) ∈ [[φ]]}
– X yx 〈〈α yx 〉〉 = (X〈〈α〉〉) yx
– X yx [[α
y
x ]] = (X[[α]])
y
x
– a yx (ω) = a(ω
y
x )
Proof. For terms, this property holds of any reasonable representation of com-
putable functions. We give an inductive proof which handles the polynomial
cases from the paper. Formula and program cases are by simultaneous induction
on formulas and programs. Realizers are by a separate induction.
We give cases for term connectives. Any term language which supports the
renaming and substitution properties could be used; these cases are only exam-
ples.
Case q Have [[q yx ]]ω = [[q]]ω = q = [[q]]ω
y
x
Case x Have [[z yx ]]ω = ω(z
y
x ) = ω
y
x (z) = [[z]]ω
y
x
Case f+g Have [[(f + g) yx ]]ω = [[f
y
x ]]ω+[[g
y
x ]]ω = [[f ]]ω
y
x+[[g]]ω
y
x = [[f + g]]ω
y
x
Case f · g Have [[(f · g) yx ]]ω = [[f yx ]]ω · [[g yx ]]ω = [[f ]]ω yx · [[g]]ω yx = [[f · g]]ω yx
We give the formula cases.
Case f > g Have
[[f > g yx ]]
= {((), ω) | [[f yx ]]ω > [[g yx ]]ω}
= {((), ω) | [[f ]]ω yx > [[g]]ω yx}
= {((), ω yx ) | [[f ]]ω > [[g]]ω}
= [[f > g]] yx .
The cases for <,≤,=, 6=≥ are symmetric.
Case 〈α〉φ Have
[[〈α〉φ yx ]]
= {(a, ω) | {(a, ω)}〈〈α yx 〉〉 ⊆ [[φ yx ]] ∪ {>}}
= {(a, ω) | {(a yx , ω yx )}〈〈α〉〉 yx ⊆ [[φ]] yx ∪ {>}}
= {(a yx , ω yx ) | {(a, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 yx ⊆ [[φ]] yx ∪ {>}}
= {(a yx , ω yx ) | {(a, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}}
= [[〈α〉φ]] yx
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.
Case [α]φ Have
[[[α]φ yx ]]
= {(a, ω) | {(a, ω)}[[α yx ]] ⊆ [[φ yx ]] ∪ {>}}
= {(a, ω) | {(a yx , ω yx )}[[α]] yx ⊆ [[φ]] yx ∪ {>}}
= {(a yx , ω yx ) | {(a, ω)}[[α]] yx ⊆ [[φ]] yx ∪ {>}}
= {(a yx , ω yx ) | {(a, ω)}[[α]] ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}}
= [[[α]φ]] yx
.
We give the game cases for Angel.
Case x := f HaveX yx 〈〈{x := f} yx 〉〉 = X yx 〈〈y := (f yx )〉〉 = {(a, ω
[[f
y
x ]]ω
y ) | (a, ω) ∈
X yx} = {(a, ω
[[f ]]ω
y
x
y ) | (a, ω) ∈ X yx} = {(a yx , ω[[f ]]ωx ) | (a, ω) ∈ X} = X〈〈x := f〉〉 yx
Case x := ∗ Have X yx 〈〈{x := ∗} yx 〉〉 = X yx 〈〈y := ∗〉〉 = {(a, ω
a
y
x (ω)
y ) | (a, ω) ∈
X yx} = {(a, ω
a(ω
y
x )
y ) | (a, ω) ∈ X yx} = {(a yx , ω
a(ωyx)
x
y
x ) | (a, ω) ∈ X} = X〈〈x := ∗〉〉 yx
Case ?φ Have X yx 〈〈?φ yx 〉〉 = {(piR(a), ω) | (a, ω) ∈ X yx , (piL(a), ω) ∈ [[φ yx ]]} ={(piR(a), ω) | (a, ω) ∈ X yx , (piL(a) yx , ω yx ) ∈ [[φ]]} = {(piR(a), ω) | (a yx , ω yx ) ∈
X, (piL(a)
y
x , ω
y
x ) ∈ [[φ]]} = {(piR(a) yx , ω yx ) | (a, ω) ∈ X, (piL(a), ω) ∈ [[φ]]} =
X〈〈?φ〉〉 yx
Case α ∪ β Have X yx 〈〈α ∪ β yx 〉〉 = X〈0〉 yx 〈〈α yx 〉〉 ∪X〈1〉 yx 〈〈β yx 〉〉 = X〈0〉〈〈α〉〉 yx ∪
X〈1〉〈〈β〉〉 yx = X〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 yx
Case α;β Have X yx 〈〈α;β〉〉 = X yx 〈〈β〉〉〈〈α〉〉 = X〈〈β〉〉 yx 〈〈α〉〉 = X〈〈β〉〉〈〈α〉〉 yx
Case α∗ Have
X yx 〈〈α yx∗〉〉
=
⋂
Z〈0〉 | X yx ∪ Z〈1〉〈〈α yx 〉〉 ⊆ Z
=
⋂
Z〈0〉 | X yx ∪ Z〈1〉 yx 〈〈α〉〉 yx ⊆ Z
=
⋂
Z〈0〉 | X ∪ Z〈1〉 yx 〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ Z yx
=
⋂
Z〈0〉
y
x | X ∪ Z〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ Z
=
⋂
Z yx 〈0〉 | X ∪ Z〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ Z
= X〈〈α∗〉〉 yx
Case αd X yx 〈〈α yxd〉〉 = X yx [[α yx ]] = X[[α]] yx = X〈〈αd〉〉 yx
We give the game cases for Demon.
Case x := f Have X yx [[x := f
y
x ]] = X
y
x [[y := f
y
x ]] = {((), ω
[[f
y
x ]]ω
y ) | ((), ω) ∈
X yx} = {((), ω
[[f ]]ω
y
x
y ) | ((), ω) ∈ X yx} = {((), ω
[[f ]]ω
y
x
y ) | ((), ω yx ) ∈ X} =
{((), ω yx [[f ]]ωy ) | ((), ω) ∈ X} = {((), ω
[[f ]]ω
x
y
x ) | ((), ω) ∈ X} = X[[x := f ]] yx
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Case x := ∗ Have X yx [[x := ∗ yx ]] = X yx [[y := ∗]] = {ωry | ω ∈ X yx , exists r ∈
Q} = {ωrx yx | ω ∈ X, exists r ∈ Q} = X[[x := ∗]] yx
Case ?φHaveX yx [[?φ
y
x ]] = {(a b, ω) | (a, ω) ∈ X yx , (b, ω) ∈ [[φ yx ]]} = {(a b, ω) | (a yx , ω yx ) ∈
X, (b yx , ω
y
x ) ∈ [[φ]]} = {(a b yx , ω yx ) | (a, ω) ∈ X, (b, ω) ∈ [[φ]]} = X[[?φ]] yx
Case α ∪ β Have X yx [[α ∪ β yx ]] = X yx [0][[α yx ]] ∪ X yx [1][[β yx ]] = X[0] yx [[α yx ]] ∪
X[1]
y
x [[β
y
x ]] = X[0][[α]]
y
x ∪X[1][[β]] yx = X[0][[α]] ∪X[1][[β]] yx = X[[α ∪ β]] yx
Case α;β Have X yx [[α
y
x ;β
y
x ]] = X
y
x [[β
y
x ]][[α
y
x ]] = X[[β]]
y
x [[α
y
x ]] = X[[β]][[α]]
y
x
Case α∗ Have
X yx [[α
y
x
∗
]]
=
⋂
Z[0] | X yx ∪ Z[1][[α yx ]] ⊆ Z
=
⋂
Z[0] | X yx ∪ Z[1] yx [[α]] yx ⊆ Z
=
⋂
Z[0] | X ∪ Z[1] yx [[α]] ⊆ Z yx
=
⋂
Z[0]
y
x | X ∪ Z[1][[α]] ⊆ Z
=
⋂
Z yx [0] | X ∪ Z[1][[α]] ⊆ Z
= X[[α∗]] yx
Case αd X yx [[α
y
x
d
]] = X yx 〈〈α yx 〉〉 = X〈〈α〉〉 yx = X[[αd]] yx
We give the cases for realizers.
Case z: Have z yx (ω) = z(ω
y
x ) by definition of renaming on realizer variables.
Case f : Have f yx (ω) = f(ω
y
x by IH on terms.
Case piL(a): Have piL(a) yx (ω) = piL(a
y
x )(ω) = piL(a
y
x (ω)) = piL(a(ω
y
x )) =
piL(a)(ω
y
x )
Case piR(a): Have piR(a) yx (ω) = piR(a
y
x )(ω) = piR(a
y
x (ω)) = piR(a(ω
y
x )) =
piR(a)(ω
y
x )
Case (): Have () yx (ω) = ()(ω) = unit = ()(ω
y
x )
Case (a, b)Have ((a, b)) yx (ω) = (a
y
x , b
y
x )(ω) = (a
y
x (ω), b
y
x (ω) = (a(ω
y
x ), b(ω
y
x )) =
(a, b)(ω yx )
Case (λν : S. a) Have (λν : S. a) yx (ω) = (λν : S. a
ν
y
x
ν (ω)) = a
ω
y
x
ν = (λν :
S. a(ω yx ))
Case (Λz : Q. a)Have (Λz : Q. a) yx (ω) = (Λz : Q. a
y
x (ω)) = (Λz : Q. a(ω
y
x )) =
(Λz : Q. a(ω)(ω yx ))
Case (Λz : φRz. a) Have that (Λz : φRz. a) yx (ω) = (Λz : φRz. a yx (ω)) =
(Λz : φRz. a(ω yx )) = (Λz : φRz. a(ω)(ω yx ))
Lemma 14 (Suitable substitutes). The realizer a is suitable for α iff σ(a)
is suitable for σ(α).
Proof. By induction on α with separate cases for Demon and Angel suitability.
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Definition 13 (Substitution adjoints). We write σ for any substitution ·fx.
For any region X, we write σ∗(X) for the adjoint region which applies substitu-
tion σ to every possibility in X. We write σ(e) for the result of substituting σ in
expression e, which could be a term f, formula φ, game α, or realizer a.
Lemma 15 (Substitution distributes over unions). For all regions A and
B have σ∗((A ∪B)) = σ∗(A) ∪ σ∗(B)
Proof. Follows from σ(a)(ω) = a(σ∗(ω)).
Lemma 16 (Expression substitution). If the substitution σ is admissible,
then:
– σ(a)(ω) = a(σ∗(ω))
– [[σ(f)]]ω = [[f ]]σ∗(ω)
– (a, ω) ∈ X[[σ(α)]] iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ σ∗(X)[[α]]
– (a, ω) ∈ X〈〈σ(α)〉〉 iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ σ∗(X)〈〈α〉〉
– (a, ω) ∈ [[σ(φ)]] iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ [[φ]]
Proof. We give the realizer cases.
Case () Have σ(())(ω) = ()(ω) = unit = ()(σ∗(ω))
Case x Have σ(x)(ω) = x(ω) = x(σ∗(ω)) by definition of substitution on
realizer variables.
Case f Have σ(f)(ω) = [[σ(f)]]ω = [[f ]]σ∗(ω) = f(σ∗(ω)) by term IH.
Case piL(a)Have σ(piL(a))(ω) = piL(σ(a))(ω) = piL(σ(a)(ω)) = piL(a(σ∗(ω))) =
piL(a)(σ
∗(ω))
Case piR(a)Have σ(piR(a))(ω) = piR(σ(a))(ω) = piR(σ(a)(ω)) = piR(a(σ∗(ω))) =
piR(a)(σ
∗(ω))
Case (a, b)We have that σ((a, b))(ω) = (σ(a), σ(b))(ω) = (σ(a)(ω), σ(b)(ω)) =
(a(σ∗(ω)), b(σ∗(ω))) = (a, b)(σ∗(ω))
Case (λx : S. a) We have σ(λx : S. a)(ω) = (λx : S. σ(a))(ω) = σ(a)ωx =
a
σ∗(ω)
x = (λx : S. a)(σ∗(ω))
Case (Λx : Q. a)We reason by equality: σ(Λx : Q. a)(ω) = (Λx : Q. σ(a))(ω) =
(Λx : Q. σ(a)ωy ) = (Λx : Q. a
σ∗(ω)
y = (Λx : Q. a)(σ∗(ω))
Case Λx : φRz. a We have σ(Λx : φRz. a)(ω) = (Λx : φRz. σ(a))(ω) =
(Λx : φRz. σ(a)ωy ) = (Λx : φRz. aσ
∗(ω)
y = (Λx : φRz. a)(σ∗(ω))
For terms, we give an inductive proof handling the polynomial cases from the
paper. The claim for terms will hold for any reasonable definition of computable
functions.
Case q Have [[σ(q)]]ω = q = [[q]]σ∗(ω)
Case x Have [[σ(x)]]ω = ω(σ(x)) = ω(x) = σ∗(ω)(x) = [[x]]σ∗(ω) in the case
x /∈ BV(σ) or [[σ(x)]]ω = [[fi]]ω = σ∗(ω)(x) = [[x]]σ∗(ω) if x ∈ BV(σ).
Case f + g Have [[σ(f + g)]]ω = [[σ(f) + σ(g)]]ω = [[σ(f)]]ω + [[σ(g)]]ω =
[[f ]]σ∗(ω) + [[g]]σ∗(ω) = [[f + g]]σ∗(ω)
Case f ·g Have [[σ(f · g)]]ω = [[σ(f) · σ(g)]]ω = [[σ(f)]]ω · [[σ(g)]]ω = [[f ]]σ∗(ω) ·
[[g]]σ∗(ω) = [[f · g]]σ∗(ω)
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We give the Angel cases.
Case x := f Have (a, ω) ∈ X〈〈σ(x := f)〉〉 iff (a, ω) ∈ X〈〈x := σ(f)〉〉 iff ω =
ν
[[σ(f)]]ω
x for some (a, ν) ∈ X iff ω = ν[[σ(f)]]ωx for some (a, σ∗(ν)) ∈ σ∗(X) iff
ω = ν
[[f ]]σ∗(ω)
x for some (a, σ∗(ν)) ∈ σ∗(X) iff σ∗(ω) = σ∗(ν)[[f ]]σ
∗(ω)
x , for some
(a, ν) ∈ σ∗(X) iff σ∗(ω) ∈ σ∗(X)〈〈x := f〉〉 by IH on f and since by admissibility
of σ have x /∈ BV(σ).
Case x := ∗ Have (b, ω) ∈ X〈〈σ(x := ∗)〉〉 iff (b, ω) ∈ X〈〈x := ∗〉〉 iff ω =
νaωx , for some ((a, b), ν) ∈ X iff ω = νaωx , for some ((a, b), σ∗(ν)) ∈ σ∗(X) iff
ω = ν
σ∗(a)σ∗(ω)
x , for some ((a, b), σ∗(ν)) ∈ σ∗(X) iff σ∗(ω) = σ∗(ν)σ
∗(a)σ∗(ω)
x ,
for some ((a, b), σ∗(ν)) ∈ σ∗(X) iff (σ∗(b), σ∗(ω)) = σ∗(ν)σ∗(a)σ∗(ω)x , for some
((a, b), σ∗(ν)) ∈ σ∗(X) iff (σ∗(b), σ∗(ω)) ∈ σ∗(X)〈〈x := f〉〉 by IH on f and since
by admissibility of σ have x /∈ BV(σ).
Case ?φ Have (b, ω) ∈ X〈〈σ(?φ)〉〉 iff (a, ω) ∈ [[σ(φ)]] and ((a, b), ω) ∈ X
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ σ∗([[φ]]) and (σ∗((a, b)), σ∗(ω)) ∈ σ∗(X) iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈
σ∗(X)〈〈?φ〉〉
Case α;β Have
(a, ω) ∈ X〈〈σ(α;β)〉〉
iff (a, ω) ∈ X〈〈σ(α)〉〉〈〈σ(β)〉〉
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ {(σ∗(a), σ∗(ν)) | (a, ν) ∈ X〈〈σ(α)〉〉}〈〈β〉〉
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ σ∗(X)〈〈α〉〉〈〈β〉〉
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ σ∗(X)〈〈α;β〉〉
using the IH’s on α and β.
Case α ∪ β Have
(a, ω) ∈ X〈〈σ(α ∪ β)〉〉
iff (a, ω) ∈ X〈0〉〈〈σ(α)〉〉 ∪X〈1〉〈〈σ(β)〉〉
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ (σ∗(X〈0〉))〈〈α〉〉 ∪ (σ∗(X〈1〉))〈〈β〉〉
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ (σ∗(X)〈0〉)〈〈α〉〉 ∪ (σ∗(X)〈1〉)〈〈β〉〉
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ σ∗(X)〈〈α ∪ β〉〉
where the main step uses the IH’s on α, β, and piL(a).
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Case α∗ Have
ω ∈ X〈〈σ(α∗)〉〉
iff (a, ω) ∈
⋂
{Z〈0〉 | X ∪ Z〈1〉〈〈σ(α)〉〉 ⊆ Z}
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈
⋂
{σ∗(Z〈0〉) | σ∗(X) ∪ σ∗(Z〈1〉〈〈σ(α)〉〉) ⊆ σ∗(Z)}
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈
⋂
{σ∗(Z〈0〉) | σ∗(X) ∪ σ∗(Z〈1〉〈〈σ(α)〉〉) ⊆ σ∗(Z)}
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈
⋂
{σ∗(Z〈0〉) | σ∗(X) ∪ σ∗(Z〈1〉)〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ σ∗(Z)}
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈
⋂
{σ∗(Z)〈0〉 | σ∗(X) ∪ σ∗(Z)〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ σ∗(Z)}
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈
⋂
{Z〈0〉 | σ∗(X) ∪ Z〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ Z}
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ σ∗(X)〈〈α∗〉〉
Case αd Have (a, ω) ∈ X〈〈σ(αd)〉〉 iff (a, ω) ∈ X[[σ(α)]] iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈
σ∗(X)[[α]] iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ σ∗(X)〈〈αd〉〉
We give the Demon cases.
Case x := f Have (a, ω) ∈ X[[σ(x := f)]] iff (a, ω) ∈ X[[x := σ(f)]] iff ω =
ν
[[σ(f)]]ν
x , for some (a, ν) ∈ X iff σ∗(ω) = σ∗(ν[[σ(f)]]νx ), for some (a, ν) ∈ σ∗(X)
iff σ∗(ω) = σ∗(ν[[f ]]σ
∗(ν)
x ), for some (a, ν) ∈ σ∗(X) iff σ∗(ω) = σ∗(ν)[[f ]]σ
∗(ν)
x , for
some (a, ν) ∈ σ∗(X) iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ σ∗(X)[[x := f ]] by IH on f and since by
admissibility of σ have x /∈ BV(σ).
Case x := ∗ Have (a, ω) ∈ X[[σ(x := ∗)]] iff (a, ω) ∈ X[[x := ∗]] iff ω = νvx , for
some (a, ν) ∈ X, v ∈ Q iff σ∗(ω) = σ∗(νvx), for some (a, ν) ∈ σ∗(X), v ∈ Q iff
σ∗(ω) = σ∗(ν)vx, for some (a, ν) ∈ σ∗(X) iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ σ∗(X)[[x := ∗]] by
IH on f and since by admissibility of σ have x /∈ BV(σ).
Case ?φ Have (a b, ω) ∈ X[[σ(?φ)]] iff (a, ω) ∈ X for all (b, ω) ∈ [[σ(φ)]] iff
(σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ σ∗(X) for all (σ∗(b), σ∗(ω)) ∈ [[φ]] iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ σ∗(X)[[?φ]]
Case α;β
(b, ω) ∈ X[[σ(α;β)]]
iff (b, ω) ∈ σ(piR(a))[[σ(α)]]X[[σ(β)]]
iff (σ∗(b), σ∗(ω)) ∈ {(σ∗(a), σ∗(ν)) | (a, ν) ∈ X[[σ(α)]]}[[β]]
iff (σ∗(b), σ∗(ω)) ∈ {(σ∗(a), σ∗(ν)) | (σ∗(a), σ∗(ν)) ∈ σ∗(X)[[α]]}[[β]]
iff (σ∗(b), σ∗(ω)) ∈ σ∗(X)[[α]][[β]]
iff (σ∗(b), σ∗(ω)) ∈ σ∗(X)[[α;β]]
using the IH’s on α and β.
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Case α ∪ β Have
iff (a, ω) ∈ X[[σ(α ∪ β)]]
iff (a, ω) ∈ X[0][[σ(α)]] ∪X[1][[σ(β)]]
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ (σ∗(X[0]))[[α]] ∪ (σ∗(X[1]))[[β]]
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ (σ∗(X)[0])[[α]] ∪ (σ∗(X)[1])[[β]]
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ (σ∗(X))[[α ∪ β]]
where the main step uses the IH’s on α, β.
Case α∗ Have
(a, ω) ∈
⋂
{Z[0] | X ∪ Z[1][[σ(α)]] ⊆ Z}
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈
⋂
{σ∗(Z[0]) | σ∗(X) ∪ σ∗(Z[1][[σ(α)]]) ⊆ σ∗(Z)}
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈
⋂
{σ∗(Z[0]) | σ∗(X) ∪ σ∗(Z[1][[σ(α)]]) ⊆ σ∗(Z)}
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈
⋂
{σ∗(Z[0]) | σ∗(X) ∪ σ∗(Z[1])[[α]] ⊆ σ∗(Z)}
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈
⋂
{σ∗(Z)[0] | σ∗(X) ∪ σ∗(Z)[1][[α]] ⊆ σ∗(Z)}
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈
⋂
{Z[0] | σ∗(X) ∪ Z[1][[α]] ⊆ Z}
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ σ∗(X)[[α∗]]
Case αd Have (a, ω) ∈ X[[σ(αd)]] iff (a, ω) ∈ X〈〈σ(α)〉〉 iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈
σ∗(X)〈〈α〉〉 iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ σ∗(X)[[αd]]
We give the formula cases.
Case f > g Have ((), ω) ∈ [[σ(f > g)]] iff [[σ(f)]]ω < [[σ(g)]]ω iff [[f ]]σ∗(ω) <
[[g]]σ∗(ω) iff (σ∗(()), σ∗(ω)) ∈ [[f < g]]. The cases for≤, <,=, 6=,≥ are symmetric.
Case 〈α〉φ Have
(a, ω) ∈ [[σ(〈α〉φ)]]
iff {(a, ω)}〈〈σ(α)〉〉 ⊆ {(a, ω) | (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ [[φ]] ∪ {>}}
iff σ∗({(σ∗(a), σ∗(ω))}〈〈α〉〉) ⊆ {(a, ω) | (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ [[φ]] ∪ {>}}
iff {(σ∗(a), σ∗(ω))}〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ [[〈α〉φ]]
Case [α]φ Have
(a, ω) ∈ [[σ([α]φ)]]
iff {(a, ω)}[[σ(α)]] ⊆ {(a, ω) | (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ [[φ]] ∪ {>}}
iff σ∗({(σ∗(a), σ∗(ω))}[[α]]) ⊆ {(a, ω) | (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ [[φ]] ∪ {>}}
iff σ∗({(σ∗(a), σ∗(ω))}[[α]]) ⊆ {(a, ω) | (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ [[φ]] ∪ {>}}
iff {(σ∗(a), σ∗(ω))}[[α]] ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}
iff (σ∗(a), σ∗(ω)) ∈ [[[α]φ]]
Constructive Game Logic 51
Lemma 17 (Coincidence). If ω = ω˜ and a =˜on V ⊇ FV(e) (where e is f
or φ or α or a):
– a(ω) = a(ω˜)
– [[f ]]ω = [[f ]]ω˜
– {(a, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 = {(˜, ω˜)}〈〈α〉〉 on MBV(α) ∪ V
– {(a, ω)}[[α]] = {(˜, ω˜)}[[α]] on MBV(α) ∪ V
– ω ∈ [[φ]] iff ω˜ ∈ [[φ]]
Proof. First claim is by induction on a. Second claim holds for any reasonable
representation of computable functions, we give an example inductive proof for
polynomial cases. Remaining claims are by induction simultaneously on α, φ. In
each case assumption (1) is the assumption ω = ω˜ on FV(e)
We give the cases for realizers.
Case () Have ()(ω) = unit = ()(ω˜)
Case x where x is a variable over realizers. We have x(ω) = x(ω˜) since ω
and ω˜ agree on the free variables of x. That is, they agree on all variables so
ω = ω˜.
Case f Have f(ω) = f(ω˜) by IH on terms.
Case piL(a) Have piL(a)(ω) = piL(a(ω)) = piL(˜(ω˜)) = piL(˜)(ω˜) by IH.
Case piR(a) Have piR(a)(ω) = piR(a(ω)) = piR(˜(ω˜)) = piR(˜)(ω˜) by IH.
Case (a, b) Have (a, b)(ω) = (a(ω), b(ω)) = (a(ω˜), b(ω˜)) = (˜(ω˜), b˜(ω˜)) =
(˜, b˜)(ω˜) by IHs.
Case (λx : S. a) Have (λx : S. a)(ω) = aωx =˜
ω˜
x = (λx : S. (˜ω˜)) by (1),
ω = ω˜ on FV(λx : S. a) = FV(a).
Case (Λx : Q. a) Have (Λx : Q. a)(v) = avx =˜vx = (Λx : Q. )˜(v)
Case (Λx : φRz. a) Have (Λx : φRz. a)(v) = abx =˜b˜x = (Λx : φRz. )˜(v)
We give (example) term cases.
Case q Have [[q]]ω = q = [[q]]ω˜
Case x Have [[x]]ω = ω(x) = ω˜(x) = [[x]]ω˜ by (1).
Case f + g Have [[f + g]]ω = [[f ]]ω + [[g]]ω = [[f ]]ω˜ + [[g]]ω˜ = [[f + g]]ω˜ by the
IHs.
Case f · g Have [[f · g]]ω = [[f ]]ω · [[g]]ω = [[f ]]ω˜ · [[g]]ω˜ = [[f · g]]ω˜ by the IHs.
We give the Angel cases.
Case x := f {(a, ω)}〈〈x := f〉〉 = {(a, ω[[f ]]ωx } = {(a, ω[[f ]]ωx } = {(a, ω[[f ]]ω˜x }
which equals = {(˜, ω˜[[f ]]ω˜x } on V ∪MBV(α) = V ∪ {x}.
Case x := ∗ Have {(a, ω)}〈〈x := ∗〉〉 = {(piR(a), ωpiL(a)ωx } = {(piR(a), ωpiL(a)ωx }
Then piL(a)ω = piL(˜) ω˜ by assumption so {(piR(a), ωpiL(a)ωx } = {(piR(a), ωpiL(a)ωx }
on V ∪MBV(α) = V ∪ {x}.
Case ?φ Have {(a, ω)}〈〈?φ〉〉 = {(piR(a), ω)} if (piL(a), ω) ∈ [[φ]] else ∅. =
{(piR(a), ω)} if (piL(a), ω) ∈ [[φ]] else ∅. = (IH) {(piR(a), ω)} if (piL(˜), ω˜) ∈ [[φ]] else
∅. = (1) {(piR(˜), ω˜)} if (piL(˜), ω˜) ∈ [[φ]] else ∅. ={(˜, ω˜)}〈〈?φ〉〉
Case α;β Have {(a, ω)}〈〈α;β〉〉 = {(a, ω)}〈〈α〉〉〈〈β〉〉 Then by IH on α have
{(a, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 = {(˜, ω˜)}〈〈α〉〉 on MBV(α)∪V . Then by Lemma18 and IH on β have
{(a, ω)}〈〈α〉〉〈〈β〉〉 = {(˜, ω˜)}〈〈α〉〉〈〈β〉〉 on MBV(α;β) = MBV(α) ∪MBV(β) ∪ V .
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Case α∪β Have {(a, ω)}〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 = {(a, ω)}〈0〉〈〈α〉〉 ∪ {(a, ω)}〈1〉〈〈β〉〉 In each
case, one projection is singleton and the other empty. In each case, {(a, ω)}〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 =
{(a, ω)} on MBV(α)∪ V or MBV(β)∪ V , then since MBV(α ∪ β) = MBV(α)∩
MBV(β), in either case they agree on MBV(α ∪ β) ∪ V .
Case α∗ Let C(a, ω) =
⋂{Z〈0〉 | {(a, ω)}∪Z〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ Z}. (a, ω) ∈ {(a, ω)}〈〈α∗〉〉
iff (a, ω) ∈ ⋂{Z〈0〉 | {(a, ω)}∪Z〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ Z}. Consider any such Z: {(a, ω)}〈0〉∪
Z〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 = {(˜, ω˜)}〈0〉 ∪ Z〈1〉〈〈α〉〉, on MBV(α∗) ∪ V = V, the first conjunct by
(1) and the second by the IH. Then by definition of least fixed point, C is one
such Z, satisfying the set inclusion with exact equality, so C(a, ω) iff C (˜, ω˜), i.e.,
{(a, ω)}〈〈α∗〉〉 = {(˜, ω˜)}〈〈α∗〉〉
Case αd Have {(a, ω)}〈〈αd〉〉= {(a, ω)}[[α]]= (IH) {(˜, ω˜)}[[α]] on V ∪MBV(α) =
V ∪MBV(αd). which equals {(˜, ω˜)}〈〈αd〉〉 yieliding the case.
We give the Demon cases.
Case x := f Have {(a, ω)}[[x := f ]] = {(a, ω[[f ]]ωx } = {(a, ω[[f ]]ωx } = {(a, ω[[f ]]ω˜x }
which equals = {(˜, ω˜[[f ]]ω˜x } on V ∪MBV(α) = V ∪ {x}.
Case x := ∗ Have {(a, ω)}[[x := ∗]] = {(a v, ωvx) | v ∈ Q} Then a v = v˜ by
assumption so {(a v, ωvx)} = {(a v, ωvx)} on V ∪MBV(α) = V ∪ {x}.
Case ?φ Have {(a, ω)}[[?φ]] = {(a b, ω) |(b, ω) ∈ [[φ]]} likewise {(˜, ω˜)}[[?φ]] =
{(˜ b˜, ω˜) |(b˜, ω˜) ∈ [[φ]]} then by (IH) and (1) (b˜, ω˜) ∈ [[φ]] iff (b, ω) ∈ [[φ]] and a =˜
and ω = ω˜ on V ∪MBV(?φ) = V .
Case α;β Have {(a, ω)}[[α;β]] = {(a, ω)}[[α]][[β]] Then by IH on α have
{(a, ω)}[[α]] = {(˜, ω˜)}[[α]] on MBV(α)∪V . Then by Lemma18 and IH on β have
{(a, ω)}[[α]][[β]] = {(˜, ω˜)}[[α]][[β]] on MBV(α;β) = MBV(α) ∪MBV(β) ∪ V .
Case α∪β Have {(a, ω)}[[α ∪ β]]= {(a, ω)}[0][[α]]∪{(a, ω)}[1][[β]] In each case,
one projection is singleton and the other empty. In each case, {(a, ω)}[[α ∪ β]] =
{(a, ω)} on MBV(α)∪ V or MBV(β)∪ V , then since MBV(α ∪ β) = MBV(α)∩
MBV(β), in either case they agree on MBV(α ∪ β) ∪ V .
Case α∗ Let C(a, ω) =
⋂{Z[0] | {(a, ω)}∪Z[1][[α]] ⊆ Z}. (a, ω) ∈ {(a, ω)}[[α∗]]
iff (a, ω) ∈ ⋂{Z[0] | {(a, ω)} ∪ Z[1][[α]] ⊆ Z}. Consider any such Z: {(a, ω)}[0] ∪
Z[1][[α]] = {(˜, ω˜)}[0] ∪ Z[1][[α]], on MBV(α∗) ∪ V = V, the first conjunct by (1)
and the second by the IH. Then by definition of least fixed point, C is one
such Z, satisfying the set inclusion with exact equality, so C(a, ω) iff C (˜, ω˜), i.e.,
{(a, ω)}[[α∗]] = {(˜, ω˜)}[[α∗]]
Case αd Have {(a, ω)}[[αd]]= {(a, ω)}〈〈α〉〉= (IH) {(˜, ω˜)}〈〈α〉〉 on V ∪MBV(α) =
V ∪MBV(αd). which equals {(˜, ω˜)}[[αd]] yieliding the case.
We give the formula cases
Case f > g Have ((), ω) ∈ [[f > g]] iff [[f ]]ω > [[g]]ω iff [[f ]]ω˜ > [[g]]ω˜ iff
((), ω˜) ∈ [[f > g]]. The cases for ≤, <,=, 6=,≥ are symmetric.
Case 〈α〉φ Have (a, ω) ∈ [[〈α〉φ]] iff {(a, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]]∪{>} iff∗ {(˜, ω˜)}〈〈α〉〉 ⊆
[[φ]] ∪ {>} iff (˜, ω˜) ∈ [[〈α〉φ]] where the starred step holds by the IH because a =˜
and ω = ω˜ on FV(〈α〉φ) = FV(α) ∪ (FV(φ) −MBV(α)), thus {(a, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 =
{(˜, ω˜)}〈〈α〉〉 on MBV(α) ∪ V ⊇ FV(φ) giving the equivalence by the IH on φ.
Case [α]φ Have (a, ω) ∈ [[[α]φ]] iff {(a, ω)}[[α]] ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>} iff∗ {(˜, ω˜)}[[α]] ⊆
[[φ]] ∪ {>} iff (˜, ω˜) ∈ [[[α]φ]] where the starred step holds by the IH because a =˜
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and ω = ω˜ on FV(〈α〉φ) = FV(α) ∪ (FV(φ) −MBV(α)), thus {(a, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 =
{(˜, ω˜)}〈〈α〉〉 on MBV(α)∪V ⊇ FV(φ) giving the equivalence by the IH on φ.
Lemma 18 (Partition). For all suitable regions X and all games α,
– X〈〈α〉〉 = ⋃(a,ω)∈X {(a, ω)}〈〈α〉〉
– X[[α]] =
⋃
(a,ω)∈X {(a, ω)}[[α]]
Proof. Straightforward induction on α.
Lemma 19 (Bound Effect). If X = {(a, ω)} and (b, ν) ∈ X[[α]] or (b, ν) ∈
X〈〈α〉〉 then ω = ν on BV(α){, the complement of set BV(α).
Proof. Angel Cases:
Case x := f Have (b, ν) ∈ X〈〈x := f〉〉 iff b = a and ν = ω[[f ]]ωx and BV(x :=
f) = {x} and ν = ω on {x}{.
Case x := ∗ Have (b, ν) ∈ X〈〈x := ∗〉〉 iff b = piR(a) and ν = ωpiL(a)ωx and
BV(x∗) = {x} and ν = ω on {x}{.
Case ?φ Have (b, ν) ∈ X〈〈?φ〉〉 iff ν = ω and b = piR(a) and (piL(a), ω) ∈ [[φ]]
and (a, ω) ∈ X then ω = ω on ∅{ and BV(?φ) = ∅.
Case α;β Have (b, ν) ∈ X〈〈α;β〉〉 iff (b, ν) ∈ X〈〈α〉〉〈〈β〉〉 iff exists (c, µ) ∈
X〈〈α〉〉 s.t. (b, ν) ∈ {(b, ν)}〈〈β〉〉, then result holds by Lemma18 and IH twice
since BV(α;β) = BV(α) ∪ BV(β).
Case α∪ β Have (b, ν) ∈ X〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 iff (b, ν) ∈ X〈0〉〈〈α〉〉 ∪X〈1〉〈〈β〉〉 . In each
case one branch is empty and the other singleton, so by IH on the singleton
side, ω = ν on BV(α){ or BV(β){ and thus in both cases on BV(α ∪ β){ =
BV(α){ ∩ BV(β){.
Case α∗ Let C =
⋂{Z〈0〉 | X ∪ Z〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ Z}. (b, ν) ∈ X〈〈α∗〉〉 iff (LFP)
{(b, ν)}〈0〉 ⊆ X ∪ C〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 then by IH ν = ω on BV(α){ = BV(α∗){.
Case αd (b, ν) ∈ X〈〈αd〉〉 iff (b, ν) ∈ X[[α]] so by IH ν = ω on BV(αd){ =
BV(α){.
We give the Demon cases.
Case x := f Have (b, ν) ∈ X[[x := f ]] iff b = a and ν = ω[[f ]]ωx and BV(x :=
f) = {x} and ν = ω on {x}{.
Case x := ∗ Have (b, ν) ∈ X[[x := ∗]] iff b = a v and ν = ωvxω, some v ∈ Q.
So BV(x := ∗) = {x} and ν = ω on {x}{.
Case α;β Have (b, ν) ∈ X[[α;β]] iff (b, ν) ∈ X〈〈α〉〉[[β]] iff exists (c, µ) ∈
X[[α]] s.t. (b, ν) ∈ {(b, ν)}[[β]], then result holds by Lemma18 and IH twice since
BV(α;β) = BV(α) ∪ BV(β).
Case α ∪ β Have (b, ν) ∈ X〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 iff (b, ν) ∈ X[0]〈〈α〉〉 ∪X[1]〈〈β〉〉 . In each
case one branch is empty and the other singleton, so by IH on the singleton
side, ω = ν on BV(α){ or BV(β){ and thus in both cases on BV(α ∪ β){ =
BV(α){ ∩ BV(β){.
Case α∗ Let C =
⋂{Z[0] | X ∪ Z〈1〉[[α]] ⊆ Z}. (b, ν) ∈ X[[α∗]] iff (LFP)
{(b, ν)}[0] ⊆ X ∪ C〈1〉[[α]] then by IH ν = ω on BV(α){ = BV(α∗){.
Case αd Have (b, ν) ∈ X[[αd]] iff (b, ν) ∈ X〈〈α〉〉 so by IH ν = ω on BV(αd){ =
BV(α){.
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Lemma 20 (Monotonicity). If X ⊆ Y then X[[α]] ⊆ Y [[α]] and X[[α]] ⊆
Y [[α]].
Proof. By induction on α. We begin with the Angel cases.
Case x := f HaveX〈〈x := f〉〉 = {(a, ω[[f ]]ωx ) | (a, ω) ∈ X} ⊆ {(a, ω[[f ]]ωx ) | (a, ω) ∈
Y } = Y 〈〈x := f〉〉
Case x := ∗HaveX〈〈x := ∗〉〉 = {(piR(a), ωpiL(a)ωx ) | (a, ω) ∈ X} ⊆ {(piR(a), ωpiL(a)ωx ) | (a, ω) ∈
Y } = Y 〈〈x := ∗〉〉
Case ?φ Have X〈〈?φ〉〉 = {(piR(a), ω) | (a, ω) ∈ X and (piL(a), ω) ∈ [[φ]]} ⊆
{(piR(a), ω) | (a, ω) ∈ Y and (piL(a), ω) ∈ [[φ]]} = Y 〈〈?φ〉〉.
Case α∪β Have X〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 = X〈0〉〈〈α〉〉∪X〈1〉〈〈β〉〉 ⊆= Y〈0〉〈〈α〉〉∪Y〈1〉〈〈β〉〉 =
Y 〈〈α ∪ β〉〉
Case α;β Have X〈〈α;β〉〉 = X〈〈α〉〉〈〈β〉〉 ⊆ Y 〈〈α〉〉〈〈β〉〉 = Y 〈〈α;β〉〉 since by the
second IH have X〈〈β〉〉 ⊆ Y 〈〈β〉〉.
Case α∗ Have X〈〈α∗〉〉 = ⋂{Z〈0〉 | X ∪ Z〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ Z} ⊆ ⋂{Z〈0〉 | Y ∪
Z〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ Z} = Y 〈〈α∗〉〉. Since by assumption X ⊆ Y , then X ∪ Z〈1〉〈〈α〉〉 is no
larger than Y ∪Z〈1〉〈〈α〉〉, so the
⋂
Z for Y contains only larger terms than
⋂
Z
of X never smaller.
Case αd X〈〈αd〉〉 = X[[α]] ⊆ Y [[α]] = Y 〈〈αd〉〉
We give the Demon cases.
Case x := f HaveX[[x := f ]] = {(a, ω[[f ]]ωx ) | (a, ω) ∈ X} ⊆ {(a, ω[[f ]]ωx ) | (a, ω) ∈
Y } = Y [[x := f ]]
Case x := ∗ Have X[[x := ∗]] = {(a v, ωvx) | (a, ω) ∈ X, for some v ∈ Q} ⊆
{(a v, ωvx) | (a, ω) ∈ Y , for some v ∈ Q} = Y [[x := ∗]]
Case ?φHaveX[[?φ]] = {(a b, ω) | (a, ω) ∈ X, (b, ω) ∈ [[φ]]} ⊆ {(a b, ω) | (a, ω) ∈
Y, (b, ω) ∈ [[φ]]} = Y [[?φ]]
Case α∪β Have X[[α ∪ β]] = X[0][[α]]∪X[1][[β]] = Y[0][[α]]∪Y[1][[β]]Y [[α ∪ β]]
Case α;β Have X[[α;β]] = X[[α]][[β]] ⊆ Y [[α]][[β]] = Y [[α;β]]. since by the
second IH X[[β]] ⊆ Y [[β]].
Case α∗ Have X[[α∗]] =
⋂{Z[0] | X∪Z[1][[α]] ⊆ Z} ⊆ ⋂{Z[0] | Y ∪Z[1][[α]] ⊆
Z} = Y [[α∗]]. Since by assumption X ⊆ Y , then X ∪ Z[1][[α]] is no larger than
Y ∪ Z[1][[α]], so the
⋂
Z for Y contains only larger terms than
⋂
Z of X, never
smaller.
Case αd Have X[[αd]] = X〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ Y 〈〈α〉〉 = Y [[αd]]
Theorem 4 (Soundness). If Γ `M : φ, then the sequent (Γ ` φ) is valid.
Proof. By structural induction on the proof term M . In every case, we use
D,D1,D2, etc. to refer to the subderivations and the IH’s on those subderiva-
tions.
Case
Γ `M : 〈?φ〉ψ
Γ ` 〈pi1M〉 : φ
By D, assume (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]] and (c b, ω) ∈ [[〈?φ〉ψ]] iff {(c b, ω)}〈〈?φ〉〉 ⊆
[[ψ]] ∪ {>} iff (piL(c b), ω) ∈ [[φ]] and (piR(c b), ω) ∈ [[ψ]] Now define a(b) = λν :
S. piL(c b)(ν) and (a, ω) ∈ [[φ]], then since this held for all (b, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ ]] and c,
we have that Γ ` φ is valid.
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Case
Γ `M : 〈?φ〉ψ
Γ ` 〈pi2M〉 : ψ
By D, assume (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]] and (c b, ω) ∈ [[〈?φ〉ψ]] iff {(c b, ω)}〈〈?φ〉〉 ⊆
[[ψ]] ∪ {>} iff (piL(c b), ω) ∈ [[φ]] and (piR(c b), ω) ∈ [[ψ]] Now define a(b) = λν :
S. piR(c b)(ν) and (a, ω) ∈ [[ψ]], then since this held for all (b, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ ]] and c,
we have that Γ ` ψ is valid.
Case
Γ `M : [α ∪ β]φ
Γ ` [pi1M ] : [α]φ
By D, assume (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]] and (c b, ω) ∈ [[[α ∪ ψ]φ]] = (c b, ω)[[α ∪ β]] ⊆
[[φ]] ∪ {>} = (c b, ω)[0][[α]] ∪ (c b, ω)[1][[β]] ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>} implies (c b, ω)[0][[α]] ⊆
[[φ]] ∪ {>} Now define a(b) = piL(c b) and (a, ω) ∈ [[[α]φ]], i.e., Γ ` [α]φ is valid.
Case
Γ `M : [α ∪ β]φ
Γ ` [pi2M ] : [β]φ
By D, assume (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]] and (c b, ω) ∈ [[[α ∪ ψ]φ]] = (c b, ω)[[α ∪ β]] ⊆
[[φ]] = (c b, ω)[0][[α]] ∪ (c b, ω)[1][[β]] ⊆ [[φ]] implies (c b, ω)[1][[β]] ⊆ [[φ]] Now define
a(b) = piR(c b) and (a, ω) ∈ [[[β]φ]], i.e., Γ ` [β]φ is valid.
Case
Γ `M : φ Γ ` N : ψ
Γ ` 〈M,N〉 : 〈?φ〉ψ
Assume (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]] and (c1 b, ω) ∈ [[φ]] and (c2 b, ω) ∈ [[ψ]] by D1 and D2,
thus ((c1 b, c2 b), ω)〈〈?φ〉〉 ⊆ [[ψ]] ∪ {>} thus ((c1 b, c2 b), ω) ∈ [[〈?φ〉ψ]] thus letting
a(b) = (c1 b, c2 b), have Γ ` 〈?φ〉ψ valid.
Case
Γ `M : [α]φ Γ ` N : [β]φ
Γ ` [M,N ] : [α ∪ β]φ
Assume (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]] and (c1 b, ω) ∈ [[[α]φ]] and (c2 b, ω) ∈ [[[β]φ]] by D1 and
D2, thus (c1 b, ω)[[α]] ∪ (c2 b, ω)[[β]] ⊆ [[φ]]. Then, letting a(b) = (c1 b, c2 b), have
(a, ω)[[α ∪ β]] = {(a, ω)}[0][[α]]∪{(a, ω)}[1][[β]] = (c1 b, ω)[[α]]∪(c2 b, ω)[[β]] ⊆ [[φ]].
Thus have Γ ` [α ∪ β]φ valid.
Case
Γ `M : φfx
Γ ` 〈f yx :∗ p. M〉 : 〈x := ∗〉φ
Assume (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]], by Lemma16 then (c b yx , ωf yxx ) ∈ [[∧Γ yx ]] so by
D1 Let a(b) = (f, c b) yx have (c b yx , ω
f
y
x
x ) ∈ [[φ]] Suffice to show (c b yx , ω
f
y
x
x ) ∈
{(a, ω)}〈〈x := ∗〉〉 = {(piR(a), ωpiL(a)ωx )} which holds by definition of a, then by
the previous line {(a, ω)}〈〈x := ∗〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>} as desired.
Case
Γ `M : 〈α〉φ
Γ ` 〈` ·M〉 : 〈α ∪ β〉φ
By D, assume (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]] have (c b, ω) ∈ [[〈α〉φ]] so {(c b, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪
{>}. Now let f(ν) = 0 and a(b) = (f, c b), then {(a, ω)}〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 = {(c b, ω)}〈〈α〉〉
and by transitivity {(a, ω)}〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}, that is (a, ω) ∈ [[〈α ∪ β〉φ]] as
desired, so Γ ` 〈α ∪ β〉φ is valid.
Case
Γ `M : 〈β〉φ
Γ ` 〈r ·M〉 : 〈α ∪ β〉φ
By D, assume (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]] have (c b, ω) ∈ [[〈β〉φ]] so {(c b, ω)}〈〈β〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪
{>}. Now let f(ν) = 1 and a(b) = (f, c b), then {(a, ω)}〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 = {(c b, ω)}〈〈β〉〉
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and by transitivity {(a, ω)}〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}, that is (a, ω) ∈ [[〈α ∪ β〉φ]] as
desired, so Γ ` 〈α ∪ β〉φ is valid.
Case
Γ ` A : 〈α ∪ β〉φ Γ, ` : 〈α〉φ ` B : ψ Γ, r : 〈β〉φ ` C : ψ
Γ ` 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : ψ
ByD1 assume (b, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ ]] and have (c b, ω) ∈ [[〈α ∪ β〉φ]] so {(c b, ω)}〈〈α ∪ β〉〉 ⊆
[[φ]] ∪ {>}.
In the first case, piL(c b)(ω) = 0, so {(piR(c b), ω)}〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}. Now let
b1 = (b, piR(c b)) then D2 is applicable because (b1, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ, ` : 〈α〉φ]], so we
have some c1 such that (c1 b1, ω) ∈ [[ψ]]
In the second case, piL(c b)(ω) = 1, so {(piR(c b), ω)}〈〈β〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}. Now
let b2 = (b, piR(c b)) then D3 is applicable because (b2, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ, r : 〈β〉φ]], so we
have some c2 such that (c2 b2, ω) ∈ [[ψ]]
Lastly, define a(b)(ω) = if(f(ω) = 0){c1 b1(ω)}else{c2 b2(ω)} and (a b, ω) ∈
[[ψ]] as desired by the previous two cases.
Case
Γ `M : J p : J ` N : [α]J p : J ` O : φ
Γ ` (M rep p : J. N in O) : [α∗]φ
Assume some c1 such that for all (b1, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ ]] have (c1 b1, ω) ∈ [[J ]] by D1,
assume some c2 such that for all (b2, ω) ∈ [[
∧
p : J ]] have (c2 b2, ω) ∈ [[[α]J ]] by
D2, and assume some c3 such that for all (b3, ω) ∈ [[
∧
p : J ]] have (c3 b3, ω) ∈
[[φ]]. Let C ≡ ⋂{Z ⊆ Rz × S | X ∪ Z[1][[α]] ⊆ Z}, where X = {(a b, ω)},
letting a(b) = (c1 b, c2 b). Assume (b, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ ]]. Consider arbitrary (d, ν) ∈
C, suffices to show that (d, ν) ∈ [[J ]]. Because C is inductively defined as the
intersection across Z, suffices to induct on the membership of (d, ν) in C. In
the base case, (d, ν) ∈ X[0] = {(a, ω)}[0] so d = piL(a) = c1 b and ν = ω. By
D1 then have (d, ν) = (c1 b, ω) ∈ [[J ]], which then yields (c3 (c1 b), ω) ∈ [[φ]] as
desired. In the inductive case assume Z ⊆ [[J ]] and (d, ν) ∈ Z[1][[α]][0] and show
(d, ν) ∈ [[J ]]. By the IH have c2 s.t. for all (b, ω) ∈ Z have (c2 b, ω) ∈ [[[α]J ]], so
{(c2 b, ω)}[[α]] ⊆ [[J ]]. Then {(a(b), ω)}[1] = {(c2 b, ω)} so {(a(b), ω)}[1][[α]] ⊆ [[J ]].
Then {(a(b), ω)}[1][[α]][0] ⊆ {(a(b), ω)}[1][[α]] ⊆ [[J ]] ⊆ [[φ]] (by D3) as desired.
Case
Γ `M : [?φ]ψ Γ ` N : φ
Γ `M N : ψ
Assume (1) some c1 such that for (b, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ ]] have (c1 b, ω) ∈ [[[?φ]ψ]] by
D1. Assume (2) some c2 such that for (b, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ ]] have (c2 b, ω) ∈ [[φ]] by D2.
Assume (3) some (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]]. By (1), then (c1 b, ω)[[?φ]] ⊆ [[ψ]] ∪ {>}. That
is for all d s.t. (d, ω) ∈ [[φ]] then (c1 b d, ω) ∈ [[ψ]]. By (2) then let d = c2 b and
have ((c1 b) (c2 b), ω) ∈ [[ψ]]. Then letting a(b) = (c1 b) (c2 b) have (a b, ω) ∈ [[ψ]]
as desired.
Case
Γ, p : φ `M : ψ
Γ ` λp : φ. M : [?φ]ψ
Assume (1) some c such that for (b2, ω) ∈ [[
∧
(Γ, p : φ)]] have (c b2, ω) ∈ [[ψ]]
by D. Assume (2) some (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]]. Let a(b)(b1) = c (b, b1) Suffice to show
that assuming (3) (b1, ω) ∈ [[φ]] then a b b1 ∈ [[ψ]]. This holds by expanding the
definition of a, then applying (1), whose assumptions hold by (2) and (3).
Case
Γ yx `M : φ
Γ ` (λx : Q. M) : [x := ∗]φ
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Assume (1) some c such that for (b1, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ yx ]] have (c b1, ω) ∈ [[φ]] by D.
Assume (2) some (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]]. By side condition, y is fresh. Let a(b)(v) = c bvx.
Suffice to show [[φ]] ⊇ {(a(b), ω)}[[x := ∗]] = {(a(b)(v), ωvx) | v ∈ Q}. Fix some
v ∈ Q, then by freshness of y and Lemma13 have (b yx , ω yx ) ∈ [[
∧
Γ yx ]]. Then
by (1) have (c b yx , ω
y
x ) ∈ [[φ]]. Then by Lemma17 note (c b yx , ω yx ) agrees with{(a(b)(v), ωvx) | v ∈ Q} on the free variables of φ, since a(b)(v) = c bvx = c byx for
some assignment of the fresh y, that is each v fixed earlier matches some value
of y when taking the union. Furthermore ω yx = ω
v
x for some valuation of y for
the same reason. Then by Lemma17 can conclude {(a(b)(v), ωvx) | v ∈ Q} ⊆ [[φ]]
as desired.
Case
Γ `M : [α][β]φ
Γ ` [ι M ] : [α;β]φ
Assume (1) some c such that for (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]] have (c b, ω) ∈ [[[α][β]φ]]
by D. Assume (2) some (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]]. Then by (1) have (c b, ω) ∈ [[[α][β]φ]]
iff {(c b, ω)}[[α]] ⊆ [[[β]φ]] iff {(c b, ω)}[[α]] ⊆ {(d, ν) | {(d, ν)}[[β]] ⊆ [[φ]]} iff(⋃
(d,ν)∈{(c b,ω)}[[α]] {(d, ν)}[[β]]
)
⊆ [[φ]] iff (Lemma18) {(c b, ω)}[[α]][[β]] ⊆ [[φ]]
iff (c b, ω) ∈ [[[α;β]φ]] as desired.
Case
Γ `M : 〈α〉〈β〉M
Γ ` 〈ι M〉 : 〈α;β〉φ
Assume (1) some c such that for (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]] have (c b, ω) ∈ [[〈α〉[β]φ]] by
D. Assume (2) some (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]]. Then by (1) have
(c b, ω) ∈ [[〈α〉[β]φ]]
iff{(c b, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ ([[[β]φ]] ∪ {>})
iff{(c b, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ {(d, ν) | {(d, ν)}〈〈β〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>})}
iff
 ⋃
(d,ν)∈{(c b,ω)}〈〈α〉〉
{(d, ν)}〈〈β〉〉
 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}
iff (Lemma18){(c b, ω)}〈〈α〉〉〈〈β〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}
iff(c b, ω) ∈ [[〈α;β〉φ]]
as desired.
Case
Γ `M : [α]φ
Γ ` 〈yield M〉 : 〈αd〉φ
Assume (1) some c such that for (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]] have (c b, ω) ∈ [[[α]φ]] by
D. Assume (2) some (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]], then by (1) have (c b, ω) ∈ [[[α]φ]] iff
{(c b, ω)}[[α]] ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {⊥} iff (({(c b, ω)}[[α]])d ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>} iff {(c b, ω)}〈〈αd〉〉 ⊆
[[φ]] ∪ {>} iff (c b, ω) ∈ [[〈αd〉φ]] as desired.
Case
Γ `M : 〈α〉φ
Γ ` [yield M ] : [αd]φ
Assume (1) some c such that for (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]] have (c b, ω) ∈ [[〈α〉φ]] by
D. Assume (2) some (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]], then by (1) have (c b, ω) ∈ [[〈α〉φ]] iff
{(c b, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>} iff (({(c b, ω)}〈〈α〉〉)d ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {⊥} iff {(c b, ω)}[[αd]] ⊆
[[φ]] ∪ {⊥} iff (c b, ω) ∈ [[[αd]φ]] as desired.
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Case
Γ `M : 〈α〉φ x : φ ` N : ψ
Γ `M◦xN : 〈α〉ψ
Assume (1) some c1 such that for (b1, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ ]] have (c1 b1, ω) ∈ [[〈α〉φ]]
by D1. Assume (2) some c2 such that for (b2, ν) ∈ [[
∧
x : φ]] have (c2 b2, ω) ∈
[[ψ]] by D2. Assume (3) some (b, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ ]]. Let a(b) = c2 ◦ c1 b, that is the
realizer which applies c2 as the continuation after playing according to c1. By
(1) have (c1 b, ω) ∈ [[〈α〉φ]] iff {(c1 b, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>} Consider arbitrary
(b2, ν) in {(c1 b, ω)}〈〈α〉〉. If (b2, ν) = > then we’re done because {(c1 b, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 ⊆
[[ψ]] ∪ {>} as well, else we can apply (2) and get (c2 b2, ν) ∈ [[ψ]]. Now recall it
suffices to show (a b, ω)〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ [[ψ]] ∪ {>}. By definition of a, have (a b, ω)〈〈α〉〉 =
{(c2 b2, ν) | (b2, ν) ∈ {(c1 b, ω)}〈〈α〉〉}, so by (2) have (a b, ω)〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ [[ψ]] as desired.
Case
Γ `M : φ
Γ ` 〈stop M〉 : 〈α∗〉φ
Assume (1) some c such that for (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]] have (c1 b, ω) ∈ [[φ]] by D.
Assume (2) some (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]]. Let a(b) = ((λν : S. 0), c1 b). Then by (1) have
(c b, ω) ∈ [[φ]] and {(a(b), ω)}〈0〉 = {(c b, ω)} so {(a(b), ω)}〈0〉 ⊆ [[φ]].
Suffices to show (a(b), ω) ∈ [[〈α∗〉φ]] iff {(a(b), ω)}〈〈α∗〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] iff ⋂{Z〈0〉 ⊆
Rz×S | {(a(b), ω)}∪(Z〈1〉〈〈α〉〉) ⊆ Z} ⊆ [[φ]]∪{>} which holds if {(a(b), ω)}〈0〉 ⊆
[[φ]], which we showed above, so we’re done.
Case
Γ `M : 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ
Γ ` 〈go M〉 : 〈α∗〉φ
Assume (1) some cboth such that for (b, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ ]] have (c1 b, ω) ∈ [[〈α〉〈α∗〉φ]]
by D. Split cboth into c2 ◦ c1 for α∗ and α. Assume (2) some (b, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ ]].
Let C(X) =
⋂{Z ⊆ Rz × S | X ∪ (Z〈1〉〈〈α〉〉) ⊆ Z} Note because C is a
fixed point, C(X) = X ∪ (C〈1〉〈〈α〉〉) holds as an exact equality. Then by (1)
have (c b, ω) ∈ [[〈α〉〈α∗〉φ]] iff {(c b, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 ⊆ [[〈α∗〉φ]] ∪ {>} iff {(c b, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 ⊆
{(d, ν) | {(d, ν)}〈〈α∗〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}} iff (2) for all (c1 b, µ) ∈ {(c b, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 and
all (c2 c1 b, ν) ∈ {(c1 b, µ)}〈〈α∗〉〉 have (c2 c1 b, ν) ∈ [[φ]] ∪ {>}. Let a(b) = ((λν :
S. 1), c2 ◦ c1 b). So {(a(b), ω)}〈0〉 = ∅ and {(a(b), ω)}〈1〉 = {(c2 ◦ c1 b, ω)}. Then
{(c2 ◦ c1 b, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 = {(c1 b, µ) ∈ {(c b, ω)}〈〈α〉〉}, fulfilling the first assumption
of (2). Then {(c1 b, µ) | · · · }〈〈α∗〉〉 = (c2 c1 b, ν) ∈ {(c1 b, µ)}〈〈α∗〉〉 fulfilling sec-
ond assumption of (2), thus we conclude (c2 c1 b, ν) ∈ [[φ]] ∪ {>} By definition
of a, we have that ({(a(b), ω)}〈〈α〉〉)〈〈α∗〉〉 is the set of all such (c2 c1 b, ν) so
({(a(b), ω)}〈〈α〉〉)〈〈α∗〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>} as desired.
Case
Γ ` A : 〈α∗〉φ Γ, ` : φ ` B : ψ Γ, r : 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ ` C : ψ
Γ ` 〈case∗ A of s⇒ B | g ⇒ C〉 : ψ
Assume (1) some c1 such that for (b, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ ]] have (c1 b, ω) ∈ [[〈α∗〉φ]] by
D1. Assume (2) some c2 such that for (b2, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ, ` : φ]] have (c2 b2, ω) ∈
[[ψ]] by D2. Assume (3) some c3 such that for (b3, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ, r : 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ]]
have (c3 b3, ω) ∈ [[ψ]] by D3. Assume (4) some (b, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ ]], To handle case
piL(c1 b)(ω) = 0 let b2 = (b, piR(c1 b)). To handle case piL(c1 b)(ω) = 1 let
b3 = (b, piR(c1 b)). Note (5a) when piL(c1 b)(ω) = 0 then (piR(c1 b), ω) ∈ [[φ]].
and (5b) when piL(c1 b)(ω) = 0 then (piR(c1 b), ω) ∈ [[〈α〉〈α∗〉φ]] by (1) and
the definition of diamond repetition realizers. Let a(b)(ω) = if(piL(c1 b)(ω) =
0){c2 b2(ω)}else{c3 b3(ω)}
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By (4) and (1) have (c1 b, ω) ∈ [[〈α∗〉φ]] iff (c1 b, ω)〈〈α∗〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}. By
LemmaD.2 we have either a) {(c1 b, ω)}〈〈α∗〉〉 = (c1 b, ω)〈0〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}, or b)
{(c1 b, ω)}〈〈α∗〉〉 = (c1 b, ω)〈1〉〈〈α〉〉〈〈α∗〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}.
In case (a) then {(a(b), ω)}〈〈α∗〉〉 = c2 b2(ω) ⊆ [[ψ]] by (2), which is applicable
because ((b, piR(c1 b)), ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ, ` : φ]] by (5a). In case (b) then {(a(b), ω)}〈〈α∗〉〉 =
c3 b3(ω) ⊆ [[ψ]] by (3), which is applicable because ((b, piR(c1 b)), ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ, ` : 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ]]
by (5b).
In either case {(a(b), ω)}〈〈α∗〉〉 ⊆ [[ψ]] as desired.
Case
Γ `M : φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ
Γ ` [roll M ] : [α∗]φ
Assume (1) some c such that for (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]] have (c b, ω) ∈ [[φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ]]
by D. Assume (2) some (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]], so by (1) have (c b, ω) ∈ [[φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ]] iff
(3a) (piL(c b), ω) ∈ [[φ]] and (3b) (piR(c b), ω) ∈ [[[α][α∗]φ]]
Suffice to show (c b, ω) ∈ [[[α∗]φ]] iff {(c b, ω)}[[α∗]] ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {⊥} iff (by
LemmaD.2) (G1) {(c b, ω)}[0] ⊆ [[φ]]∪{⊥} and (G2) {(c b, ω)}[[α∗]][[]] ⊆ [[φ]]∪{⊥}.
Goal (G1) is direct by (3a) and (G2) holds from (3b) since (piR(c b), ω) ∈
[[[α][α∗]φ]] iff {(piR(c b), ω)}[[α]][[α∗]] ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {⊥}.
Case
Γ `M : [α∗]φ
Γ ` [unroll M ] : φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ
Assume (1) some c such that for (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]] have (c b, ω) ∈ [[[α∗]φ]] by
D. Assume (2) some (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]], so by (1) have (c b, ω) ∈ [[[α∗]φ]] iff (3a)
(piL(c b), ω) ∈ [[φ]] and (3b) (piR(c b), ω) ∈ [[[α][α∗]φ]]
Suffice to show (c b, ω) ∈ [[φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ]] iff (G1) {(piL(c b), ω)}[[α∗]] ⊆ [[φ]] ∪
{⊥} and (G2) {(piR(c b), ω)}[[α∗]][[]] ⊆ [[φ]]∪{⊥} Goal (G1) is direct by (3a) and
(G2) holds from (3b) since (piR(c b), ω) ∈ [[[α][α∗]φ]] iff {(piR(c b), ω)}[[α]][[α∗]] ⊆
[[φ]] ∪ {⊥}.
Case
Γ yx , p : (x = f
y
x ) `M : φ
Γ ` [x := f yx in p. M ] : [x := f ]φ
Assume (1) some c such that for (b1, ν) ∈ [[
∧
Γ yx , p : (x = f
y
x ]] have (c b1, ν) ∈
[[φ]] by D. Assume (2) some (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]]. Let v = [[f yx ]]ω yx = [[f ]]ω by Lemma13
and ν = ω yx
v
x
. Let b1(ω) = b(ω
[[f ]]ω
x ) and b2(ω) = b1(ω yx ) Then by Lemma16 have
(b1, ω
y
x ) ∈ [[
∧
Γ yx ]] Then by Lemma13 (b2, ν) ∈ [[
∧
Γ yx ]]. Also by definition of
ν have (((), ()), ν) ∈ [[x = f yx ]] so let b1 = (b2, ((), ())) and then by (1) have
(c b1, ν) ∈ [[φ]]. Let a = c b1. Suffices to show {(a, ω)}[[x := f ]] ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}, the
latter case occurring only when (a, ω) = >. Then {(a, ω)}[[x := f ]] = {(a, ωvx)}
which agrees with (c b1, ν) except on fresh y, so by Lemma17 have (a, ωvx) ∈ [[φ]]
as desired.
Case
Γ yx , p : (x = f
y
x ) `M : φ
Γ ` 〈x := f yx in p. M〉 : 〈x := f〉φ
Assume (1) some c such that for (b1, ν) ∈ [[
∧
Γ yx , p : (x = f
y
x )]] have (c b1, ν) ∈
[[φ]] by D. Assume (2) some (b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]]. Let v = [[f yx ]]ω yx = [[f ]]ω by Lemma13
and ν = ω yx
v
x
. Let b1(ω) = b(ω
[[f ]]ω
x ) and b2(ω) = b1(ω yx ) Then by Lemma16 have
(b1, ω
y
x ) ∈ [[
∧
Γ yx ]] Then by Lemma13 (b2, ν) ∈ [[
∧
Γ yx ]]. Also by definition of
ν have (((), ()), ν) ∈ [[x = f yx ]] so let b1 = (b2, ((), ())) and then by (1) have
(c b1, ν) ∈ [[φ]]. Let a = c b1. Suffices to show {(a, ω)}〈〈x := f〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}, the
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latter case occurring only when (a, ω) = >. Then {(a, ω)}〈〈x := f〉〉 = {(a, ωvx)}
which agrees with (c b1, ν) except on fresh y, so by Lemma17 have (a, ωvx) ∈ [[φ]]
as desired.
Case
Γ `M : 〈x := ∗〉φ Γ yx , p : φ ` N : ψ
Γ ` unpack(M,py. N) : ψ for y fresh and x /∈ FV(ψ)
Assume (1) some c1 such that for (b, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ ]] have (c1 b, ω) ∈ [[〈x := ∗〉φ]]
by D1. Assume (2) some c2 such that for (b2, ν) ∈ [[
∧
Γ yx , p : φ]] have (c2 b2, ν) ∈
[[ψ]] by D2. Assume (3) some (b, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ ]], then by (1) have (c1 b, ω) ∈
[[〈x := ∗〉φ]] iff {(c1 b, ω)}〈〈x := ∗〉〉 ⊆ [[φ]] ∪ {>}, the latter occurring only when
(b, ω) = >, in which case we are done. Else (piR(c1 b), ωpiL(c1 b)x ) ∈ [[φ]] and by
freshness of y and by Lemma17 then have (4a) (piR(c1 b), ω yx
piL(c1 b)
x
) ∈ [[φ]]
Also (4b) (b yx , ω
y
x
piL(c1 b)
x
) ∈ [[∧Γ yx ]] by Lemma13 on (3) and by Lemma17 be-
cause x /∈ FV(Γ yx ). Then from (4a) and (4b) have ((b yx , piR(c1 b)), ω yxpiL(c1 b)x ) ∈
[[
∧
Γ yx , p : φ]] so by (2) have (5) (c2 (b
y
x , piR(c1 b)), ω
y
x
piL(c1 b)
x
) ∈ [[ψ]]. Lastly note
ω = ω yx
piL(c1 b)
x
on FV(ψ) ⊆ {x, y}{, so let a = c2 (b yx , piR(c1 b)) then (a, ω) ∈ [[ψ]]
as desired.
Case
Γ ` A : 〈α∗〉φ p : φ ` B : ψ q : 〈α〉ψ ` C : ψ
Γ ` FP(A, s. B, g. C) : ψ
Assume (1) some c1 such that for (b, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ ]] have (c b, ω) ∈ [[〈α∗〉φ]] by D1.
Assume (2) some c2 such that for (b2, ν) ∈ [[
∧
p : φ]] have (c2 b2, ν) ∈ [[ψ]] by D2.
Assume (3) some c3 such that for (b3, ν) ∈ [[
∧
q : 〈α〉ψ]] have (c3 b3, ν) ∈ [[ψ]]
by D3. Assume (4) some (b, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ ]], so by (1) have (c b, ω) ∈ [[〈α∗〉φ]]
iff {(c b, ω)}〈〈α〉〉k〈0〉 ⊆ [[φ]] for all k ∈ N. Fix any k and any such (d, ν) ∈
{(c b, ω)}〈〈α〉〉k〈0〉 We define a by induction on k. This definition can be considered
constructive in the sense that we could instrument the realizer c b to compute
the results of a “as it goes”:
Case (d, ν) ∈ {(c b, ω)}〈0〉, then (d, ν) = (piR(c b), ω) and piL(c b) = 0. Then
let a(ω) = (c2 b2, ω) where b2 = d, then by (2) (a, ω) ∈ [[ψ]].
Case (d, ν) ∈ {(c b, ω)}[[α]]k[[α]]〈0〉. By (1) had (d, ν) ∈ [[φ]], so by (2) have
(c2 d, ν) ∈ [[ψ]]. Then by applying (3) k times, have (ck3(c2 d), ω) ∈ [[ψ]] So it
suffices to let a = ck3(c2 d).
Case
Γ ` A : ϕ p : ϕ, q : (M0 =M  0) ` B : 〈α〉(ϕ ∧M0 M) p : ϕ, q : (M = 0) ` C : φ
Γ ` for(p : ϕ(M) = A; q.B;C){α} : 〈α∗〉φ
Assume (1) some c1 such that for (b, ω) ∈ [[
∧
Γ ]] have (c b, ω) ∈ [[ϕ]] by
D1. Assume (2) some c2 such that for (b2, ν) ∈ [[
∧
p : ϕ, q : (M0 =M  0)]]
have (c2 b2, ν) ∈ [[〈α〉(ϕ ∧M0 M)]] by D2. Assume (3) some c3 such that for
(b3, ν) ∈ [[
∧
p : ϕ, q : (M = 0)]] have (c3 b3, ν) ∈ [[φ]] by D3. Assume (4) some
(b, ω) ∈ [[∧Γ ]], so by (1) have (c b, ω) ∈ [[ϕ]].
Begin by showing (a, ω) ∈ [[〈α∗〉(M = 0 ∧ ϕ)]], that is (a, ω)〈〈α∗〉〉 ⊆ [[(M = 0 ∧ ϕ)]]∪
{>}, that is ⋃k∈N (a, ω)〈〈α〉〉k〈0〉 ⊆ [[(M = 0 ∧ ϕ)]] ∪ {>} We define a recursively
by a(ω) = if(M  0){(a ◦ c2 b2)(ω)}else{((), c b)} where b2 = (c b, ()). The re-
cursion is well-founded by the fact that every application of c2 b2 reduces the
metricM, which is Nötherian.
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Now fix arbitrary k ∈ N and (d, ν) ∈ (a, ω)〈〈α〉〉k〈0〉, then suffices to show
(d, ν) ∈ [[(M = 0 ∧ ϕ)]] ∪ {>}. Case 0, then (d, ν) = (((), c b), ω) and since the
test M  0 was negative, thus ((), ω) ∈ [[M = 0]] and by (1) (((), c b), ω) ∈
[[M = 0 ∧ ϕ]] ∪ {>} as desired.
Case 1 + k, then (d, ν) ∈ {(a, ω)}〈〈α〉〉〈〈α〉〉k〈0〉. Have a(ω) = (a ◦ c2 b2)(ω)
and since the testM  0 was positive, thus ((), ω) ∈ [[M  0]] and by (1) have
(b2, ω) ∈ [[M  0 ∧ ϕ]] so by (2) have (c2 b2, ω) ∈ [[〈α〉(ϕ ∧M0 M)]]∪{>} For
all (d1, ν1) ∈ {(a, ω)}〈〈α〉〉 have (d1, ν1) ∈ [[(ϕ ∧M0 M)]]∪{>}. In case >, we
are already finished, else d1 = a recursively, and applying the IH on smallerM
and k have (a, ν1)〈〈α〉〉k〈0〉 ⊆ [[M = 0 ∧ ϕ]] ∪ {>} as desired.
Now (by commuting M = 0 and ϕ) D3 yields [[M = 0 ∧ ϕ]] ⊆ [[φ]] so that
finally (a′, ω) ∈ [[〈α∗〉φ]] for some a′.
D.4 Proof Theory
The following theorems concern proof terms, normal forms, progress, and preser-
vation.
Lemma 21 (Normal forms). If Γ ` M : ρ and M normal, then either M is
〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 for simple A and normal B and C, else M starts
with the canonical introduction rule(s) for the top-level connective of ρ and all
subterms are well-typed and simple, except those under binders.
For example, M has form:
– λp : φ. N if ρ ≡ φ→ ψ
– 〈[A,B]〉 if ρ ≡ 〈?φ〉ψ
– ` ·N or r ·N if ρ ≡ 〈α ∪ β〉φ
– 〈go N〉 or 〈stop N〉 if ρ ≡ 〈α∗〉φ
– [roll N ] if ρ ≡ [α∗]φ
Proof.
Lemma 22 (Progress). If · ` M : φ then either M normal or exists M ′ such
that M 7→M ′.
Proof. Case [:∗]I, 〈:∗〉I, [?]I, or 〈[:=]〉I: In these cases, M is already normal by
definition.
Case 〈?〉I, term 〈M,N〉 : By first IH1, M normal or M 7→ M ′. If M 7→
M ′ then 〈M,N〉 7→ 〈M ′, N〉 by 〈∧〉S1. Else, by IH2, N normal or N 7→ N ′. If
N 7→ N ′ then 〈M,N〉 7→ 〈M,N ′〉 by 〈∧〉S2. Else, M normal and N normal. If
M ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 then 〈〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉, N〉 7→
〈case A of ` ⇒ 〈B,N〉 | r ⇒ 〈C,N〉〉 by ∧C1. Else if N ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B
| r ⇒ C〉 then 〈M, 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉〉 7→ 〈case A of ` ⇒ 〈M,B〉
| r ⇒ 〈M,C〉〉 by ∧C2. ElseM simp andN simp so 〈[M,N ]〉 simp and 〈[M,N ]〉 normal.
Case [∪]I is symmetric.
Case 〈∪〉I1, term ` ·M : By IH, either M 7→ M ′ or M normal. If M 7→ M ′,
then ` ·M 7→ ` ·M ′ by `·S. Else, either M simp or M ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B
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| r ⇒ C〉. If M ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 then ` · 〈case A of ` ⇒ B
| r ⇒ C〉 7→ 〈case A of ` ⇒ ` · B | r ⇒ ` · C〉 by 〈[`·]〉C. Else M simp so
` ·M simp. Diamond case 〈stop M〉 is symmetric.
Case 〈∪〉I2, term r ·M : By IH, either M 7→ M ′ or M normal. If M 7→ M ′,
then r ·M 7→ r ·M ′ by r·S. Else, either M simp or M ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B
| r ⇒ C〉. If M ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 then r · 〈case A of ` ⇒ B
| r ⇒ C〉 7→ 〈case A of ` ⇒ r · B | r ⇒ r · C〉 by r·C. Else M simp so
r ·M simp. Diamond case 〈go M〉 is symmetric.
Case 〈[;]〉I (both box and diamond): By IH, either M 7→ M ′ or M normal.
If M 7→ M ′, then 〈[ι M ]〉 7→ 〈[ι M ′]〉 by [ι]S or 〈ι〉S. Else, either M simp or
M ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉. If M ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 then
〈[ι 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉]〉 7→ 〈case A of ` ⇒ 〈[ι B]〉 | r ⇒ 〈[ι C]〉〉 by ιC
or ιC. Else M simp so 〈[ι M ]〉 is normal.
Case 〈[d]〉I (both box and diamond): By IH, either M 7→M ′ or M normal. If
M 7→ M ′, then 〈[yield M ]〉 7→ 〈[yield M ′]〉 by [d]S or 〈d〉S. Else, either M simp or
M ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉. If M ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 then
〈[ι 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉]〉 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ 〈[yield B]〉 | r ⇒ 〈[yield C]〉〉
by yieldC or yieldC. Else M simp so 〈[yield M ]〉 is normal.
Case 〈∗〉I, term for(p : ϕ(M) = A; q.B;C){α}. Abbreviate term M =
[A, 〈r, rr〉/p, q]B◦tfor(p : ϕ(M) = pi1t; q.B;C){α}. By IH, eitherA 7→ A′ orA normal.
If A 7→ A′ for(p : ϕ(M) = A; q.B;C){α} 7→ for(p : ϕ(M) = A′; q.B;C){α} by
forS. else A normal so A simp or A ≡ 〈case D of `⇒ E | r ⇒ F 〉. If A simp then
for(p : ϕ(M) = A; q.B;C){α} 7→ 〈case split [M, 0] of `⇒ 〈stop [(A, `)/(p, q)]C〉
| r ⇒ Ghost[M0 =M](rr. 〈goM〉)〉 by forβ. Otherwise we have for(p : ϕ(M) =
〈case D of `⇒ E | r ⇒ F 〉; q.B;C){α} 7→ 〈case D of ` ⇒ for(p : ϕ(M) =
E; q.B;C){α} | r ⇒ for(p : ϕ(M) = F ; q.B;C){α}〉 by forC.
Case 〈∗〉C, term FP(A, s. B, g. C). By IH, either A 7→ A′ or A normal. If A
7→ A′ then FP(A, s. B, g. C) 7→ FP(A′, s. B, g. C) by FPS. Else, since A normal
then A ≡ 〈case D of ` ⇒ E | r ⇒ F 〉 or A simp. If A ≡ 〈case D of ` ⇒ E
| r ⇒ F 〉 then FP(〈case D of ` ⇒ E | r ⇒ F 〉, s. B, g. C) 7→ 〈case D of
` ⇒ FP(E, s. B, g. C) | r ⇒ FP(F, s. B, g. C)〉 by FPC. If A simp then
FP(A, s. B, g. C) 7→ (〈case∗ A of s ⇒ B | g ⇒ [r◦tFP(t, s. B, g. C)/q]C〉) by
FPβ.
Case [?]E, term M N . By IH, either M 7→ M ′ or M normal. If M 7→ M ′
then M N 7→ M ′ N by appS1. Else if M ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 then
〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 N 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ B N | r ⇒ C N〉 by app1C.
Else M simp. By IH, either N 7→ N ′ or N normal. If N 7→ N ′ then M N 7→
M N ′ by appS2. Else if N ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 then M 〈case A of
`⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ M B | r ⇒ M C〉 by app2C. Else N simp.
By Lemma21 M = (λp : φ. D) then (λp : φ. D) N 7→ [N/p]D by λφβ.
Case [:∗]E, term M f . By IH, M 7→M ′ or M normal. If M 7→M ′ then M f
7→ M ′ f by unroll. Else if M ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 then 〈case A of
`⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 f 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ B f | r ⇒ C f〉 by appC. Else M simp
and by Lemma21 then M ≡ (λx : Q. D) so (λx : Q. D) f 7→ Dfx by λβ.
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Case 〈?〉E1, term pi1M . By IH, M 7→ M ′ or M normal. If M 7→ M ′ then
pi1M 7→ pi1M ′ by pi1S. Else if M ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 then
pi1〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 7→ 〈case A of ` ⇒ pi1B | r ⇒ pi1C〉 by pi1C.
Else M simp so by Lemma21 have M ≡ 〈[A,B]〉 so pi1〈[A,B]〉 7→ A by pi1β.
Case 〈?〉E2, term pi2M . By IH, M 7→ M ′ or M normal. If M 7→ M ′ then
pi2M 7→ pi2M ′ by pi2S. Else if M ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 then
pi2〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 7→ 〈case A of ` ⇒ pi2B | r ⇒ pi2C〉 by pi2C.
Else M simp so by Lemma21 have M ≡ 〈[A,B]〉 so pi2〈[A,B]〉 7→ B by pi2β.
Case [∗]E, term [unroll M ]. By IH, M 7→ M ′ or M normal. If M 7→ M ′
then [unroll M ] 7→ [unroll M ′] by unroll. Else if M ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B
| r ⇒ C〉 then [unroll 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉] 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ [unroll B]
| r ⇒ [unroll C]〉 by unrollC. Else M simp so by Lemma21 have M ≡ [roll A] so
[unroll [roll A]] 7→ A by unrollβ.
Case 〈∗〉C, term 〈case∗ A of s⇒ B | g ⇒ C〉. By IH, A 7→ A′ or A normal.
If A 7→ A′ then 〈case∗ A of s⇒ B | g ⇒ C〉 7→ 〈case∗ A′ of s⇒ B | g ⇒ C〉 by
caseS. Else if M ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 then 〈case∗ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B
| r ⇒ C〉 of s⇒ D | g ⇒ E〉 7→ 〈case A of `⇒ 〈case∗ B of s⇒ D | g ⇒ E〉
| r ⇒ 〈case∗ C of s ⇒ D | g ⇒ E〉〉 by caseC. Else M simp so by Lemma21
have M ≡ 〈stop A〉 or M ≡ 〈go A〉 so 〈case∗ 〈stop A〉 of s ⇒ B | g ⇒ C〉 7→
[A/`]B and 〈case∗ 〈go A〉 of s⇒ B | g ⇒ C〉 7→ [A/r]C by caseβL and caseβR.
Case [∪]I, term [M,N ]. By IH, M 7→ M ′ or M normal. If M 7→ M ′ then
[M,N ] 7→ [M ′, N ] by [∧]S1. Else if M ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 then
[〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉, N ] 7→ 〈case A of ` ⇒ [B,N ] | r ⇒ [C,N ]〉 by
∧C1. Else M simp. By IH, N 7→ N ′ or N normal. If N 7→ N ′ then [M,N ] 7→
[M,N ′] by [∧]S2. Else if N ≡ 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 then [M, 〈case A of
` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉] 7→ 〈case A of ` ⇒ [M,B] | r ⇒ [M,C]〉 by ∧C2. Else
N simp, so [M,N ] normal.
Case 〈∪〉E, term 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉. By IH, A 7→ A′ or A normal.
If A 7→ A′ then 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 7→ 〈case A′ of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 by
caseS. Else A normal. If A ≡ 〈case D of `⇒ E | r ⇒ F 〉 then 〈case 〈case D of
` ⇒ E | r ⇒ F 〉 of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 7→ 〈case D of ` ⇒ 〈case E of ` ⇒ B
| r ⇒ C〉 | r ⇒ 〈case F of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉〉 by caseC. Else A simp so by
Lemma21, A ≡ ` ·M or A ≡ r ·M . In the first case, 〈case ` ·M of ` ⇒ B
| r ⇒ C〉 7→ [M/`]B by caseβL else 〈case r ·M of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 7→ [M/r]C
by caseβR.
Case loop, term (M rep p : J. N in O) By IH, M 7→M ′ or M normal. If M
7→M ′ then (M rep p : J. N in O) 7→ (M ′ rep p : J. N in O) by repS. Else ifM ≡
〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 then 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 rep p : J. N in O
7→ 〈case A of `⇒ (B rep p : J. N in O) | r ⇒ (C rep p : J. N in O)〉 by repC.
ElseM simp so (M rep p : J. N in O) 7→ [roll 〈M, ([M/p]N)◦q(q rep p : J. N in O)〉]
by repβ.
Case 〈:∗〉E, term unpack(M,py. N). By IH, M 7→M ′ or M normal. If M 7→
M ′ then unpack(M,py. N) 7→ unpack(M,py. N) by : ∗S. Else ifM ≡ 〈case A of
`⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 then unpack(〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉, py. N) 7→ 〈case A of
` ⇒ unpack(B, py. N) | r ⇒ unpack(C, py. N)〉 by : ∗C. Else M simp and
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by Lemma21 then M ≡ 〈f yx :∗ p. M ′〉 so unpack(〈f yx :∗ q. M〉, py. N) 7→
(Ghost[x = f yx ](q. [M/p]N))
x
y by unpackβ.
Case hyp, term x. By inversion on · ` x : φ then x ∈ ·, so the case holds by
absurdity.
Case M, term M◦pN . By IH, M 7→ M ′ or M normal. If M 7→ M ′ then
M◦pN 7→ M ′◦pN by ◦S. else if M ≡ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 then
〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉◦pN 7→ 〈case A of ` ⇒ B◦pN | r ⇒ C◦pN〉 by
◦C. ElseM normal. We proceed by cases onM . By Lemma21, it suffices to show
the cases for introduction forms. The termination argument is by lexicographic
induction on the postcondition formula φ and on the derivation M .
Case 〈?〉I, term (λp : φ. M): Then by λφ◦ have (λp : φ. M)◦pN 7→ (λp :
φ. M◦pN)
Case [:∗]I, term (λx : Q. M): Then by λ◦ have (λx : Q. M)◦pN 7→ (λx :
Q. (M◦pN))
Case [∪]I, term [A,B]: Then by [∧]◦ have [A,B]◦pN 7→ [A◦pN,B◦pN ].
Case 〈?〉I, term 〈A,B〉: Then by 〈∧〉◦ have 〈A,B〉◦pN 7→ 〈A, [B/p]N〉
Case 〈:∗〉I, term 〈f yx :∗ p. M〉: Then by :∗◦ 〈f yx :∗ p. M〉◦pN 7→ 〈f yx :∗ p. M◦p[q/f ]N〉
Case 〈[d]〉I (diamond), term 〈yield M〉: Then by 〈d〉◦ have 〈yield M〉◦pN 7→
〈yield M◦pN〉
Case 〈[d]〉I (box), term [yield M ]: Then by [d]◦ have [yield M ]◦pN 7→ [yield M◦pN ]
Case 〈∪〉I1, term ` ·M : Then by 〈[`·]〉◦ have (` ·M)◦pN 7→ ` · (M◦pN)
Case 〈∪〉I2, term r ·M : Then by 〈[r·]〉◦ have (r ·M)◦pN 7→ r · (M◦pN)
Case [∗]R, term [rollM ]: Then by [∗]◦ have [roll M ]◦pN 7→ [roll 〈pi1M◦p(N xy ), pi2M◦tt◦pN〉]
Case 〈∗〉S, term 〈stopM〉: Then by 〈[`·]〉◦ have 〈stop M〉◦pN 7→ 〈stopM◦pN〉
Case 〈∗〉G, term 〈go M〉: Then by 〈[r·]〉◦ have 〈go M〉◦pN 7→ 〈go M◦pN〉
Case 〈[:=]〉I (diamond), term 〈x := f yx in p. M〉: Then by 〈:=◦〉 have 〈y := f xy in p. M〉◦pN
7→ 〈y := f xy in p. [M/p]N〉
Case 〈[:=]〉I (box), term [x := f yx in p. M ]: Then by [:=◦] have [y := f xy in p. M ]◦pN
7→ [y := f xy in p. [M/p]N ]
Case 〈[;]〉I (box), term [ι M ]: Then by [ι◦] have ([ι M ])◦pN 7→ [ι (M◦qq◦t[t/p]N)]
Case 〈[;]〉I (diamond), term 〈ι M〉: Then by 〈ι◦〉 have (〈ι M〉)◦pN 7→ 〈ι (M◦qq◦t[t/p]N)〉
Lemma 23 (Structurality). Rules W, X, and C are admissible.
W
Γ `M : φ
Γ, p : ψ `M : φ
X
Γ, p : φ, q : ψ `M : ρ
Γ, q : ψ, p : φ `M : ρ
C
Γ, p : φ, q : φ `M : ρ
Γ, p : φ ` [p/q]M : ρ
Proof. To show each rule admissible, prove that when the premisses are deriv-
able, the conclusion is derivable. Each proof is by induction on the proof term
M .
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Observe that the only premisses regarding Γ are of the form Γ (x) = φ. Such
premisses are preserved when extending Γ with a fresh proof variable p : φ,
as needed by weakening. Premisses are also preserved under exchange, because
contexts are understood as sets to begin with, i.e., the premiss Γ (p) = φ is
ignorant of the position of x. Premisses are preserved modulo renaming under
contraction because the assumption Γ (p) = φ is as good as the assumption
Γ (q) = φ.
We note briefly that the inductive hypothesis can always be applied when
needed. The context Γ is kept universally quantified in the induction over M .
When proving Γ ` M : φ, we sometimes have assumptions in an empty or sin-
gleton context; for weakening we need not apply the IH at all in these cases,
and for exchange and contraction we simply vary the context as we apply the
inductive hypothesis. We also vary the context in the inductive hypothesis of the
assignment rule.
Lemma 24 (Proof term renaming). If Γ `M : φ then Γ yx `M yx : φ yx . If x
or y is fresh in both M and φ and Γ yx `M : φ then Γ `M : φ.
Proof. Induction on M analogous to the proof of Lemma26.
Lemma 25 (Proof term-term substitution). If Γ ` M : φ and Mfx is ad-
missible then Γ fx `Mfx : φfx.
Proof. Induction on M analogous to the proof of Lemma26.
Lemma 26 (Proof term substitution). If Γ, p : ψ ` M : φ and Γ ` N : ψ
then Γ ` [N/p]M : φ.
By induction on the derivation Γ, p : ψ `M : φ, generalizing the context.
Case 〈[:=]〉I (diamond): In this case to avoid clash let’s say the substituted
proof variable was t not p. By premiss, have Γ yx , t : ψ
y
x , p : (x = f
y
x ) ` M
: φ. Now regroup the context as ([y/x]Γ, p : (x = f yx ), t : ψ
y
x ). By Lemma24
on N and weakening have Γ yx , p : (x = f
y
x ) ` N yx : ψ yx . Then we can ap-
ply the IH on M but varying the context to Γ yx , p : (x = f
y
x ) and varying
N to N yx , which yields Γ
y
x , p : (x = f
y
x ) ` [N yx/t]M : φ, then by 〈[:=]〉I have
Γ ` 〈x := f yx in p. [N yx/t]M〉 : [x := f ]φ. Note to avoid capture, the substitu-
tion case for assignment does a renaming, i.e., [N/t]〈x := f yx in p. M〉 = 〈x :=
f yx in p. [N
y
x/t]M〉
Case 〈:∗〉I: By premiss have Γ yx , t : ψ yx , p : (x = f yx ) `M : φ for some state-
computable computable function f . Now regoup the context as ([y/x]Γ, p : (x =
f yx ), t : ψ
y
x ). By Lemma24 on N and weakening have Γ
y
x , p : (x = f
y
x ) ` N yx
: ψ yx . Then apply IH on M, varying context to Γ
y
x , p : (x = f
y
x ) and varying
N to N yx , which yields Γ
y
x , p : (x = f
y
x ) ` [N yx/t]M : φ, then by 〈:∗〉I have
Γ ` 〈f yx :∗ p. [N/t]M〉 : 〈x := ∗〉φ. The case holds since [N/t]〈f yx :∗ p. M〉 =〈f yx :∗ p. [N/t]M〉. Note the formula (x = f yx ) is more subtle than it first
appears, because f is an arbitrary computable function, not strictly an element
of the term language, however renaming and formulas generalize just fine from
terms to computable functions.
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Case 〈:∗〉E, postcondition ρ, term unpack(A, py. B), call the substituted
variable t. Assume the side condition that x /∈ FV(ρ). By premiss have D1
is Γ, t : ψ ` A : 〈x := ∗〉φ and D2 is (Γ, t : ψ) zx , p : φ ` B : ρ. By IH on D1
have Γ ` [ψ/t]A : 〈x := ∗〉φ. In D2 reorder the context as (Γ zx , p : φ), t : ψ zx ,
then observe by Lemma24 have Γ zx ` N zx : ψ zx and by weakening, Γ zx , p : φ` N zx : ψ zx so by IH on D2 have Γ zx , p : φ ` [N zx/t]B : ρ, so by 〈:∗〉E have Γ` unpack([N/t]A, py. [N zx/t]B) : ρ. Note then that this case of substitution re-
names forN ’s withinB, i.e., [N/t]unpack(A, py. B) = unpack([N/t]A, py. [N zx/t]B)
as desired.
Case 〈∗〉I, variable t: By the premisses, have D1 is Γ, t : ψ ` A : ϕ and
have D2 is p : ϕ, q : (M0 = M  0) ` B : 〈α〉(ϕ ∧M0 ) for fresh M0 and
have D3 is p : ϕ, q : (M = 0) ` C : φ. By IH on D1 have Γ ` [N/t]A : ϕ,
then reusing D2 as is, apply 〈∗〉I giving Γ ` for(p : ϕ(M) = [N/t]A; q.B;C){α}
: 〈α∗〉φ. This completes the case since [N/t](for(p : ϕ(M) = A; q.B;C){α}) =
for(p : ϕ(M) = [N/t]A; q.B;C){α}. Note substitution does not substitute in
the B or C branches, which cannot access t to begin with.
Case FP, postcondition ρ: By the premisses, have D1 is Γ, t : ψ ` A
: 〈α∗〉φ, D2 is p : φ ` B : ρ, and D3 is q : 〈α〉ρ ` C : ρ. By IH on D1 have
Γ ` [N/t]A : 〈α∗〉φ, then apply FP reusing D2 and D3 as-is: yielding Γ `
FP([N/t]A, s. B, g. C) : ρ, which completes the case since [N/t]FP(A, s. B, g. C) =
FP([N/t]A, s. B, g. C). Note that it does not substitute in the B and C branches
because they cannot access t in the first place.
Case 〈∗〉S, postcondition 〈α∗〉φ: By premiss, Γ, p : ψ ` M : φ. By IH, Γ `
[N/p]M : φ and by 〈∗〉S, Γ ` 〈stop [N/p]M〉 : 〈α∗〉φ, then the case holds because
[N/p]〈stop M〉 = 〈stop [N/p]M〉.
Case 〈∗〉G, postcondition 〈α∗〉φ: By premiss, Γ, p : ψ ` M : φ. By IH, Γ
` [N/p]M : 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ and by 〈∗〉G, Γ ` 〈go [N/p]M〉 : 〈α∗〉φ, then the case holds
because [N/p]〈go M〉 = 〈go [N/p]M〉.
Case 〈∗〉C, postcondition ρ, assume without loss of generality p has been uni-
formly renamed so p /∈ {s, g}. By D1, Γ, p : ψ ` A : 〈α∗〉φ. By D2, Γ, p : ψ, s : φ
` B : ρ. By D3, Γ, p : ψ, g : 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ ` C : ρ. By weakening on N and IH1, Γ
` [N/p]A : 〈α∗〉φ, by weakening on N and IH2, Γ, s : ψ ` [N/p]B : ρ, and by IH3
Γ, g : 〈α〉〈α∗〉ψ ` [N/p]C : ρ, then by 〈∗〉C, Γ ` 〈case∗ [N/p]A of s⇒ [N/p]B | g ⇒
[N/p]C〉 : ρ.
Case 〈∪〉I1, postcondition 〈α ∪ β〉φ: By premiss, Γ, p : ψ ` M : 〈α〉φ. By
IH, Γ ` [N/p]M : 〈α〉φ, and by 〈∪〉I1 Γ ` 〈` · [N/p]M〉 : 〈α ∪ β〉φ, then the case
holds because [N/p]〈` ·M〉 = 〈` · [N/p]M〉.
Case 〈∪〉I2, postcondition 〈α ∪ β〉φ: By premiss, Γ, p : ψ ` M : 〈β〉φ. By
IH, Γ ` [N/p]M : 〈β〉φ, and by 〈∪〉I2 Γ ` 〈r · [N/p]M〉 : 〈α ∪ β〉φ, then the case
holds because [N/p]〈r ·M〉 = 〈r · [N/p]M〉.
Case 〈∪〉E, postcondition φ, term 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉: By pre-
misses, D1 is Γ, p : ψ ` A : 〈α ∪ β〉ρ, D2 is Γ, p : ψ, ` : 〈α〉ρ ` B : φ, and
D3 is Γ, p : ψ, r : 〈β〉ρ ` C : φ. By weakening, Γ, ` : 〈α〉ρ ` N : ψ and
Γ, r : 〈β〉ρ ` N : ψ. By IH then Γ ` [N/p]A : 〈α ∪ β〉ρ and Γ, ` : 〈α〉ρ ` [N/p]B :
φ and Γ, r : 〈β〉ρ ` [N/p]C : φ. Then by 〈∪〉E, have Γ ` 〈case [N/p]A of
Constructive Game Logic 67
` ⇒ [N/p]B | r ⇒ [N/p]C〉 : ψ, then since p /∈ {`, r} (by renaming if nec-
essary) have [N/p]〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 = 〈case [N/p]A of ` ⇒ [N/p]B
| r ⇒ [N/p]C〉 which completes the case.
Case 〈?〉I, postcondition 〈?ρ〉φ, term 〈A,B〉: By premisses have D1 that
Γ, p : ψ ` A : ρ and D2 that Γ, p : ψ ` B : φ. By IH have Γ ` [N/p]A : ρ
and Γ ` [N/p]B : φ. By 〈?〉I have Γ ` 〈[N/p]A, [N/p]B〉 : 〈?ρ〉φ. Then since
[N/p]〈A,B〉 equals 〈[N/p]A, [N/p]B〉 this completes the case.
Case 〈?〉E1, postcondition ρ, term pi1M : By premiss, have Γ, p : ψ ` M
: 〈?ρ〉φ. By IH, have Γ ` [N/p]M : 〈?ρ〉φ, then by 〈?〉E1 have Γ ` pi1[N/p]M : ρ,
then [N/p]pi1M = pi1[N/p]M which completes the case.
Case 〈?〉E2, postcondition φ, term pi2M : By premiss, have Γ, p : ψ ` M
: 〈?ρ〉φ. By IH, have Γ ` [N/p]M : 〈?ρ〉φ, then by 〈?〉E2 have Γ ` pi2[N/p]M : φ,
then [N/p]pi2M = pi2[N/p]M which completes the case.
Case 〈[;]〉I: By premiss, have Γ, p : ψ ` M : 〈[α]〉〈[β]〉φ. By IH, have Γ `
[N/p]M : 〈[α]〉〈[β]〉φ, then by 〈[;]〉I have Γ ` 〈[ι [N/p]M ]〉 : 〈[α;β]〉φ, then [N/p]〈[ι M ]〉 =
〈[ι ([N/p]M)]〉 which completes the case.
Case 〈[d]〉I: By premiss, have Γ, p : ψ `M : 〈[α]〉φ. By IH, have Γ ` [N/p]M :
〈[α]〉φ, then by 〈[d]〉I have Γ ` 〈[yield [N/p]M ]〉 : [〈αd〉]φ, then [N/p]〈[yield M ]〉 =
〈[yield ([N/p]M)]〉 which completes the case.
Case 〈[:=]〉I (box): In this case to avoid confusion let’s say the substituted
proof variable was t not p. By premiss, have Γ yx , t : ψ
y
x , p : (x = f
y
x ) ` M
: φ. Now regroup the context as (Γ yx , p : (x = f
y
x ), t : ψ
y
x ). By Lemma24
and weakening have Γ yx , p : (x = f
y
x ) ` N yx : ψyx. Then we can apply the IH
on M but varying the context to Γ yx , p : (x = f
y
x ) and varying N to N
y
x ,
which yields Γ yx , p : (x = f
y
x ) ` ([(N yx )/t]M) : φ, then by 〈[:=]〉I have Γ `
[x := f yx in p. ([(N
y
x )/t]M)] : [x := f ]φ. Note that to avoid capture, this case of
substitution renames, i.e., [N/t][x := f yx in p. M ] = [x := f
y
x in p. [N
y
x/t]M ]
Case [:∗]I, here call the substituted variable t: By premiss, have (Γ, t : ψ) yx`M : φ. Regroup the context as (Γ yx ), t : ψ yx . By Lemma24 have Γ yx ` N yx : φ yx .
Then apply IH for M and varying to Γ yx and N
y
x , yielding Γ
y
x ` [N yx/t]M : φ,
then by [:∗]I have Γ ` (λx : Q. [N yx/t]M) : [x := ∗]φ. Note that to avoid capture,
this case of substitution renames, i.e., [N/t](λx : Q. M) = λx : Q. ([(N yx )/t]M).
Case [:∗]E: By premiss, have Γ, t : ψ ` M : [x := ∗]φ. By IH, have Γ `
[N/t]M : [x := ∗]φ. By [:∗]E have Γ ` ([N/t]M) f : φfx, then the case holds since
[N/t](M f) = ([N/t]M) f
Case loop: By premisses, have D1 is Γ, t : ψ ` A : J and D2 is q : J ` B
: [α]J and D3 is q : J ` C : φ. By IH on D1 have Γ ` [N/t]A : J, then applying
loop without changing D2 or D3, have Γ ` ([N/t]A) rep q : J. B in C : [α∗]φ.
This concludes the case since [N/t](A rep q. B in ) = ([N/t]A) rep q. B in , i.e.,
no substitution in B or C since they cannot access t anyway.
Case [∗]R, postcondition [α∗]φ: By premiss, Γ, p : ψ ` M : φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ. By
IH, Γ ` [N/p]M : φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ and by [∗]R, Γ ` [roll [N/p]M ] : [α∗]φ, then the
case holds because [N/p][roll M ] = [roll [N/p]M ].
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Case [∗]E, postcondition φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ: By premiss, Γ, p : ψ ` M : [α∗]φ. By
IH, Γ ` [N/p]M : [α∗]φ and by [∗]E, Γ ` [unroll [N/p]M ] : φ∧ [α][α∗]φ, then the
case holds because [N/p][unroll M ] = [unroll [N/p]M ].
Case [∪]I, postcondition [α ∪ β]φ, term [A,B]: By premisses have D1 that
Γ, p : ψ ` A : [α]φ and D2 that Γ, p : ψ ` B : [β]φ. By IH have Γ ` [N/p]A : [α]φ
and Γ ` [N/p]B : [β]φ. By [∪]I have Γ ` [[N/p]A, [N/p]B] : [α ∪ β]φ. Then since
[N/p][A,B] = [[N/p]A, [N/p]B] this completes the case.
Case [∪]E1, postcondition [α]φ, term [pi1M ]: By premiss, have Γ, p : ψ
` M : [α ∪ β]φ. By IH, have Γ ` [N/p]M : [α ∪ β]φ, then by [∪]E1 have Γ
` [pi1[N/p]M ] : [α]φ, then [N/p][pi1M ] = [pi1[N/p]M ] which completes the case.
Case [∪]E2, postcondition [β]φ, term [pi2M ]: By premiss, have Γ, p : ψ
` M : [α ∪ β]φ. By IH, have Γ ` [N/p]M : [α ∪ β]φ, then by [∪]E2 have Γ
` [pi2[N/p]M ] : [β]φ, then [N/p][pi2M ] = [pi2[N/p]M ] which completes the case.
Case [?]I, postcondition [?ρ]φ, term λq : ρ. M : By premiss, have Γ, p : ψ, q : ρ
`M : φ. By weakening, have Γ, q : ρ ` N : ψ. By IH, have Γ, q : ρ `M : φ so by
[?]I have λq : ρ. ([N/p]M). Then (by renaming if necessary) [N/p](λq : ρ. M) =
λq : ρ. ([N/p]M) as desired.
Case [?]E, postcondition φ, term A B: By premiss, have Γ, p : ψ ` A : [?ρ]φ
and Γ, p : ψ ` B : ρ. By IH, have Γ ` [N/p]A : [?ρ]φ and Γ ` [N/p]B : ρ, then
[N/p]A B = [N/p]A [N/p]B as desired.
Case 〈[;]〉I (box): By premiss, have Γ, p : ψ ` M : [α][β]φ. By IH, have Γ
` [N/p]M : [α][β]φ, then by 〈[;]〉I have Γ ` [ι [N/p]M ] : [α;β]φ, then [N/p][ι M ] =
[ι [N/p]M ] which completes the case.
Case 〈[d]〉I (box): By premiss, have Γ, p : ψ ` M : 〈α〉φ. By IH, have Γ `
[N/p]M : 〈α〉φ, then by 〈[d]〉I have Γ ` 〈yield [N/p]M〉 : [αd]φ, then [N/p]〈yield M〉 =
〈yield [N/p]M〉 which completes the case.
Case M, postcondition 〈α〉ρ, term A◦qB: Let x = BV(α) and y be a vector
of fresh variables of the same length. By D1 have Γ, p : ψ ` A : 〈α〉φ and by D2
have (Γ, p : ψ)yx , q : φ ` B : ρ. Then by IH on D1, have (1) Γ ` [N/p]A : 〈α〉φ.
By Lemma ?? (|x| times) on N and weakening, have Γ yx , q : φ ` N yx : φyx , then
because (((Γ, p : ψ)yx ), q : φ = ((Γ )
y
x , q : φ), p : ψ
y
x ), we can apply the IH on D2,
giving (2) (Γ )yx , q : φ ` [N yx/p]B : ρ. Then apply M to (1) and (2), giving Γ` ([N/p]A)◦q[N yx/p]B : 〈α〉ρ. Note that the substutition avoids capture in the
B branch, that is [N/p](A◦qB) = ([N/p]A)◦q[N yx/p]B, so that the case holds.
Case hyp, postcondition φ: That is, the proof term is some variable q. If
q = p, then [N/p]q = N and Γ ` N : ψ by assumption. Moreover φ = ψ since
Γ, p : φ = Γ, p : ψ assigns only one type to p. Thus trivially Γ ` [N/p]q : φ as
desired. Else q 6= p, so [N/p]q = q and q ∈ Γ, so that Γ ` q : φ by hyp and thus
Γ ` [N/p]q : φ as well.
Lemma 27 (Preservation). If · `M : φ and M 7→M ′ then · `M ′ : φ
Proof. By induction on the evaluation trace M 7→M ′.
We split the cases of the proof according to the four main kinds of rules: Beta
rules, structural rules, monotonicity-conversion rules, and commuting-conversion
rules. While the cases within each class are not necessarily symmetric, they
usually share a similar proof approach.
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We give the beta rules first.
Case λφβ, rule (λp : ψ. M) N 7→ [N/p]M , postcondition φ: By inversion, ·
`M : ψ → φ and · ` N : ψ. Then by Lemma26, have · ` [N/p]M : φ as desired.
Case λβ, rule (λx : Q. M) f 7→Mfx , postcondition φfx: By inversion · yx `M
: φ, Then by Lemma25 have · yxfx ` Mfx : φfx. Then note · yx
f
x
= · yx for y fresh in
Mfx and in φfx, so by Lemma24, · `Mfx : φfx.
Case pi1β, rule pi1〈[A,B]〉 7→ A, postcondition φ: By inversion twice, · ` A : φ
as desired.
Case pi2β: By inversion twice, · ` B : φ as desired.
Case caseβL, rule 〈case ` · A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 7→ [A/`]B, postcondition
φ: By inversion · ` A : 〈α〉ψ, for some α,ψ. By inversion, ` : 〈α〉ψ ` B : φ, then
by Lemma26 · ` [A/`]B : φ as desired.
Case caseβR, rule 〈case r ·A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 7→ [A/r]C, postcondition
φ: By inversion · ` A : 〈β〉ψ, for some β, ψ. By inversion, r : 〈β〉ψ ` C : φ, then
by Lemma26 · ` [A/r]C : φ as desired.
Case unpackβ, rule unpack(〈f yx :∗ p. M〉, py. N) 7→ [f,M/x, y]N , postcon-
dition φ: By inversion, · ` M : ψfx and · zx , y : ψ ` N : φ. Then note x is free in
· zx . By Lemma25 have · zxfx, y : ψfx ` Nfx : φfx which simplifies to · zx , y : ψfx ` Nfx
: φ (by trivial context identities and because x was fresh in φ by side condition)
and then simplifies again by Lemma24 (using side condition z /∈ FV(Nfx )) to
y : ψfx ` Nfx : φ Then by Lemma26 have · ` [M/y]Nfx : φ where [M/y]Nfx is a
funny way of writing [f,M/x, y]N , as desired.
Case FPβ, rule FP(A, s. B, g. C) 7→ 〈case∗ A of s⇒ B | g ⇒ [g◦tFP(t, s. B, g. C)/g]C〉,
postcondition ψ: By inversion, D1 is · ` A : 〈α∗〉φ, D2 is (1)s : φ ` B : ψ, and
D3 is g : 〈α〉ψ ` C : ψ. On the other branch, note t : 〈α∗〉φ ` FP(t, s. B, g. C)
: ψ, by FP then by hyp and by D2 and D3. Then by M, have g : 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ
` g◦tFP(t, s. B, g. C) : 〈α〉ψ by the previous line and by weakening and hyp.
Next, apply Lemma26 to D3, (first weakening it with Γ ), getting (2) g : 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ
` [g◦tFP(t, s. B, g. C)/g]C : ψ. Now apply rule 〈∪〉E (which is the eliminator for
〈α∗〉φ as well) to facts (1) and (2), which yields · ` 〈case∗ A of s ⇒ B | g ⇒
[g◦tFP(t, s. B, g. C)/g]C〉 : ψ as desired.
Case repβ, rule (M rep p : J. N in O) 7→ [roll 〈M, ([M/p]N)◦q(q rep p : J. N in O)〉]:
By inversion have D1 is · `M : J and D2 is p : J ` N : [α]J and D3 is p : J ` O
: φ.
Note (1) q : J ` (q rep p : J. N in O) : [α∗]φ by loop since q : J ` q : J by hyp
and p : J ` N : [α]J by D2. Then (2) · ` [M/p]N : [α]J by Lemma26 and D1 and
D2 and weakening. Then from (1) and (2) by M have · ` ([M/p]N)◦q(q rep p : J. N in O)
: [α][α∗]φ Then by 〈?〉I have · ` 〈M, ([M/p]N)◦q(q rep p : J. N in O)〉 : φ∧[α][α∗]φ
so by [∗]R have · ` [roll 〈M, ([M/p]N)◦q(q rep p : J. N in O)〉] : [α∗]φ as desired.
Case unrollβ, rule [unroll [roll M ]] 7→ M : By inversion twice, · ` M : φ ∧
[α][α∗]φ as desired.
Case caseβL, rule 〈case ` ·A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 7→ [A/`]B: By inversion, ·
` A : φ and by substitution · ` [A/`]B : ψ as desired. Case for diamond loops is
symmetric.
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Case caseβR, rule 〈case r ·A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 7→ [A/r]C: By inversion, ·
` A : 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ and by substitution · ` [A/r]C : ψ as desired. Case for diamond
loops is symmetric.
Case forβ, rule
for(p : ϕ(M) = A; q.B;C){α} 7→
〈case split [M, 0] of
`⇒ 〈stop [(`, A)/(p, q)]C〉
| r ⇒ Ghost[M0 =M](rr. 〈go (([A, 〈r, rr〉/p, q]B)◦t(for(p : ϕ(M) = pi1t; q.B;C){α}))〉)〉
By inversion, D1 is · ` A : ϕ and D2 is p : ϕ, q : (M0 = M  0) ` B
: 〈α〉(ϕ ∧ M0  M) and D3 is p : ϕ, q : (M = 0) ` C : φ. By split, (1) ·
` split [M,0] : (M = 0∨M  0). Consider the first branch: ` :M≤ 0 ` 〈`, A〉
:M = 0∧ϕ by 〈?〉I and hyp and weakening. Then by 〈∗〉S have (left) ` :M = 0
` 〈stop [(A, `)/(p, q)]C〉 : 〈α∗〉φ Consider the second branch: By 〈?〉I have (x)
pvr :M0 =M, rr :M  0 ` 〈r, rr〉 :M0 =M  0. then by (x) and D2 and
weakening and Lemma26 have (3a) r :M≥ 0, r :M0 =M ` [A, 〈r, rr〉/x, y]B
: 〈α〉(M = 0 ∨M  0). Separately, (3b) t : ϕ ∧M0  M ` for(p : ϕ(M) =
pi1t; q.B;C){α} : 〈α∗〉(M = 0∧ϕ). Then combining (3a) and (3b) with M, have
rr : M0 = M, r : M ≥ 0 ` [A, 〈r, rr〉/x, y]B◦tfor(p : ϕ(M) = pi1t; q.B;C){α}
: 〈α〉〈α∗〉(φ). By 〈∗〉G have rr :M0 =M, rM≥ 0 ` 〈go [A, 〈r, rr〉/x, y]B◦tfor(p : ϕ(M) = pi1t; q.B;C){α}〉
: 〈α∗〉φ. By iG have (3)
r :M≥ 0 (1)
` Ghost[M0 =M](rr. 〈go [A, 〈r, rr〉/x, y]B◦tfor(p : ϕ(M) = pi1t; q.B;C){α}〉)
(2)
: 〈α∗〉φ (3)
Lastly, combining (1), (2), and (3), then by 〈∪〉E have
· (4)
` 〈case split [M, 0] of (5)
`⇒ 〈stop [(A, `)/(p, q)]C〉 (6)
| r ⇒ Ghost[M0 =M](rr. 〈go [A, 〈r, rr〉/x, y]B◦tfor(p : ϕ(M) = pi1t; q.B;C){α}〉)
(7)
: 〈α∗〉φ (8)
as desired.
Structural rules: We do not write out the premisses of the stepping rules
explicitly in each case, because they are very similar. For unary operations ap-
plied to a term M, as well as the left structural rule of any binary operator,
we assume M 7→M ′, or for the right structural rule of any binary operator, we
assume M simp for the left operand and N 7→ N ′ for the right operand.
Case [∧]S1: By the IH, · `M ′ : [α]φ, so by case assumption and by [∪]I then
· ` [M ′, N ] : [α ∪ β]φ.
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Case [∧]S2, [M,N ] 7→ [M,N ′], postcondition [α ∪ β]φ: By the IH, · ` N ′
: [β]φ, so by case assumption and by [∪]I then · ` [M,N ′] : [α ∪ β]φ.
Case 〈∧〉S1 (diamond): By the IH, · `M ′ : φ, so by case assumption and by
〈?〉I then · ` 〈M ′, N〉 : 〈?φ〉ψ.
Case 〈∧〉S2 (diamond): By the IH, · ` N ′ : ψ, so by case assumption and by
〈?〉I then · ` 〈M ′, N〉 : 〈?φ〉ψ.
Case pi1S: By the IH, · ` M ′ : 〈?φ〉ψ so by 〈?〉E1 then · ` 〈pi1M ′〉 : φ. The
case for [pi1M ′] is symmetric.
Case pi2S: By the IH, · ` M ′ : 〈?φ〉ψ so by 〈?〉E2 then · ` 〈pi2M ′〉 : ψ. The
case for [pi2M ′] is symmetric.
Case `·S: By the IH, · `M ′ : 〈α〉φ so by 〈∪〉I1 then · ` ` ·M ′ : 〈α ∪ β〉φ.
Case r·S: By the IH, · `M ′ : 〈β〉φ so by 〈∪〉I2 then · ` r ·M ′ : 〈α ∪ β〉φ.
Case repS: By the IH, · ` M ′ : J so by loop then · ` M ′ rep p : J. N in O
: [α∗]φ.
Case appS1: By the IH, · `M ′ : φ→ ψ so by [?]E then · `M ′ N : ψ.
Case appS2; By the IH, · ` N ′ : φ so by [?]E then · `M N ′ : ψ
Case [ι]S: By the IH, · `M ′ : [α][β]φ so by 〈[;]〉I then · ` [ι M ′] : [α;β]φ
Case 〈ι〉S: By the IH, · `M ′ : 〈α〉〈β〉φ so by 〈[;]〉I then · ` 〈ι M ′〉 : 〈α;β〉φ
Case [d]S: By the IH, · `M ′ : 〈α〉φ so by 〈[d]〉I then · ` [yield M ′] : [αd]φ.
Case 〈d〉S: By the IH, · `M ′ : [α]φ so by 〈[d]〉I then · ` 〈yield M ′〉 : 〈αd〉φ
Case ◦S: By the IH, · `M ′ : 〈α〉φ so by M then · `M ′◦pN : 〈α〉ψ
Case FPS: By the IH, · ` A′ : 〈α∗〉φ so by FP then · ` FP(A′, s. B, g. C)
: ψ.
Case caseS: By the IH, · ` A′ : 〈α ∪ β〉φ so by 〈∪〉E then · ` 〈case A′ of
`⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : ψ.
Case 〈∗〉C (diamond loops): By the IH, · ` A′ : 〈α∗〉φ so by 〈∗〉C then ·
` 〈case∗ A′ of s⇒ B | g ⇒ C〉 : ψ.
Case : ∗S: By the IH, · `M ′ : 〈x := ∗〉φ so by 〈:∗〉E then · ` unpack(M ′, py. N)
: ψ.
Case forS: By the IH, · ` M ′ : ϕ so by 〈∗〉I then · ` for(p : ϕ(M) =
M ′; q.N ;O){α} : 〈α∗〉φ.
Case unroll: By the IH, · ` M ′ : [α∗]φ so by [∗]E then · ` [unroll M ′] : φ ∧
[α][α∗]φ.
We give the monotonicity conversion rules next. In each case, let x denote the
bound variables of the full program and y be a fresh variable vector of the same
size. For subprograms α, β we write a, b for the vectors of bound variables of each
subprogram, a, b for their relative complements BV(β)− BV(α) and vice-versa,
and we affix primes to indicate a vector of fresh variables.
Case λφ◦, rule (λp : φ. M)◦qN 7→ (λp : φ. ([M/q]N)): Note ·yx = ·. By
premisses, have D1 is · ` λp : φ. M : [?φ]ψ and D2 is ·yx , q : ψ ` N : ρ, i.e., q : ψ` N : ρ. By inversion on D1 have p : φ ` M : ψ then p : φ ` [M/q]N : ρ by
Lemma26 and weakening, then by 〈?〉I have · ` λp : φ. ([M/q]N) : [?φ]ρ.
Case λ◦, rule (λx : Q. M)◦qN 7→ (λx : Q. [N/q]M): By premisses, have D1
is · ` (λx : Q. M) : [x := ∗]φ and D2 is ·yx , q : φ ` N : ψ. By inversion on D1 have
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·yx `M : φ since x = x. then ·yx ` [N/q]M : ρ by Lemma26 and weakening, then
by 〈:∗〉I have · ` (λx : Q. ([N/q]M)) : [x := ∗]ψ.
Case [∧]◦, rule [A,B]◦pN 7→ [A◦pN,B◦pN ]: By premisses, have D1 is ·
` [A,B] : [α ∪ β]φ and D2 is ·yx , p : φ ` N : ψ. By inversion on D1 have (1) · ` A
: [α]φ and (2) · ` B : [β]φ. By Lemma24 on D2 have (3a) ·a′a , p : φ ` N aa′ : ψ
since a′ are fresh in ψ and φ, and (3b) · b′b , p : φ ` N bb′ : ψ since b′ are fresh in ψ
and φ. By M on (1) and (3a) have · ` A◦pN aa′ : [α]ψ and by M on (2) and (3b)
D2 have · ` B◦pN bb′ : [β]ψ, lastly by [∪]I have · ` [A◦pN aa′ , B◦pN bb′ ] : [α ∪ β]ψ.
Case 〈∧〉◦, rule 〈A,B〉◦pN 7→ 〈A, [B/p]N〉: Note ·yx = Γ . By premisses,
have D1 is · ` 〈A,B〉 : 〈?φ〉ψ and D2 is p : ψ ` ρ : . By inversion on D1 have (1)
· ` A : φ and (2) · ` B : ψ. By Lemma26, have · ` [N/p]B : ρ. By 〈?〉I have ·
` 〈A, [N/p]B〉 : 〈?φ〉ρ.
Case :∗◦: By premisses, have D1 is · ` 〈f yx :∗ p. M〉 : 〈x := ∗〉φ, and D2 is·yx , q : φ ` N : ψ. then by inversion on D1 have (1) ·yx , p : (x = f yx ) `M : φ. By
weakening on D2 have ·yx , q : φ, p : (x = f yx ) ` N : ψ, then by Lemma25 have·yx , p : (x = f yx ) ` [M/p]N : ψ, and lastly by 〈:∗〉I have · ` 〈f yx :∗ p. [M/p]N〉
: 〈x := ∗〉ψ.
Case 〈d〉◦: By premisses, have D1 is · ` 〈yield M〉 : 〈αd〉φ, and D2 is ·yx , q : φ` N : ψ. By inversion on D1 have (1) · ` M : [α]φ. By M have · ` M◦pN : [α]ψ
so by 〈[d]〉I have · ` 〈yield (M◦pN)〉 : 〈αd〉ψ as desired.
Case [d]◦: By premisses, have D1 is · ` [yield M ] : [αd]φ, and D2 is ·yx , q : φ` N : ψ. By inversion on D1 have (1) · `M : 〈α〉φ. By M have · `M◦pN : 〈α〉ψ
so by 〈[d]〉I have · ` [yield (M◦pN)] : [αd]ψ as desired.
Case 〈[`·]〉◦: By premisses, have D1 is · ` 〈` ·M〉 : 〈α ∪ β〉φ, then by inversion
have (1) · ` M : 〈α〉φ. By M have · ` M◦pN : 〈α〉ψ so by 〈∪〉I1 have · ` ` ·
(M◦pN) : [α ∪ β]ψ as desired.
Case 〈[r·]〉◦: By premisses, have D1 is · ` 〈r ·M〉 : 〈α ∪ β〉φ, then by inversion
have (1) · ` M : 〈β〉φ. By M have · ` M◦pN : 〈β〉ψ so by 〈∪〉I2 have · ` r ·
(M◦pN) : [α ∪ β]ψ as desired.
Case 〈:=◦〉 (diamond): By premisses, have D1 is · ` 〈x := f yx in p. M〉
: 〈x := f〉φ, and D2 is ·yx , q : φ ` N : ψ. then by inversion on D1 have (1) ·yx , p :
(x = f yx ) ` M : φ. By weakening on D2 have ·yx , q : φ, p : (x = f yx ) ` N : ψ,
then by Lemma25 have ·yx , p : (x = f yx ) ` [M/p]N : ψ, and lastly by 〈:∗〉I have· ` 〈x := f yx in p. [M/p]N〉 : 〈x := f〉ψ.
Case [:=◦] (box): By premisses, have D1 is · ` [x := f yx in p. M ] : [x := f ]φ,
and D2 is ·yx , q : φ ` N : ψ. then by inversion on D1 have (1) ·yx , p : (x = f yx )` M : φ. By weakening on D2 have ·yx , q : φ, p : (x = f yx ) ` N : ψ, then by
Lemma25 have ·yx , p : (x = f yx ) ` [M/p]N : ψ, and lastly by 〈:∗〉I have · ` [x :=
f yx in p. [M/p]N ] : [x := f ]ψ.
Case [ι◦]: By premisses have D1 is · ` [ι M ] : [α;β]φ, and D2 is ·yx , p : φ
` N : ψ. By inversion on D1 have (1) · `M : [α][β]φ. From D2 have(2) ·a′a , p : φ
` N aa′ : ψ by Lemma24 since a′ are fresh in φ and ψ. Then by M on (2) have
q : [β]φ ` q◦pN aa′ : [β]ψ, then by M again have · ` M◦qq◦p(N aa′ ) : [α][β]ψ and
finally by 〈[;]〉I have · ` [ι M◦q(q◦p(N aa′ ))] : [α;β]ψ.
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Case 〈ι◦〉: By premisses have D1 is · ` 〈ι M〉 : 〈α;β〉φ, and D2 is p : φ ` N
: ψ. By inversion on D1 have (1) · `M : 〈α〉〈β〉φ. By Lemma26 on D2 have t : φ
` [t/p]N : ψ, then by M have q : 〈β〉φ ` q◦t([t/p]N) : 〈β〉ψ, then by M again have
· ` M◦qq◦t([t/p]N) : 〈α〉〈β〉ψ and finally by 〈[;]〉I have · ` 〈ι M◦q(q◦t([t/p]N))〉
: 〈α;β〉ψ.
Case [∗]◦: By premisses have D1 is · ` [rollM ] : [α∗]φ, and D2 is ·yx , p : φ ` N
: ψ. Then have (2a) p : φ ` N xy : ψ by Lemma24 since y are fresh. By inversion
on D1 have (1) · `M : φ∧ [α][α∗]φ. Then by 〈?〉E1 and 〈?〉E1 have (1a) · ` pi1M
: φ and (1b) · ` pi2M : [α][α∗]φ By M on (1a) and (2a) have (L) · ` pi1M◦pN xy
: ψ. By M on D2 and weakening then have ·yx , t : [α∗]φ ` t◦pN : [α∗]ψ , then by
M again and (1b) have (R) · ` pi2M◦pt◦pN : [α][α∗]ψ. Finally, from (L) and (R)
have by 〈?〉I, · ` 〈pi1M◦p(N xy ), pi2M◦tt◦pN〉 : ψ ∧ [α][α∗]ψ and immediately by
[∗]R · ` [roll 〈pi1M◦p(N xy ), pi2M◦tt◦pN〉] : [α∗]ψ.
Case 〈[`·]〉◦ (diamond loops): By premisses have D1 is · ` 〈stop M〉 : 〈α∗〉φ,
and D2 is ·yx , p : φ ` N : ψ. By inversion on D1 have (1) · `M : φ. By Lemma24
on D2 have p : φ ` N aa′ : ψ since a′ are fresh in φ and ψ. Then by Lemma26 then
have · ` [M/p]N aa′ : ψ so by 〈∗〉S have · ` 〈stop [M/p]N aa′ 〉 : 〈α∗〉ψ as desired.
Case 〈[r·]〉◦ (diamond loop): By premisses have D1 is · ` 〈go M〉 : 〈α∗〉φ,
and D2 is ·yx , p : φ ` N : ψ. By inversion on D1 have (1) · ` M : 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ.
By M have ·yx , t : 〈α∗〉φ ` t◦qN : 〈α〉ψ. Note this application checks even
with ·yx because in checking N we can exploit ·yx zx = ·yx , where z is the ad-
ditional vector of fresh variables used in the second application. Then by M
again have q : 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ ` q◦tt◦pN : 〈α〉〈α∗〉ψ. Then by Lemma26 and (1)have ·
` [M/q]q◦tt◦pN : 〈α〉〈α∗〉ψ so by 〈∗〉G have · ` 〈go [M/q]q◦tt◦pN〉 : 〈α∗〉ψ
We give the commuting conversion rules next.
Case ιC: From premisses, D1 is · ` 〈ι 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉〉 : 〈α;β〉φ
and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : 〈α〉〈β〉φ. (A) · ` A
: ψ ∨ ρ. (B) ` : ψ ` B : 〈α〉〈β〉φ. (C) r : ρ ` C : 〈α〉〈β〉φ. Then by 〈[;]〉I have (B1)
` : ψ ` 〈ι B〉 : 〈α;β〉φ. (C1) r : ρ ` 〈ι C〉 : 〈α;β〉φ, then by 〈∪〉E on (A) have ·
` 〈case A of `⇒ 〈ι B〉 | r ⇒ 〈ι C〉〉 : 〈α;β〉φ
Case ιC: From premisses, D1 is · ` [ι 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉] : [α;β]φ
and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : [α][β]φ. (A) · ` A
: ψ ∨ ρ. (B) ` : ψ ` B : [α][β]φ. (C) r : ρ ` C : [α][β]φ. Then by 〈[;]〉I have (B1)
` : ψ ` 〈ι B〉 : [α;β]φ. (C1) r : ρ ` 〈ι C〉 : [α;β]φ, then by 〈∪〉E on (A) have ·
` 〈case A of `⇒ [ι B] | r ⇒ [ι C]〉 : [α;β]φ
Case ∧C1: From premisses, D1 is · ` [〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉, N ]
: [α ∪ β]φ and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : [α]φ. (A) · ` A
: ψ ∨ ρ. (B) ` : ψ ` B : [α]φ. (C) r : ρ ` C : [α]φ. Then by [∪]I and weakening
on N have (B1) ` : ψ ` [B,N ] : [α ∪ β]φ. (C1) r : ρ ` [C,N ] : [α ∪ β]φ, then by
〈∪〉E on (A) have · ` 〈case A of `⇒ [B,N ] | r ⇒ [C,N ]〉 : [α ∪ β]φ
Case ∧C2: From premisses, D1 is · ` [M, 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉]
: [α ∪ β]φ and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : [β]φ. (A) · ` A
: ψ ∨ ρ. (B) ` : ψ ` B : [β]φ. (C) r : ρ ` C : [β]φ. Then by [∪]I and weakening
on M have (B1) ` : ψ ` [M,B] : [α ∪ β]φ. (C1) r : ρ ` [M,C] : [α ∪ β]φ, then by
〈∪〉E on (A) have · ` 〈case A of `⇒ [M,B] | r ⇒ [M,C]〉 : [α ∪ β]φ
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Case ∧C1: From premisses,D1 is · ` 〈〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉, N〉 : 〈?ψ〉φ
and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : ψ. (A) · ` A : ζ ∨ ρ. (B)
` : ζ ` B : ψ. (C) r : ρ ` C : ψ. Then by 〈?〉I and weakening on N have (B1)
` : ζ ` 〈B,N〉 : 〈?ψ〉φ. (C1) r : ρ ` 〈C,N〉 : 〈?ψ〉φ, then by 〈∪〉E on (A) have ·
` 〈case A of `⇒ 〈B,N〉 | r ⇒ 〈C,N〉〉 : [?ψ]φ
Case ∧C2: From premisses,D1 is · ` 〈M, 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉〉 : 〈?ψ〉φ
and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : ψ. (A) · ` A : ζ ∨ ρ. (B)
` : ζ ` B : ψ. (C) r : ρ ` C : ψ. Then by 〈?〉I and weakening on M have (B1)
` : ζ ` 〈M,B〉 : 〈?ψ〉φ. (C1) r : ρ ` 〈M,C〉 : 〈?ψ〉φ, then by 〈∪〉E on (A) have ·
` 〈case A of `⇒ 〈M,B〉 | r ⇒ 〈M,C〉〉 : [?ψ]φ
Case pi1C: From premisses, D1 is · ` pi1〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : ψ and
by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : 〈?ψ〉φ. (A) · ` A : ζ ∨ ρ. (B)
` : ζ ` B : 〈?ψ〉φ. (C) r : ρ ` C : 〈?ψ〉φ. Then by 〈?〉E1 have (B1) ` : ζ ` pi1B
: ψ. (C1) r : ρ ` pi1C : ψ, then by 〈∪〉E on (A) have · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ pi1B
| r ⇒ pi1C〉 : ψ
Case pi2C: From premisses, D1 is · ` pi2〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : φ and
by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : 〈?ψ〉φ. (A) · ` A : ζ ∨ ρ. (B)
` : ζ ` B : 〈?ψ〉φ. (C) r : ρ ` C : 〈?ψ〉φ. Then by 〈?〉E2 have (B1) ` : ζ ` pi2B
: φ. (C1) r : ρ ` pi2C : φ, then by 〈∪〉E on (A) have · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ pi2B
| r ⇒ pi2C〉 : φ
Case 〈[`·]〉C: From premisses, D1 is · ` ` · 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉
: 〈α ∪ β〉φ and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : 〈α〉φ. (A) ·
` A : ζ ∨ ρ. (B) ` : ζ ` B : 〈α〉φ. (C) r : ρ ` C : 〈α〉φ. Then by 〈∪〉I1 have (B1)
` : ζ ` ` · B : 〈α ∪ β〉φ. (C1) r : ρ ` ` · C : 〈α ∪ β〉φ, then by 〈∪〉E on (A) have ·
` 〈case A of `⇒ ` ·B | r ⇒ ` · C〉 : 〈α ∪ β〉φ
Case r·C: From premisses, D1 is · ` r ·〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : 〈α ∪ β〉φ
and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : 〈β〉φ. (A) · ` A : ζ ∨ ρ.
(B) ` : ζ ` B : 〈β〉φ. (C) r : ρ ` C : 〈β〉φ. Then by 〈∪〉I2 have (B1) ` : ζ ` r · B
: 〈α ∪ β〉φ. (C1) r : ρ ` r ·C : 〈α ∪ β〉φ, then by 〈∪〉E on (A) have · ` 〈case A of
`⇒ r ·B | r ⇒ r · C〉 : 〈α ∪ β〉φ
Case repC: From premisses, D1 is · ` 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 rep p :
J. N in O : [α∗]φ and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : J . (A) ·
` A : ζ ∨ ρ. (B) ` : ζ ` B : J . (C) r : ρ ` C : J . Then by loop and because N is
being applied in the same context as before have (B1) ` : ζ ` B rep p : J. N in O
: [α∗]φ. (C1) r : ρ ` C rep p : J. N in O : [α∗]φ, then by 〈∪〉E on (A) have ·
` 〈case A of `⇒ B rep p : J. N in O | r ⇒ C rep p : J. N in O〉 : [α∗]φ
Case app1C From premisses, D1 is · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 N : φ
and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : ψ → φ. (A) · ` A : ζ ∨ ρ.
(B) ` : ζ ` B : ψ → φ. (C) r : ρ ` C : ψ → φ. Then by [?]E and weakening on
N have (B1) ` : ζ ` B N : φ. (C1) r : ρ ` C N : φ, then by 〈∪〉E on (A) have ·
` 〈case A of `⇒ B N | r ⇒ C N〉 : φ
Case app2C: From premisses, D1 is · ` M 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : φ
and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : ψ. (A) · ` A : ζ ∨ ρ. (B)
` : ζ ` B : ψ. (C) r : ρ ` C : ψ. Then by [?]E and weakening on M have (B1)
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` : ζ `M B : φ. (C1) r : ρ `M C : φ, then by 〈∪〉E on (A) have · ` 〈case A of
`⇒ M B | r ⇒ M C〉 : φ
Case yieldC: From premisses, D1 is · ` 〈yield 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉〉
: 〈αd〉φ and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : [α]φ. (A) · ` A
: ζ ∨ ρ. (B) ` : ζ ` B : [β]φ. (C) r : ρ ` C : [β]φ. Then by 〈[d]〉I have (B1) ` : ζ
` 〈yield B〉 : 〈αd〉φ. (C1) r : ρ ` 〈yield C〉 : 〈αd〉φ, then by 〈∪〉E on (A) have ·
` 〈case A of `⇒ 〈yield B〉 | r ⇒ 〈yield C〉〉 : 〈αd〉φ
Case yieldC: From premisses, D1 is · ` [yield 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉]
: [αd]φ and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : 〈α〉φ. (A) · ` A
: ζ ∨ ρ. (B) ` : ζ ` B : 〈β〉φ. (C) r : ρ ` C : 〈β〉φ. Then by 〈[d]〉I have (B1) ` : ζ
` [yield B] : [αd]φ. (C1) r : ρ ` [yield C] : [αd]φ, then by 〈∪〉E on (A) have ·
` 〈case A of `⇒ [yield B] | r ⇒ [yield C]〉 : [αd]φ
Case appC: From premisses, D1 is · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 f : φfx
and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : [x := ∗]φ. (A) · ` A : ζ ∨ρ.
(B) ` : ζ ` B : [x := ∗]φ. (C) r : ρ ` C : [x := ∗]φ. Then by [:∗]E have (B1) ` : ζ
` B f : φfx. (C1) r : ρ ` B f : φfx, then by 〈∪〉E on (A) have · ` 〈case A of
`⇒ B f | r ⇒ C f〉 : φfx
Case ◦C: From premisses, D1 is · ` 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉◦pN : 〈α〉ψ
and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : 〈α〉φ. (A) · ` A : ζ ∨ ρ.
(B) ` : ζ ` B : 〈α〉φ. (C) r : ρ ` C : 〈α〉φ. Then by M and by weakening N with
ζ zx and ρ
z
x , then (B1) ` : ζ ` B◦pN : 〈α〉ψ. (C1) r : ρ ` C◦pN : 〈α〉ψ, then by〈∪〉E on (A) have · ` 〈case A of `⇒ B◦pN | r ⇒ C◦pN〉 : 〈α〉ψ.
Case FPC: From premisses,D1 is · ` FP(〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉, s. D, g. E)
: ψ and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : 〈α∗〉φ. (A) · ` A : ζ∨ρ.
(B) ` : ζ ` B : 〈α∗〉φ. (C) r : ρ ` C : 〈α∗〉φ. Then by FP and since D and E
are applied with the same context as before, then (B1) ` : ζ ` FP(B, s. D, g. E)
: ψ. (C1) r : ρ ` FP(C, s. D, g. E) : ψ, then by 〈∪〉E on (A) have · ` 〈case A of
`⇒ FP(B, s. D, g. E) | r ⇒ FP(C, s. D, g. E)〉 : ψ.
Case caseC: From premisses, D1 is · ` 〈case 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 of
` ⇒ D | r ⇒ E〉 : ρ and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉
: φ ∨ ψ. (A) · ` A : ζ ∨ ρ. (B) ` : ζ ` B : φ ∨ ψ. (C) r : ρ ` C : φ ∨ ψ. Then by
〈∪〉E and since D and E are applied with the same context as before (that is,
we allow ` and r to shadow here as the outer binding is never used), then (B1)
` : ζ ` 〈case B of `⇒ D | r ⇒ E〉 : ρ. (C1) r : ρ ` 〈case C of `⇒ D | r ⇒ E〉
: ρ, then by 〈∪〉E on (A) have · ` 〈case A of `⇒ 〈case B of `⇒ D | r ⇒ E〉
| r ⇒ 〈case C of `⇒ D | r ⇒ E〉〉 : ρ.
Case : ∗C: From premisses,D1 is · ` unpack(〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉, py. N)
: ψ and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : 〈x := ∗〉φ. (A)
· ` A : ζ ∨ ρ. (B) ` : ζ ` B : 〈x := ∗〉φ. (C) r : ρ ` C : 〈x := ∗〉φ. Then by
〈:∗〉E and by weakening N with ζ yx and ρ yx (B1) ` : ζ ` unpack(B, py. N) : ψ.
(C1) r : ρ ` unpack(C, py. N) : ψ, then by 〈∪〉E on (A) have · ` 〈case A of
`⇒ unpack(B, py. N) | r ⇒ unpack(C, py. N)〉 : ψ.
Case forC: From premisses,D1 is · ` for(p : ϕ(M) = 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉; q.N ;O){α}
: 〈α∗〉(M = 0∧ϕ) and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : ϕ. (A)
· ` A : ζ ∨ρ. (B) ·, ` : ζ ` B : ϕ. (C) r : ρ ` C : ϕ. Then by 〈∗〉I and because N is
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applied only in its original context, (B1) ` : ζ ` for(p : ϕ(M) = B; q.N ;O){α}
: 〈α∗〉φ. (C1) r : ρ ` for(p : ϕ(M) = C; q.N ;O){α} : 〈α∗〉φ, then by 〈∪〉E on (A)
have · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ for(p : ϕ(M) = B; q.N ;O){α} | r ⇒ for(p : ϕ(M) =
C; q.N ;O){α}〉 : 〈α∗〉φ.
Case unrollC: From premisses, D1 is · ` [unroll 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉]
: φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : [α∗]φ. (A) ·
` A : ζ ∨ ρ. (B) ` : ζ ` B : [α∗]φ. (C) r : ρ ` C : [α∗]φ. Then by [∗]E, (B1) ` : ζ
` [unroll B] : φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ. (C1) r : ρ ` [unroll C] : φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ, then by 〈∪〉E on
(A) have · ` 〈case A of `⇒ [unroll B] | r ⇒ [unroll C]〉 : φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ.
Case caseC: From premisses,D1 is · ` 〈case∗ 〈case A of `⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 of s⇒ D | g ⇒
E〉 : ψ and by inversion (1) · ` 〈case A of ` ⇒ B | r ⇒ C〉 : 〈α∗〉φ. (A) · ` A
: ζ ∨ ρ. (B) ·, ` : ζ ` B : 〈α∗〉φ. (C) r : ρ ` C : 〈α∗〉φ. Then by 〈∗〉C, (B1) ` : ζ
` 〈case∗ B of s ⇒ D | g ⇒ E〉 : ψ. (C1) r : ρ ` 〈case∗ C of s ⇒ D | g ⇒ E〉
: ψ, then by 〈∪〉E on (A) have · ` 〈case A of `⇒ 〈case∗ B of s⇒ D | g ⇒ E〉
| r ⇒ 〈case∗ C of s⇒ D | g ⇒ E〉〉 : ψ.
